









The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 











STRANGER THAN FICTION 
THE CASE HISTORIES OF 
SIGMUND FREUD 
F.A.V. Long-Innes 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ENGLISH 
at the University of Cape Town 
February, 2001 










In memory of my father 
Peter Vivian Long-Innes (1913-1996) 














1. Versions of Freud 16 
Psychobiography 
The French Connection 
Literary Freud 
Beyond Psychoanalysis and/or Science 
Extending the Limits of Scientificity 
Conclusion 
2. Psychoanalysis and History in Dora's Case 65 
(Male) Science, Theory, Rationality 
Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria 
The Narrative of Dora's Desire 
Dora in History 
Conclusion 
3. Culture and Psychosis in the Case of Daniel Paul Schreber 111 
The Critical Tradition 
Re-reading "Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical 
Account of a Case of Paranoia" 
Conclusion 
4. Power, Meaning and Persuasion in the Case of the "WolfMan" 155 
The Scene of Persuasion 
Practices of Reading and Interpretation 














The general aim of this study is to arrive at a critical assessment of the 
cultural-historical significance of Freud' s major case histories, through a close 
examination of three of the most famous: the cases of "Dora", "Schreber" and the 
"WolfMan". 
My investigation of the case histories themselves is prefaced, in Chapter One, 
by a selective review of some major strands in the recent critical tradition. These 
include "stylistic" readings of Freud's text, which aim at a psycho-biographical 
investigation of the author himself, along with related readings within what has 
popularly become known as "French Freud". My major concern, however, is 
with those examinations of Freud's writing that contribute to what has been 
defined as "Literary Freud" - the critical initiative, that is, within which Freud's 
genius is acclaimed as "poetic" rather than "scientific". 
The thesis tests the notion that it is the underlying allegiance in all these 
responses to a conception of science as a form of "neutral language" which has 
resulted in their tendency either to elide the place oflanguage in Freud's work, or 
to convert it (if at times unwittingly) into evidence of his implausibility as a 
scientist. In questioning the conception of science as a neutral meta-language, 
and the view of Freud as "unscientific" when measured against that conception, 
my argument does not in any way take an "anti-science" position. What it is 
above all concerned with is not re-stating the alleged priority of the "literary" 
over the "scientific" in Freud, but displacing that very division. How the 
"scientific" and "literary" relate in Freud's text - and in these three exemplary 











The first case history examined in detail, in Chapter Two, is that of "Dora" -
the case, that is, which has most interested Freud's feminist critics. Historians of 
psychoanalysis have described the vilification of Freud by feminists as one of 
two principal themes in the overall critique of psychoanalysis through the 
twentieth century (the other being its status as a source of scientific authority). 
The examination of the Dora case thus necessarily entails a dialogue with this 
important strand of the critical tradition, dealing with the history of Freud's 
relation to feminism since the 1970's, and bringing a new dimension to the 
discussion by invoking the work of Quentin Skinner (doyen of the Cambridge 
History of Ideas school). Drawing on Skinner's work, my reading of the Dora 
case attempts to restore a sense I believe to have been lost, of its unique, 
foundational status in the history not only of psychoanalysis but also of 
"hysteria" itself, as a twentieth (and twenty-first) century pathology. 
In Chapter Three, which investigates Freud's analysis of the memoirs of 
Judge Daniel Paul Schreber, we see Freud as much in the guise of literary critic 
as psychoanalyst. (Freud never met Schreber himself, and his case history is 
based exclusively on his reading of Schreber' s written memoirs.) The second 
principal theme in the critique of psychoanalysis comes into play here - namely, 
its status as a source of scientific authority. Using a brief and unassuming, but to 
my mind deeply insightful essay by Carl PIetsch as a pivot, my reading of the 
Schreber case (and the critical tradition which supports it) is an attempt to move 
the debate beyond the question of the scientific accuracy or otherwise of Freud's 
conclusions in the case. Instead, the discussion tries to take cognizance of the 
case's significance as a contribution to a mode of knowledge which may well 
have no use at all for traditional conceptions of scientificity, and which needs to 
be recognized on its own terms. Providing a sense of what these terms might be, 
then, will be one of the objectives of this chapter. 
Chapter Four examines the case of the "WolfMan". This is the last of the 
great published case histories and, from a narrative point of view at least, the 
most complex by far. Since the 1970's, this case history has become what a 











with negative results. There is a burgeoning tradition, in other words, which uses 
the case to attack both the institution of psychoanalysis and the integrity of Freud 
as its founder. The case thus affords an opportunity to confront another 
significant strand in the Freudian critical tradition - that typified in the recent 
remarks of critics such as Frank Cioffi and Frederick Crews, whose critical 
commentary has increasingly taken the form of an ad hominem attack on Freud 
himself, whom they are intent on establishing as an irredeemable charlatan and a 
liar. Taking an influential essay by literary critic Stanley Fish as representative, 
my return to the WolfMan case constitutes a response to this new generation of 
"Freud bashers". 
Freud's critics have often suggested that his work would have been more 
successful had it embodied their notions of scientific discourse. But there is 
evidence to suggest that the enabling dynamic ofFreud's thought was the result 
of a constant transgression of the boundaries of these notions as instituted by the 
scientific community during his lifetime. The thesis concludes with the assertion 
that Freud's commitment, finally, was a commitment to scepticism - a scepticism 
which, in refusing the usual boundaries of science, made it possible to transcend 
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After all, it was patients, rather than theorists, 
who inspired many of Freud's major principles ... 
and what Freud failed to get from his analysands 
he usually picked up from literature. 
1 
Maud Ellmann 
What do Freud's case histories mean to us today? The appearance, in the last 
decade, of at least three full length academic studies, each devoted exclusively to 
a single case, is testimony, at the very least, to their enduring significance in 
contemporary intellectual life. 2 Yet where exactly does this significance lie? 
Even Freud's followers would not deny what his critics never tire of telling us -
that most of the case histories were therapeutic failures. As for the critics 
themselves, on this point they are unequivocal: as Seymour Fisher and Roger 
Greenberg remark in their 1977 study, "It is curious and striking that Freud chose 
to demonstrate the utility of psychoanalysis through descriptions of largely 
unsuccessful cases" (1977: 285). And as Frank Sulloway observes, in his own 
recent "reassessment" of the case histories, some of them present "such dubious 
evidence in favour of psychoanalytic theory that one may seriously wonder why 
Freud even bothered to publish them" (1991: 251). So why did he publish them? 
And why do intelligent men and women the world over continue not only to read 
them, but to devote considerable portions of their intellectual lives to them? 










namely Frederick Crews, are the case histories still so "inherently fascinating"? 
(1998: xi) 
The general aim of this study will be to arrive at an answer to these questions 
- to arrive, that is, at a critical assessment of the cultural-historical significance 
of Freud's major case histories. How many case histories did Freud actually 
write, and when were they published? After the Studies on Hysteria, written in 
collaboration with Josef Breuer and published between 1893 and 1895 (SE TI), 
Freud wrote only six detailed case histories. Two ofthese dealt with women, and 
were essentially incomplete. The first (published in 1905) concerned an eighteen-
year-old girl called Ida Bauer, later named "Dora" in Freud's case history. 3 
Treatment lasted only three months, after which the patient left of her own 
accord. Though Freud described the case history as a "fragment of an analysis" 
in the title, it was soon to become a classic in the psychoanalytic literature, and 
has since also been widely read outside psychoanalytic circles, generating a huge 
critical response, particularly from feminists. Freud's much later case of a female 
homosexual (published in 1920) also tenninated after a short time. 4 Unlike the 
Dora case, however, it has not been particularly widely read and is seldom 
discussed at any length in the critical literature. 
After Dora, the next case to be published dealt with the five-year-old "Little 
Hans", who was not actually treated by Freud. He saw the boy only once, and the 
analysis was in fact carried out by Little Hans's father, himself a devout 
Freudian. The case was, however, both supervised, and later written up by Freud, 
to be published for the first time in 1909. 5 Then came the case of the "Rat Man", 
also published in 1909 after its initial presentation at the Salzburg Congress in 
1908. In a letter of 19th April 1908, Freud had complained to Carl Jung that he 
had no case that was "complete" and could be "viewed as a whole" to present at 
the Congress, which was to be held the following week. 6 He had considered 
presenting details of the case of Little Hans, whose treatment he was supervising 
at the time, but ended by discussing the Rat Man instead, emphasizing what he 











became Freud's first public communication of a psychoanalytic cure (Sulloway, 
1991: 255). 7 
The next case history to appear in print was that of Daniel Paul Schreber, a 
psychotic German magistrate whom Freud never met, but "analysed" from 
Schreber's own published memoirs. 8 Schreber's memoirs appeared in 1903, and 
included a detailed narrative of the series of mental breakdowns he had suffered 
towards the end of the previous century. Freud's case history was finally 
published in 191 L The last major case history (published in 1918) involved a 
young Russian (the "WolfMan") whose analysis, as it turned out, was to be 
continued intermittently, with a number of different analysts, for some fifty years 
after his initial treatment with Freud. 9 Freud himself treated the WolfMan for 
four years (from 1910 to 1914), while also conducting a brief second analysis 
five years later, to remove a remnant of "transference" that had remained 
unresolved during the first treatment. In subsequent years the WolfMan was re-
analyzed twice by Ruth Mack Brunswick, and by several others after World War 
II, in a process which continued until his death in 1978. 10 
Ideally, this study would have dealt with all six case histories, and included an 
examination of the early Studies on Hysteria. This was the initial plan, 
abandoned eventually, for practical reasons. Since my intention was to examine 
the case histories in close dialogue with the different critical traditions generated 
by each, and since the literature associated with each of these traditions turned 
out to be so vast, it seemed more sensible to limit the discussion to a maximum 
of three cases, where hopefully the issues raised would be applicable across the 
full canon of six. Having made the decision to restrict the project in this way, I 
had no difficulty with my selection of the cases, for the following reasons. 
To have left out the Dora case would have been unthinkable. This is Freud's 
first great case history, and his longest of a woman patient, recently described by 
Helene Cixous as an 'urtext in the history of woman' (cited in Appignanesi, 











Freud's feminist critics, and as such, its examination necessarily entails a 
dialogue with this enonnously important strand ofthe critical tradition. The 
vilification of Freud by feminists, John Forrester suggests, has provided a stable 
cultural framework over the last thirty years for much discussion of 
psychoanalysis, and is one of two principal themes in the overall critique of 
psychoanalysis through the twentieth century (the other being its status as a 
source of scientific authority and therapeutic promise) (1997: 3). As such, any 
project taking a position on the value and significance of Freud's work must 
necessarily deal with the history of his relation to feminism since the 1970's at 
least. This I do in my reading of the Dora case, hopefully bringing a new 
dimension to the discussion by invoking the work of Quentin Skinner (doyen of 
the Cambridge History ofIdeas school), and bringing it to bear on the canon of 
feminist voices in Columbia University Press's In Dora's Case: Freud, Hysteria, 
Feminism (1985). Drawing on Skinner's work (along with the Foucauldian 
perspective described in Chapter One), I have attempted, in my reading of the 
Dora case, to restore a sense I believe to have been lost, of its unique, 
foundational status in the history not only of psychoanalysis but also of 
"hysteria" itself, as a twentieth (and twenty-first) century pathology. 
It would have been equally unthinkable, in a project of this nature, to have left 
out the case of the WolfMan. This is the last of the great published case histories 
and, from a narrative point of view at least, the most complex by far. Whereas for 
writers such as Peter Brooks, the early case of Dora reads like a "flawed 
Victorian novel", the case of the WolfMan represents one of Freud's "most 
heroic gestures as a writer", and places him on the same level with such masters 
of the modem novel as Joyce, Kafka, Proust and Mann amongst others. In 
Brooks' words, the case history is an intricately "layered text" - a "palimpsest" 
so innovative in its narrative pattern that it ends by "displacing the whole 
question of origins, to suggest another kind of referentiality" (1985: 277). With 
the textuality of Freud's writing as one of my major concerns (as I will later 











Also, probably because the WolfMan himself died relatively recently, and 
was thus able to comment at length for himself on the long-term consequences of 
his psychoanalysis, this, along with the Dora case, is one of the most 
controversial of the histories, eliciting much vitriolic comment from 
psychoanalysis' detractors, who have scoured the WolfMan's commentary in 
search of any contradictions between his view and Freud's. 11 It thus affords an 
opportunity to confront another significant strand in the Freudian critical 
tradition - that typified in the recent remarks of critics such as Frank Cioffi and 
Frederick Crews, whose critical commentary has increasingly taken the form of 
an ad hominem attack on Freud himself, whom they are intent on establishing as 
an irredeemable charlatan and a liar. 12 As I will later point out, since the 1970's, 
the WolfMan case history has become what Forrester calls "a test case for the 
truth of psychoanalysis" (1997: 209), often with negative results. There is a 
burgeoning tradition, in other words, which uses the case to attack both the 
institution of psychoanalysis and the integrity of Freud as its founder. Taking an 
influential essay by Stanley Fish ("Withholding the Missing Portion: Power, 
Meaning and Persuasion in Freud's 'The wolf-man"', 1986) as representative, 
my return to the Wolf Man case will constitute a response to this new generation 
of "Freud bashers". 
Finally, in deliberating for my third choice between the cases of Schreber, 
Little Hans and the Rat Man, all of which fall between the early treatment of 
Dora and the climactic analysis of the WolfMan, I settled in the end on 
Schreber, not least because here we see Freud as much in the guise of literary 
critic as of psychoanalyst. Freud never met Schreber himself, and his case history 
is based exclusively on his reading of Schreber' s written memoirs. Most of the 
critical voices whose work has a bearing on my project write at the interface 
between psychoanalysis and literary studies, and many of them are in fact literary 
critics rather than analysts, so it seemed important to include a representation of 
Freud himself writing at this intersection. 
As for the critical tradition in relation to Schreber, so vast is the literature in 











the field of"Schreber Studies", almost as if it constituted a new academic 
discipline. Schreber's text is of course at the centre of this, but so displaced by 
Freud's case study as to have been recently described as the "most-quoted unread 
book of the twentieth century" (Geller, 1994: 180). This in itself seemed a 
curious enough phenomenon to be worth investigation. Interestingly enough, 
however, on first perusing this voluminous critical response, its focus (bar a few 
notable exceptions 13), turned out to be surprisingly narrow, and indeed rather 
tedious, resting squarely (and unrelentingly) on whether Freud was "right" or 
"wrong" in the case of Schreber, on the confirmation or otherwise of his 
theoretical conclusions in the case - on the case's "truth" value, in other words, 
as a "scientific" document. 
The second ofF orrester' s two principal themes in the critique of 
psychoanalysis thus comes into play here - namely, its status as a source of 
scientific authority. Using a brief and unassuming, but to my mind deeply 
insightful essay by Carl PIetsch as a pivot, my own reading of the Schreber case 
(and the critical tradition which supports it) is an attempt to move the debate 
beyond the question of the scientific accuracy or otherwise of Freud's 
conclusions in the case. 14 Instead, the discussion tries to take cognizance of the 
case's significance as a contribution to a mode of knowledge which may well 
have no use at all for traditional conceptions of scientificity, and which needs to 
be recognized on its own terms. Providing a sense of what these terms might be, 
then, will be one of the objectives of this chapter. 
Psychoanalysis: Science or Literature? 
The ongoing controversy over the status of psychoanalysis as a source of 
scientific authority will thus be central to my response, not only to the Schreber 
case history, but to those of Dora and the WolfMan as well. This controversy is 
as old as psychoanalysis itself It is, as Forrester recently suggested, the "constant 
companion of psychoanalysis, as much a part of its history as its infiltration and 
co-option by the movie industry" (1997: 3). It has been the subject of debate for a 











The Foundations ofPsychoClnalysis (1984), in which he puts to the test Freud's 
view that psychoanalysis is a natural science like any other. Leaving to one side 
questions of what exactly Freud himself meant by "natural science," this was a 
position he defended hotly throughout his career. Thus in one of his later papers, 
while "looking back over the patchwork of [his] life's labours," Freud makes his 
position plain: "While [psychoanalysis] was originally the name of a particular 
therapeutic method," he writes, "it has now become the name of a science - the 
science of unconscious mental processes" (SE XX: 70). 
This position has not fared well over the years. In one of the more extreme 
recent responses, Fran~ois Roustang argues that the "science" of psychoanalysis 
is a myth from its very beginnings, employed to disguise and play down the less 
reputable aspects of certain psychoanalytic practices - those connected with 
hypnosis, suggestion, thought-transference, telepathy and the like. In invoking 
this myth, he argues - a myth that "domesticates what cannot be integrated into a 
scientific, technological, rational world" - psychoanalysis simply extends the 
limits of science to cover the irrational, a domain from which science had 
hitherto been excluded. In renouncing this myth, analysis falls back into 
"occultism and magic ... into the unsayable and the ineffable," condemned never 
to rise above the level of "faith-healing and witch-craft" (1983: 120). 
Even psychoanalysts themselves have been hard put to defend Freud's point 
of view. Jacques Lacan, for one, was categorically opposed to the idea of 
psychoanalysis as a science. Indeed, as perhaps the most resolute critic of 
Freud's neo-positivist claims for the scientificity of psychoanalysis, Lacan's 
position on this question was unequivocal. In Andrew Ross's words, "Lacanian 
theory set out to put to the sword any distinctions between the scientific and non-
scientific~ distinctions which can themselves be seen to draw upon the rationalist 
categories of truth and error and are thus part and parcel of the ideology of 
science itself' (1990: 120-121). 
Today, according to the historians, most psychoanalysts are not particularly 











issue, they have a number of responses, the most common of which, John 
Forrester suggests, is to "beat a humble retreat, not wishing to become embroiled 
in semantic debates, whose heat does not derive from a passionate interest in 
discovering new and difficult things." He cites Robert Stoller's view, writing in 
1985: 
Residing in a university and surrounded by colleagues who are scientists, 
I know not to inflate my work with allegations that it constitutes 
experiment (for example, "every psychoanalysis is an experiment") or 
science ("our science"). Research is not a synonym for search and should 
not appear in a psychoanalyst's sentence if it is there for propaganda. At 
our best, we analysts are naturalistic observers of behavior with 
techniques unstable but powerful that no one else has. That's a good 
start. I shall settle for words such as work and studies (cited in Forrester, 
1997: 238). 
Forrester himself is deeply interesting on the long history of psychoanalysis' 
relation to this debate, in a way that moves definitively beyond the tradition 
established by logical positivism, within which much of the discussion to date 
has been conducted (namely, that there is one model of how scientific 
explanations work, and that there is one ahistorical thing called science). But I 
will come back to Forrester later. Before doing so, however, I want to re-open 
the question of psychoanalysis' scientific status for a moment, by dwelling 
briefly on a landmark essay by Roland Barthes, with the symptomatic title, 
"Science vs. Literature" (1967). 
What constitutes science and what constitutes literature, and the terms on 
which they are separated out within the division of intellectual labour, remains an 
ongoing and controversial question. One way into this is through Barthes' essay, 
in which he suggests that if their common constitution in language is one of the 
features which unites science and literature, it is also the one which divides them 











science and literature do not assume, or if one prefers, profess the language 
which constitutes them in the same way. As far as science is concerned, 
language is simply an instrument, which it profits it to make as 
transparent as possible; it is subordinate to the matter of science 
(workings, hypotheses, results) which, so it is said, exists outside 
language and precedes it. On the one hand and first there is the content of 
the scientific message, which is everything. On the other and next, the 
verbal form responsible for expressing that content, which is nothing. 
In the case of literature, however - or at any rate, that literature which has 
"freed itself' from classicism and humanism, 
language can no longer be the convenient instrument or the superfluous 
backcloth of a social, emotional or poetic "reality" which pre-exists it, 
and which it is language's subsidiary responsibility to express, by means 
of submitting itself to a number of stylistic rules. Language is literature's 
Being, its very world; the whole of literature is contained in the act of 
writing, and no longer those of "thinking", "portraying", "telling" or 
"feeling" (Barthes, 1967: 897). 
By professing the language which constitutes them in these two conflicting 
ways, science and literature stand essentially in opposition to one another. Of the 
two, it is science which assumes a privileged position in relation to literature. In 
assigning itself a purely instrumental status, in which language is simply the 
transparent medium through which the "truth" of its content is conveyed, 
scientific discourse believes itself to be a superior code, a mere "instrument of 
thought", a form of "neutral" language from which a certain number of 
specialised languages (the literary or poetic languages for example) have derived, 
as so many "deviants" or "embellishments." This neutral language is then held to 
be the referential code for all the "ex-centric" languages, which themselves are 
merely its sub-codes. By identifying itselfwith this referential code, as the basis 











essentially in a misconception of the nature oflanguage, which it is the role of 
literature - or "writing" - precisely to contest. 
My reading of the case histories will be centrally concerned with what I see as 
their refusal (consistent within Freud's writing as a whole) to uphold the 
boundaries described above between the discourses of science and literature. 
Symptomatic of this refusal is the fact that though Freud saw himself as 
essentially a scientist - founder and father of the new science of psychoanalysis -
and though, in his writings, he regularly and conscientiously defended the 
scientific status of his discoveries, the only public recognition he received from 
Germany in his lifetime was the Goethe prize for literature. Some years after this 
award, Einstein is reported to have told Freud that he particularly admired his 
work not from a scientific but from a literary point of view: "I do not know any 
contemporary who has presented his subject in the German language in such a 
masterly fashion," Einstein wrote in a letter to Freud in 1939. Later, in Stuttgart 
in 1968, a book-length study, focused exclusively on Freud's achievement not as 
a scientist but as a literary artist, appeared, 15 and for several decades since then, 
Freud's name has become commonplace in literary studies throughout the West. 
Yet Freud's transcendence of the traditional boundaries between the 
discourses of science and literature has seldom been positively acclaimed by his 
critics, who have tended either to elide the distinctive place oflanguage in his 
work, or to use it against him as evidence of his implausibility as a scientist. In 
his earlier mentioned review of the case histories, for example, Sulloway goes to 
some lengths to demonstrate how Freud's rhetorical style (his "literary 
technology" in Sulloway's terms) was simply a form of "cover up" for the 
failures of his "material technology" - his attempt, that is, to make 
psychoanalysis into apractical form of knowledge. To quote Sulloway: "After 
1897 Freud's literary technology or rhetorical style - became an increasingly 
important legitimating device for explaining why his material technology had 
been demoted from its usually prominent place in science. In the literary sphere 
Freud was, of course, a master. It was for his literary abilities, not his scientific 











this example just how easily Freud's "literary genius" can be (and has been) 
turned against him. We see how easily it becomes a weapon in the assault on his 
integrity as a scientist. 
During the course of this study, I will discuss the "textual ambiguity" which 
marks Freud's writing as a whole (and is, I want to suggest, particularly apparent 
in the case histories), in its relation to sceptical receptions of Freud's work by the 
scientific establishment and others, and to the diverse response to Freud's writing 
in recent exchanges between psychoanalytic theory, literary theory and the 
practices of textual analysis. Precisely because of this textual ambiguity, I will 
suggest, a number of critics and commentators have sought to re-construe 
psychoanalysis as the proper object not of a scientific but of an essentially 
literary study, based in the stylistic sophistication, or the "genius" of Freud's 
writing. Though I myself write from the perspective not of science but of literary 
criticism, my own reading of the three case histories concerned will be opposed 
to this re-construal. Instead, I will argue that the singular contribution Freud's 
work has made to the history of what should now simply be called "writing" has 
less to do with his literary genius than with a conceptual advance based in a 
capacity to transcend the traditional demand that texts belong either to aesthetic 
forms on the one hand, or scientific ones on the other. It is precisely the capacity 
to transcend rather than awkwardly straddle this division, I will suggest, which 
accounts for Freud's unique contribution, his practical critique of that very 
borderline. 
My investigation of the case histories will thus be prefaced (in Chapter One) 
by a selective review of some major strands of the critical tradition, including 
"stylistic" readings which aim at a psycho-biographical investigation of the 
author himself, along with related readings within what has popularly become 
known as "French Freud", the latter being a useful starting-point for addressing 
the whole question of subjectivity and language. I will, however, be most 
concerned with those examinations of Freud's writing contributing to what has 











Freud's genius is acclaimed as "poetic" rather than "scientific," and his major 
texts - the case histories in particular - compared to great works offiction. 
I will test the notion that it is the underlying allegiance of all these responses 
to a conception of science as a form of "neutral language" which has resulted in 
their tendency (as I suggested earlier) either to elide the place oflanguage in 
Freud's work, or to convert it (if at times unwittingly) into evidence of his 
implausibility as a scientist. In questioning the conception of science as a neutral 
meta-language, and the view of Freud as "unscientific" when measured against 
that conception, I will not in any way be taking an "anti-science" position. What I 
am above all concerned with is not re-stating the alleged priority of the "literary" 
over the "scientific" in Freud, but displacing that very division. How the 













1. The quotation is from the Introduction to Psychoanalytic Literary 
Criticism (EUmann, 1994: 11). To illustrate the point, EHmann suggests 
that it was the patient known as Little Hans who invented the castration 
complex, and the hysteric Anna O. who identified the 'talking cure'. 
What literature confirms for Freud, EHmann goes on to say, is not so 
much his "doctrines" as his "insights into the unconscious, which 
persistently eludes his efforts to reduce it to an orthodoxy" (11). 
2. See Davis, 1995, Lakoffand Coyne, 1993, and Santner, 1996. 
3. Sigmund Freud. "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria" 
(1905), in Standard Edition, Vol 7, pp. 3-122. 
4. Sigmund Freud. "The Psychogenesis ofa Case of Homosexuality in a 
Woman" (1920), in Standard Edition, Vol. 18, pp. 146-172. 
5. Sigmund Freud. "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy" 
(1909), in Standard Edition, Vol. 10, pp. 3-147. 
6. See Sigmund Freud and Carl Gustav lung. The Freud Jung Letters: The 
correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung. ed. William 
McGuire, trans. Ralph Manheim and R.F.C. Hull (Bollingen Series, 94) 
(princeton University Press, 1974), p. 141. 
7. Sigmund Freud. "Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis" (1909), 
in Standard Edition, Vol. 10, pp. 153-318. 
8. Sigmund Freud. "Psycho-analytic Notes on an Autobiographical 
Account ofa Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)" (1911), in 
Standard Edition, Vol. 12, pp. 3-79; and Daniel Paul Schreber, 
Denkwiirdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken (Leipzig: Oswald Mutze, 
1903), trans. as Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, trans. and ed. Ida 
Macalpine and Richard A. Hunter (London: W. Dawson, 1955; 
Cambridge, Mass. London: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
9. Sigmund Freud. "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" (1918), in 
Standard Edition, Vol. 17, pp. 3-122. 
10. See Ruth Mack Brunswick, "A Supplement to Freud's 'History of an 
Infantile Neurosis," Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 1928. 9: 439-476; and Frank 
Sulloway, "Reassessing Freud's Case Histories",ISIS, 1991. 82: 258. 
11. The major source for the Wolf Man's own story of his experiences with 
psychoanalysis is Karen Obholzer's The WolfMan Sixty Years Later: 
Conversations with Freud's Controversial Patient, trans. Michael Shaw 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982). These conversations have 











contradictions which might support the possibility that Freud had 
misrepresented the facts of the case in writing it up. Thus Frank 
Sulloway writes that, at last, owing to the "indefatigable efforts" of the 
Austrian journalist, Karin Obholzer, who located the WolfMan in 
Vienna in the early 1970's, we now have access to the WolfMan's own 
impressions of his analysis with Freud. According to Sulloway, from 
Obholzer's conversations we learn that "the WolfMan himself 
considered Freud's interpretation of his famous dream to be 'terribly 
farfetched' and that he also felt betrayed by Freud, who had promised 
him that he would one day actually remember the traumatic event that 
had made him ill. 'The whole thing is improbable,' the WolfMan 
pointed out, 'because in Russia, children sleep in their nanny's 
bedroom, not in their parents.' The Wolf Man has also reported that 
the 'wolves' in his famous dream were not wolves at all, but rather a 
special breed of wolf-like dogs - a curious and unexplained 
discrepancy" (Sulloway, 1991: 259). These are only a few of the 
examples Sulloway draws from Obholzer to support his contention that 
Freud was fundamentally dishonest in his reporting of this, and all his 
case histories. 
Peter Brooks, on the other hand, finds Obholzer's judgements to be 
"unreliable" since, as he points out, "she apparently wants to discredit 
psychoanalysis, or at least score points against Freud's claims that his 
patient was 'cured'." While it is evident, Brooks writes, that the Wolf 
Man remained a "compulsive personality who was never entirely free 
from obsessions and delusions, whose erotic life remained marked by 
his 'sister complex' ... and who never completely resolved the 
transference relation to Freud, it also seems clear that he managed to 
negotiate a reasonably normal existence" (1994: 352 n. 2). John 
Forrester is equally sceptical with regard to the purity ofObholzer's 
motivations (See, for example the discussion in Forrester 1997, pp. 
208-217). 
12. Providing a good sense of the tone of this particular strand of criticism 
is the recent unashamedly partisan collection of essays put together by 
Crews in Unauthorized Freud (1998). Eighteen different authors are 
represented, with the intention, writes Crews, of using them to restore 
the "mythified 'discoverer of the unconscious' to human size," in a 
book which claims to show psychoanalysis as "a mistake which grew 
into an imposture" (ix). The essays themselves are edited and abridged 
by Crews to suit his emphasis re-tailored, in other words, to "take the 
full measure of Freud's well-documented conceptual errors, relentless 
apriorism, disregard for counterexamples, bullying investigative 
manner, shortcuts of reasoning, rhetorical dodges, and all-round 
chronic untruthfulness ... " (ix-x) Contributing to the biased tone of the 
collection as a whole is the set of new, deliberately "irreverent" titles 
Crews dreams up for the essays he includes (Frank Sulloway's 1991 
"Reassessing Freud's Case Histories: The Social Construction of 
Psychoanalysis", for example, is re-named "Exemplary Botches", while 
Rosemarie Sand's "On a Contribution to a Future Scientific Study of 











Fallacious"). The collection also includes Frank Cioffi's 
"Psychoanalysis and the Idea of a Pseudo-Science (Cioffi, 1970, here 
re-titled "Claims Without Commitments"), and his later influential 
article "Was Freud a Liar?" (Cioffi, 1974), predictably one of only two 
essays in the collection allowed to retain their original titles. Cioffi's 
first essay suggests that psychoanalytic interpretation is made up of 
arbitrary acts of conjecture that fashion a kind of coherence instead of 
discovering it within the person or text being studied. These ideas have 
recently been developed into a full-length study entitled Freud and the 
Question of Pseudoscience (Cioffi, 1998). As for the second article, 
originally a talk broadcast on BBC Radio 3 in 1973, and then printed in 
The Listener (February, 1974), this piece triggered an intense debate 
which continues to this day. Cioffi's talk deals with the transition 
between Freud's "seduction theory" of 1896-97 (his claim that people 
who became hysterical in adulthood must have been sexually molested 
as children) and his founding of psychoanalysis proper, with its central 
focus on "repressed fantasy". 
13. These will be discussed in the first part of Chapter Three. 
14. See Pietsch, 1982. 
15. This was Walter Schonau's doctoral thesis, SigmundFreuds Prosa: 
Literarische Elemente seines Stils (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlag, 












VERSIONS OF FREUD 
Much of the commentary on Freud's literary style and technique has come 
from specialists working at the interface between psychoanalysis and literary 
studies, and especially from psychoanalytic literary critics. The field of 
psychoanalytic literary criticism is by now enormous, and the work carried out 
within it quite bewildering in its diversity. 
1 
I will say only a few words about it 
before going on to investigate how the literary-critical approach Freud initiated 
has since been turned on its creator, and put to work in the interpretation of the 
founding texts of psychoanalysis itself. 
Looking back on the ongoing dialogue between psychoanalysis and literary 
studies, most critics would probably agree on the emergence from within it of at 
least two schools of thought: the American and the French. In a review of a 
number of important collections of essays dealing with the relations between 
psychoanalysis and literature during the 1970s, John Forrester distinguishes the 
two schools as follows: 
From the former [evoked most easily by the name Harold Bloom] we 
have a theory of the practice of writing that inserts the Freudian 
mechanisms of defence and distortion at the heart of the "poetic process". 
From the latter [associated most immediately with the name Jacques 
Lacan] we have a wholesale revision of, and return to, the fundamentals 
of Freudian theory - a revision whose effects on the theory of literature, 











conception of the relation between speech and language, between sign 
and referent and between signifier and signified (1981: 170). 
In its classic form, psychoanalytic literary criticism is what Maud EHmann 
has described as "person-centred" (1994: 3). It displaces the object of analysis 
from the text to some person, be it the author, the reader, or the characters, all of 
whom are viewed as independent personalities rather than as functions of the text 
itself Within this tradition, as EHmann points out, arguably the most famous 
psychoanalytic study of a literary character is Ernest Jones' Hamlet and Oedipus 
(1949), in which Jones takes up Freud's suggestion in The Interpretation of 
Dreams (1900) that Hamlet is unable to avenge his father's death because he 
secretly identifies himself with the murderer. Jones shifts the emphasis, however, 
interpreting Hamlet's hesitation as a symptom of his wish to kill his mother, 
which gets in the way of his attempts to kill his uncle. "When a man who has 
been betrayed is emotionally moved to murder, whom should he kill, the rival 
lover or the lady? It is a nice question," writes Jones (1976[1949]: 92). This 
question informs his reading of the playas a matricidal tragedy, closer to 
Oresteia than to Oedipus. But as EHmann goes on to suggest, the problem with 
this, and all similar readings of literary character is their essentially (and 
unavoidably) speculative nature: 
Jones's reading, though inspired, makes the fundamental error of treating 
Hamlet as a real person, vexed by unconscious impulses unfathomable 
even to the text itself Jones defends this error by protesting that the 
anguished prince has more vitality than the moribund majority of living 
people. True - but Hamlet has the disadvantage that he cannot contradict 
his psychoanalyst. Unlike a real analysand, he cannot lie down on the 
couch and free associate about his dreams or recapitulate the traumas of 
his infancy. Amusing as it is to speculate about his early history, Hamlet 
never had a childhood. Jones ignores the difference between a human 
being made of flesh and a character composed of words, and thereby 
overlooks the verbal specificities of Shakespeare's text to focus on its 











When the object of classic psychoanalytic criticism is not the literary 
character (as in Jones's reading of Shakespeare's play), it is more often than not 
the author. Freud himself was fascinated by the idea of an artistic consciousness. 
Though he once admitted that the mysteries of artistic creation lay beyond his 
explanatory powers ("Before the problem of the creative artist analysis must, 
alas, lay down its arms" ("Dostoevsky and Parricide", SE XXI: 177», this did 
not prevent him from speculating on the workings of a wide range of celebrated 
artistic minds. Along with his insights on Sophocles and Shakespeare, Freud 
wrote psychobiographical accounts of Dostoevsky and Leonardo da Vinci, and a 
study of Michaelangelo's Moses. He also wrote a sustained analysis of Jensen's 
Gradiva (1907: SE IX: 1-97), and an influential essay on Hoffmann's short story, 
'The Sandman", which has inspired several new readings of the story in recent 
2 
years. 
In the past few decades, psychoanalytic literary criticism has turned its gaze 
on the writings of its progenitor, Freud himself, setting out to "analyse" Freud, 
both as reader and interpreter, and as writer. Where Freud as reader and 
interpreter is concerned, for some he is the "great synthesizer", his strength lying 
primarily in his ability to make sense out of nonsense, to comprehend the 
significance of that which appears to be purely random or marginal, and to link 
together seemingly unrelated events. For others, such as Lis Moller (The 
Freudian Reading, 1991), Freud's power as a reader shows itself not so much in 
his capacity for persuasive synthesis as in his will to press his inquiry to the point 
where he encounters the unreadable - that which he cannot explain; that which 
does not fit in with his explanatory system; or that which he can only explain at 
the risk of overthrowing previous conclusions: 
Such moments of crisis, which one encounters everywhere in Freud's 
writings, are highly significant points of rupture: problems he believed he 
had solved suddenly presented themselves in a new and disturbing light, 
causing him to swerve from his original train of thought, or even to call in 
question the theoretical foundation of his interpretation. Coherence, 











however rarely what we get - and this may be the reason why we keep 
coming back to Freud's text, not just to consult it but also, and most 
importantly, to read it" (Moller, 1991: ix-x). 3 
As for Freud the writer, here too the diversity of interpretations is noteworthy, 
and it is to a selection ?fthese that I would now like to turn, as exemplary 
instances of some of the major trends in this recent critical initiative. Starting 
with a stylistic study which takes its inspiration from the psychobiographical 
tradition alluded to above (Patrick Mahony's Freud as a Writer), I will begin my 
investigation by attempting to draw a distinction between this and those readings 
of Freud's texts associated with what has popularly come to be known as 
"French Freud" (in particular Derrida's reading of the second chapter of Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle). While the underlying objective of both these readings 
might be said to be the constitution of Freud' s scientific project as itself an 
example of figurative writing, the outcome of each is crucially different. 
From here I will move to a discussion of the critical tradition for whom 
Freud's genius was "poetic" rather than scientific; his ideas more valuable as 
"metaphors" than as literal truths. Following this discussion, I will put forward 
an alternative approach, exemplified in Arnold Davidson's reading of Freud's 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, which presents a version of Freud' s 
genius as neither an imaginative nor a rhetorical one so much as a conceptual 
one. The next section develops on my remarks on Davidson's reading by 
examining a number of recent reflections on the epistemology of psychoanalysis, 
which together suggest the essential heterogeneity of the scientific endeavour for 
Freud. This leads into my examination of the case histories themselves in the 













Representative (in some respects at least) of the American school Forrester 
invokes above is Patrick Mahony's Freud as a Writer, first published in 1982, 
and popular enough to have been reissued in an expanded edition by Yale 
University Press five years later. Here, for the first time, Freud's literary 
achievement is used as a starting point for an analysis of his !!identity as a 
writer. II In his capacity both as practicing psychoanalyst and as professor of 
English literature at the University of Montreal, Mahony sets out to delimit this 
"identity" through a proposed "stylistic" exploration of some of his major texts. 
Mahony's project, in other words, stands at the intersection described above 
. between the two fields of psychoanalysis and literature - the area to which the 
editors of Critical Inquiry devoted their winter 1987 issue. In her introduction to 
this issue, Franyoise Meltzer suggests that traditionally, when psychoanalysis and 
literature are brought together, psychoanalysis is assigned an active interpreting 
position, while literature plays the role of "slave to psychoanalysis' master", the 
object to be interpreted. Traditionally, "it is psychoanalysis which 'knows' and 
will tell literature what it is 'really' about. From psychoanalysis literature is 
supposed to learn what it itself 'means'" (1987: 219). In the usual exchange, 
suggests Meltzer, literature exists for the purpose of manifesting, almost in spite 
of itself, a psychoanalytic truth: 
Since fiction is made possible by the constitution of the subject, and since 
it is the role of psychoanalysis to demonstrate how that constitution 
occurs, then it follows, psychoanalysis would have it, that fiction 
becomes truth and thus useful only when decoded by psychoanalysis. 
Otherwise, it remains merely fable. Literature is then 'recognized' by 
psychoanalysis only as the producer of Stoff for interpretation and 
consumption - precisely the position of the slave in the Hegelian model. 











literature is mystified, as it often is in Freud or Lacan, it is so because it 
appears to have an arbitrary conception, which psychoanalysis will 
unravel as the ineluctable and incessant unfolding of the unconscious -
nothing accidental, finally, at all. Except that literature does not know 
this. Its coherence, further, will be destroyed by the psychoanalytic 
reading; but it is only a surface coherence - the deeper one, the one of 
which literature itself is ignorant, will be revealed by psychoanalysis 
(1987: 218). 
Furthermore, not only literature is "partitive" in this way in the perspective of 
psychoanalysis, maintains Meltzer. The same would apply to all other 
disciplines: "Linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, history, feminism, 
'humanism' could all be said to remain incomplete and ultimately less than 
meaningful without the overarching vision offered by psychoanalysis" (1987: 
219). It is precisely in their implicit opposition to this notion of psychoanalysis' 
"overarching vision" that the essays in the collection introduced by Meltzer find 
their common ground - by turning psychoanalysis, in other words, from the 
interpreter into that which is to be interpreted; by making of it not the "all-
consuming master subject" of inquiry, but, for once, its object. 
Potentially at least, Mahony's promised "stylistic" project belongs in the same 
group as the above, for here too it is apparently not the established notions of 
psychoanalysis that Mahony proposes to bring to the practice of reading, but the 
texts of psychoanalysis themselves which are to be "put on trial", as it were. But 
in the end, the project barely fulfills its potential: first, because of the author's 
failure to ground his exploration of Freud's style in any linguistic tradition which 
might conceivably lend his version ofllstylistics" a less than purely arbitrary 
status; 4 and second, because of the project's consequent inevitable degeneration, 
as the work proceeds, from the promised investigation of Freud's writing itself 
into a series of crude and speculative remarks more concerned with the 











Evidently, Mahony is of the school which subscribes to the notion that 
creativity is some sort of disease which (as Meltzer puts it) "once the author is 
cured, disappears" - the same school which, at a seminar for analysts at a 
psychoanalytic institute in a major American city, came up with a reading of 
Baudelaire's Fleurs du mal which argued that he wrote it because he struggled 
with a "negative maternal introject." When it was suggested to the analyst 
concerned that to see a great work of art purely as a psychoanalytic symptom 
might be to adopt an impoverished view of the creative act, he responded to his 
critic (who happened to be a woman) that she too was in need of the cure: "From 
your reaction to my paper," he is reported to have said, "I am afraid that I must 
inform you that you too seem to have an unresolved conflict with your mother. 
Since you are a woman, this conflict has blocked your normal Oedipal 
development, and thus makes your relation to your father problematic. As I am 
the paternal figure here - male, older - I must conclude that you are resisting my 
interpretation of Baudelaire because you are personally defensive with me and 
5 
what I represent. " 
My own resistance in reading Mahony is to the multitude of such symptoms 
which he manages to uncover, in the course of his study, in Freud's creative 
output: Can there be any scholarly significance, for instance, in the revelation (a 
product of Mahony's scratchings through Freud's personal correspondence) that 
Freud's habit of addressing his lectures to a single member of the audience - very 
often to his great friend Lou Andreas-Salome, as he tells her in one of his letters-
was, in Mahony'S view, a manifestation of his "anxiety" about "exteriorizing his 
ultimately undefinable unconscious," a symptom of Freud's "personal insecurity" 
which "sought containment in a projected psychic space bounded and defined by 
good object relations"? (1987: 58) How does it help us to know that Freud's 
"creativity was at its highest when he was in a bad mood," or that he found a 
"symbolic paternal value in writing"? Or how are we to respond to the fatuous 
remark that writing was for Freud above all else a sort of masturbatory impulse -
in Mahony's words, "a sublimating satisfaction for his drives," an attempt to 











In his preface to Psychoanalysis and the Question of the Text, Geoffrey 
Hartman remarks that ideally, 
psychoanalysis should provide a closer mode of close reading. Instead, it 
often blinds the "scientific" interpreter to the use oflanguage, his own as 
well as that of the text at hand. The reductionist types of reading that 
result add nothing to theme, symbol, and archetype hunting. What does it 
matter that the drift of an interpretation is descend ental rather than 
ascendental, that sex rather than a lofty ideal proves to be the key? Such 
concepts as sublimation or regression in the service of the ego or 
defensive mastery do not compensate for the crudeness and tactlessness 
of these ventures. That the patient - in this case the text - survives is 
something ofa miracle (1978: xv). 
Mahony's study is an almost parodic embodiment of the kind of "reductionist 
moves" identified both by Meltzer and Hartman, and which Hartman associates 
particularly with certain "older" kinds of psychoanalytic interpretations (Freud's 
excepted) which we read "only to know the worst... to get them over with ... " or, 
as he puts it, "to admire the artist for the odds he overcame, or ourselves for 
staying relatively sane though born inter faeces et urinas" (1978: xv). 
Hartman generously excludes Freud's own interpretive efforts from the 
reductionist forms of psychobiographical study he is attacking here. Yet it was of 
course Freud himself who, in a now notorious remark, effectively endorsed late 
nineteenth-century attempts to relate genius to madness, the artist to the neurotic: 
"An artist is once more in rudiments an introvert, not far removed from neurosis. 
He is oppressed by excessively powerful instinctual needs. He desires to win 
honour, power, love, wealth, fame and the love of women, but he lacks the 
means of achieving these satisfactions" ("Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis", SE XVI: 376). 6 And in an earlier essay ("The Interest of 
Psycho-Analysis from the Point of View of Aesthetics", 1913), the object of the 
whole artistic enterprise is reduced by Freud to the fulfillment of an infantile 











intended to allay ungratified wishes - in the first place in the creative artist 
himself and subsequently in his audience or spectators" (SE XIll: 187). 
As Elizabeth Wright points out, however, psychobiography has its roots not in 
Freud but in what had come to be called 'pathography' by the end of the 
nineteenth century: the study of the artist not for the sake of the work or even the 
man, but for the purpose of classifying a particular pathology. Studies of this 
type appeared in a periodical called Imago (published in Vienna, Leipzig and 
Zurich), from 1912 to 1937 the chief organ for the publication of writings dealing 
with the relation of psychoanalysis and the arts and all aspects of culture. Freud 
himself was ambivalent in his responses to pathographical studies. Though he 
designated his Leonardo essay as such (SE XI: 130), he was critical of others 
working in this area, wishing to shift the emphasis from the validation of a 
particular pathology to the psychoanalytic process as such. It is this shift of 
concern, Wright suggests, which is reflected in the now more commonly used 
term 'psychobiography.' 7 
II 
THE FRENCH CONNECTION 
However we situate the form, and however we determine Freud's relation to 
it, it is crucial that Mahony's psychobiographical investigation (representative as 
it is of what Jacques Derrida might have called a form of "empirico-biographical 
explanation" whose function, ultimately, is to reduce the text to an excuse for the 
performance of an episode in the life of the author) be distinguished from that 
form of criticism concerned primarily with the relation between objectivity and 
subjectivity in discourse, one of whose functions is to foreground the place of the 
subject in his or her own work; to foreground, in other words, the fact that "every 
utterance implies its own subject" (Barthes, 1967: 898). Only the latter form of 











subject's constitution within discourse, is in a position to participate in the 
Barthesian project to "de-throne!1 scientific discourse from the privileged position 
in which it is held by society as a meta-language ... Only the latter form is 
appropriately positioned to demonstrate that, as Barthes writes, 
... the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity or, if one prefers, 
the place of the subject in his own work, can no longer be thought of as in 
the halcyon days of positivist science. Objectivity and rigour, those 
attributes of the scientist which are still used as a stick to beat us with, are 
essentially preparatory qualities, necessary at the time of starting out on 
the work, and as such there is no cause to suspect or abandon them. But 
they are not qualities that can be transferred to the discourse itself, except 
by a sort of sleight-of-hand, a purely metonymical procedure which 
confuses precaution with its end product in discourse. Every utterance 
implies its own subject, whether this subject be expressed in an 
apparently direct fashion, by the use of "1", or indirectly, by being 
referred to as "he", or avoided altogether by means of impersonal 
constructions (1967: 898). 
What is excluded in the utterance is always only the "person", psychological, 
emotional, or biographical, certainly not the subject - a point amply demonstrated 
by many of those readings of Freud's texts associated with what has popularly 
come to be known as "French Freud". 8 One of the objectives of this recent 
French initiative is to constitute Freud's scientific project as itself an example of 
figurative writing, by focusing most insistently on the textuality of his work. 
These deconstructive readings of Freud set out to throw into relief the tension in 
the writing, to invoke and elicit the contradictions through which Freud disturbs 
fixed logical categorizations. In Jonathan Culler's words, 
Freud begins with a series of hierarchical oppositions: 
normaVpathological, sanity/insanity, reaVimaginary, experience/dream, 
conscious/unconscious, life/death. In each case the first term has been 











complication. Situated on the margin of the fIrst term, the second term 
designates an undesirable, dispensable deviation. Freud's investigations 
deconstruct these oppositions by identifying what is at stake in our desire 
to repress the second term and showing that in fact each fIrst term can be 
seen as a special case of the fundamentals designated by the second term, 
which in this process is transformed. Understanding of the marginal 
deviant term becomes a condition of understanding the supposed prior 
term (1983: 160-1). 
Pushing this initiative to its extreme, in his own numerous readings of Freud, 
Jacques Derrida not only deconstructs Freud's texts, but uses them to reflect 
upon the very activity of deconstruction itself As Wright puts it, "For Derrida, 
Freud becomes a Derridean avant fa fettre, paradoxically, by showing this very 
idiom to be a mere fIgure ofspeechlwriting. There is no 'before the letter': the 
subject is the subject of writing, both its product (as already written) and its 
producer (as rewriting the written)" (1998: 121-22). Derrida's reading ofthe 
second chapter of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in which he analyses Freud's 
account of the episode of the grandchild's game with the wooden reel, the fortJda 
episode, exemplifIes this initiative in a way which can be usefully compared with 
9 
Mahony. 
The game is played by Freud's grandchild who, at the age of one and a 
half, is observed by his grandfather playing with a wooden reel with a piece of 
string tied around it. "It never occurred to [the child] to pull it along the floor 
behind him, for instance, and play at its being a carriage," writes Freud. "What he 
did was to hold the reel by the string and very skilfully throw it over the edge of 
his little curtained bed, so that it disappeared into it, at the same time uttering his 
meaningful '0-0-0-0' [signifying 'gone']. He then pulled the reel out of the bed 
again by the string and hailed its reappearance with a joyful 'da' [signifying 
'there']. This, then, was the complete game - disappearance and return. As a rule 
one witnessed only its fIrst act, which was repeated untiringly as a game in itself, 
though there is no doubt that the greater pleasure was attached to the second act" 











Derrida1s reading is based on the hypothesis that the process of repetition 
identified in the fortlda game is "re-enacted" in the account itself in a way which 
can be shown to "re-inscribe" the writer (Freud) in his own text: 
If we consider the argumentative framework of the chapter, we notice that 
something repeats itself, and this process of repetition must be identified 
not only in the content (the examples, the materials described and 
analyzed) but also in Freud1s very writing, in the "steps" taken by his text, 
in what it does as well as in what it says, in its "acts" as much as in its 
11 objects. " What obviously repeats itself in this chapter is the movement 
of the speculator to reject, set aside, make disappear (fort), defer 
everything that seems to call the PP into question. 10 He notes that it is 
not enough, that he must postpone the question. Then he summons back 
the hypothesis of something beyond the pleasure principle only to dismiss 
it again. The hypothesis returns only like something that has not really 
returned but has merely passed into the ghost of its presence (1978: 
1141115). 
According to Derrida, the description of Ernst's game - of the "earnest game 
of Ernst, the elder grandson of the grandfather of psychoanalysis 11 - should no 
longer be read only as a theoretical argument, "a strictly theoretical speculation 
that tends to conclude that what we have here is the repetition compulsion or the 
death drive or simply an inner limit to the pp1l, but rather that the description of 
Ernst1s game can also be read as an "autobiography" of Freud - "not merely an 
autobiography entrusting his life to his own more or less testamentary writing but 
a more or less living description of his own writing, of his way of writing Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle (1978: 119). 
[J]ust as Ernst, in recalling the object (mother, plaything, or whatever), 
comes also to recall himself in an immediately supplementary operation, 
in the same way the speculating grandfather, describing or recalling this 











contract with himself so as to be left holding all the strings of his line, 
descendants and ascendants, in an incontestable ascendancy (1978: 134). 
By proffering both a multiple subject for the text (Freud as writer, father, 
grandfather, "father" of a discipline) and a multiple object (the fortlda game; the 
relation of the pleasure principle to a "beyond"; filiation; dissemination, or the 
projection of psychoanalysis into the future while at the same time attempting to 
master that future by repetition) Derrida's reading demonstrates how Freud's text 
both accounts for and at the same time "acts out" the psychoanalytic processes-
such as those of the dream-work - that Freud examined. 11 At the same time, he 
demonstrates how the subject is constituted within his own discourse. But what 
survives in the Derridean reading, even as it sets out to "re-inscribe" the writer 
(Freud) in his text, is a comment not on the man, nor on his life, but on the nature 
and texture of writing itself, on the fact that the "institutional character of the 
science of psychoanalysis stands in relation to the institutional character of 
writing itself' (Hartman 1978: xii), and on the fact of the impossibility, at 
significant moments, of the writer's achieving any discursive distance from or 
perspective on what is written: 
This text is auto-biographical, but in a completely different way from 
what was believed before ... "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" is ... not an 
example of what we believe we already know under the name of auto-
biography. It writes the autobiographical, and, from the fact that an 
"author" recounts something of his life in it, we can no longer conclude 
that the document is without truth value, without value as science or 
philosophy. A "domain" opens up in which the "inscription" of a subject 
in his text is also the necessary condition for the pertinence and 
performance of a text, for its "worth" beyond what is called empirical 
subjectivity (if, indeed, there is such a thing, since subjectivity speaks, 
writes, and substitutes one object for another) (1978: 135). 
Ironically, Mahony's psychobiographical project can only be described as 











"identity as a writer", to identifying a single unitary self which would be the 
source and locus of Freud's entire oeuvre, Mahony implicitly rejects the very 
Freudian scenario which would have revealed to him the impossibility of his 
project - a scenario in which the notion of a unitary identity which waits to be 
revealed to all who take the trouble to uncover it is replaced by that of a subject 
inevitably partial and divided, consisting not in a single self but instead in a 
number of II quasi selves" (see Rorty, 1986: 7) which lurk beneath the threshold 
of consciousness, irrecoverable in toto even to the mind they inhabit. 
If Mahony's project displays any sensitivity at all to the notion of an 
unconscious, it is to the reductive notion of the unconscious as a "seething mass 
of inarticulate instinctual energies" - a "reservoir oflibido" - which, as Rorty has 
pointed out, is just another name for "the passions", the lower part of the soul, the 
"bad, false self' (1986: 7). To view the conscious! unconscious distinction in this 
way is to see it essentially in terms of the Platonic reason-passion distinction; but 
had this indeed been the only sense Freud gave to the term his work would have 
left our self-image largely unchanged: "What is novel in Freud's view of the 
unconscious is his claim that our unconscious selves are not dumb, sullen, 
lurching brutes, but rather the intellectual peers of our conscious selves, possible 
conversational partners for those selves" (Rorty, 1986: 7). In the new, Freudian 
picture, complex and sophisticated sets of transactions between two or more 
Itintellects" in a single body take the place of the older, traditional picture -
apparently endorsed by Mahony - of one "intellect" (which is constituted in 
consciousness) struggling with a mob of "irrational" brutes (constituted in the 
unconscious). Mahony's psychobiographical investigation - representative as it is 
of at least one major interpretive tradition which has arisen at the intersection 
between psychoanalytic and literary theory - reveals a model of the unconscious 













As part of his psycho-biographical investigation of Freud's writing, Mahony 
includes a gushing tribute to Freud's "literary genius." This places Mahony's 
reading amongst many recent essays in which Freud has been acclaimed as 
proto-novelist - in which his texts (in particular the case histories) have been 
compared to great works of fiction. Representative is Steven Marcus' influential 
reading of Freud's Fragment of an AnalySiS of a Case of Hysteria, better known 
as the case of "Dora". 
In his analysis, Marcus compares the narrative course of Freud's history of 
Dora's illness and treatment to the general form of the modem experimental 
novel. Like a modernist writer, he suggests, Freud begins the case history with an 
elaborate introduction concerning the problematical status of his undertaking and 
the dubious character of his final achievement. In addition, like the familiar 
"unreliable narrator" of modernist fiction, Freud pauses at regular intervals to 
remind the reader that his insight into the complex of events composing the case 
history has remained "fragmentary", that his understanding of it remains in some 
essential sense permanently occluded (1985: 66). The set of "Prefatory Remarks" 
to the history are regarded by Marcus as a kind of 11 novelistic framing action", in 
which Freud "rehearses his motives, reasons, and intentions and begins at the 
same time to work his insidious devices upon the reader": 
First, exactly like a novelist, he remarks that what he is about to let us in 
on is positively scandalous, for "the complete elucidation of a case of 
hysteria is bound to involve the revelation of intimacies and the betrayal 
of ... secrets." Second, again like a writer of fiction, he has deliberately 
chosen persons, places and circumstances that will remain obscure; the 
scene is laid not in metropolitan Vienna but "in a remote provincial 
town." He has from the beginning kept the circumstances that Dora was 











discretion I have complete confidence" - knows about it. He has 
"postponed publication" of this essay for "four whole years," also in the 
cause of discretion ... Finally he has buried the case even deeper by 
publishing it "in a purely scientific and technical periodical" in order to 
secure yet another "guarantee against unauthorized readers." He has, in 
short, made his own mystery within a mystery, and one of the effects of 
such obscure preliminary goings-on is to create a kind ofNabokovian 
frame - what we have here is a history framed by an explanation which is 
itself slightly out of focus (1985: 68). 
During the course of his essay, Marcus compares the content of Freud's text to 
a play by Ibsen (1985: 64); its "forbidding" and "disconcerting" quality, in which 
the writer "succumbs to no impulse to make it easy for the reader" is said to be 
reminiscent of both Borges and Nabokov (1985: 69-70); and the elaborate 
"interweaving" of the various strands of time in the account or, as Marcus puts it, 
Freud's "geological fusing of the various time strata - strata that are themselves 
at the same time fluid and shifting" are described as virtually "Proustian" in their 
complexity (1985:73). Finally, as Marcus reminds us, the actual events of the 
case (quite apart from Freud's narration of them) are themselves "full of such 
literary and novelistic devices or conventions as thematic analogies, double plots, 
reversals, inversions, variations, and betrayals - full of what the 'sharp-sighted' 
Dora as well as the sharp-sighted Freud thought of as 'hidden connections'" 
(1985: 79-80). The work of the reading as a whole is thus to seek out the traces 
of modernist fiction in Freud's prose. 
Similar comparisons are drawn between Freud and the great masters of 
modernist fiction in Peter Brooks' widely read essay on another of Freud's best-
known case histories, that of the "WolfMan" ("Fictions of the WolfMan", 
1984). Even before he comes to Freud in 1910, the WolfMan is cast, in Brooks' 
reading, as a literary character: Emblematic of one aspect of European high 
bourgeois culture in its finest flowering - "the morbid narcissism of its most 
sensitive and artistic souls" - the WolfMan reminds us, suggests Brooks, of the 











line of valetudinarian heroes reaching back to Villiers de l'Isle-Adam's Axel..." 
(267). Like the novels of Mann and Proust, Brooks continues, the WolfMan's 
story seems to "draw up the balance sheet of European high bourgeois culture at 
the moment of its apparent triumph as it blindly prepares its self-immolation. By 
the time of his return to Freud, the social order that produced the WolfMan, and 
his story, had been shattered, the 'proud power' of European civilization lay in 
fragments, its advanced culture stunned by reversal" (267, 268). 
As for Freud the writer, in this account Brooks sees him as in a position 
analogous to that of a "Proustian narrator in relation to his own buried past or, 
better, to those Faulknerian narrators who must unearth, order, make sense of the 
past stories of others in order to make sense of history and their own 
understandings oflife" (271). Furthermore, in as much as the investigative 
procedures of the psychoanalyst can be said to resemble those of the detective, 
and thus the narrative of the case history to invoke that of the detective story, 
Freud is said to move definitively beyond the "Holmes canon" in the case of the 
WolfMan, almost inadvertently discovering "detection" and its narrative to be 
extraordinarily more "complex" and "problematic" than the creator of Sherlock 
Holmes could have imagined - "like the plots of modernist fiction, and indeed 
inextricably bound up with the fictional": 
In Freud's early case histories, those of Studies on Hysteria, finding the 
chain of events leading from the initial trauma, usually infantile, to its 
sexualized repetition, usually during adolescence, on to the present 
symptoms provided a seamless narrative that was thought to be cathartic 
and therefore in itself curative. The detective story in the case of the Wolf 
Man is evidently far more complex than anything in the Holmes canon; it 
resembles more the tenuous solutions to uncertain problems presented by 
Heart of Darkness or a number of tales by Jorge Luis Borges. Not only 
does Freud question whether one can, or need, claim that "in the 
beginning was the deed" - since the imagined can have the full originary 
force of the deed - he also proposes a radical revision of conventional 











Thus while the case of Dora reads to Brooks like a "flawed Victorian novel", 
one with a "ramifying cast of characters and relations that never can be brought 
into satisfactory form", with the case of the WolfMan, Freud has, he suggests, 
progressed and advanced to a "more sophisticated presentation of complex 
narrative plots and a more subtle understanding of what the 'healthy' narrative of 
life may be" (282). And Brooks has little difficulty invoking all the masters of 
modernist prose he finds reflected in diverse elements of the WolfMan's story as 
narrated by Freud - including Conrad, Joyce, Mann, Faulkner, Yeats, Eliot, Gide, 
Kafka, Borges, Giradoux and many others. "A nonfictional genre concerning a 
real person," Brooks concludes, "the case history of the WolfMan is radically 
allied to the fictional since its causes and connections depend on probabilistic 
constructions rather than authoritative facts, and on imaginary scenarios of lack 
and desire, and since the very language that it must work with, as object and 
medium of its explanations, takes its form from histories of desire consubstantial 
with what cannot be" (284, my emphasis). 
One of the effects of readings such as Marcus' and Brooks', and of the 
initiative they represent, is to contribute to the popular perception of Freud as a 
"literary genius", simultaneously, and in the process, underwriting, even if only 
tacitly, representations of Freud as "unscientific". Yet despite Freud's own well 
documented enthusiasm for the novelist's art, it is not certain he would have 
cared much for either Marcus' or Brooks' efforts, nor even the embedded tribute 
to his literary skill. Indeed, historically, the public's recognition of his success as 
an artist had, more often than not, been synonymous with a refusal to 
acknowledge his validity as a scientist - a bitter reminder to Freud of the public's 
scepticism with regard to the theoretical value in his writing. 
Such was the case on the occasion ofthe publication of the Studies on 
Hysteria (1895) for which the most substantial recognition came not from the 
scientific community but from the poet, literary historian, and dramatic critic, 
Alfred von Bergner, then professor of the History of Literature in the university 











it may one day become possible to approach the innermost secret of human 
personality ... " wrote von Bergner. "The theory itself is in fact nothing but the 
kind of psychology used by poets" (Jones, 1961: 224). In medical circles 
however, and in the scientific community as a whole, the book was not well 
received (Jones, 1961: 223 ft). 
Five years later, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) was given a similar 
reception. Some eighteen months after publication, no scientific periodical, and 
only a few others, had so much as mentioned the book. According to Jones, it 
was simply ignored. Although the book was not entirely neglected by the 
psychological periodicals, its reviews here were almost as destructive as 
complete silence would have been: one proclaiming the danger that "uncritical 
minds would be delighted to join in this play with ideas and would end up in 
complete mysticism and chaotic arbitrariness"; another settling for the conclusion 
that "the imaginative thoughts of an artist had triumphed over the scientific 
investigator" (Jones, 1961: 307). 
In the case of Marcus, his response to the Dora case pivots on the allegation 
that the "central moment" of the "central scene" of Dora's life (and Freud's text)-
a scene which Freud orchestrates with "inimitable richness", according to 
Marcus, and with the "tact" and "sense ofform" that one associates with a 
classical composer of music, or with Proust, Mann or Joyce - this central 
moment, which becomes thereafter the central "reality" of the case, is a 
"reconstruction" that Freud has "formed in his own mind": 
This pivotal construction becomes henceforth the principal "reality" of 
the case, and we must also observe that this reality remains Freud's more 
than Dora's, since he was never quite able to convince her of the 
plausibility of the construction, or, to regard it from the other pole of the 
dyad, she was never quite able to accept this version of reality, of what 











Marcus is eager to proclaim the "unquestionable genius" of this "pivotal 
construction", but it is clearly a "literary" rather than a "scientific" genius he has 
in mind. By suggesting that the "central character" in the action in this history is 
not Dora but Freud himself, that it is "his story that is being written and not hers 
that is being re-told," Marcus simultaneously repeats the claim, which is also his 
central thesis, that the history of Dora's case, as constructed in Freud's text, is 
essentially a fictional one. He emphasizes that the "reality" Freud insists upon is 
very different from the "reality" that Dora is claiming and clinging to. And he 
goes on to suggest that not only does Freud overlook for the most part this 
critical difference, he also adopts no measures for dealing with it: "The demon of 
interpretation has taken hold of him, and it is this power that presides over the 
case of Dora" (1985: 85). 
In this way, what begins as a tribute to Freud's power as an artist ends as an 
attack, if only implicitly, on his integrity as a scientist - an attack in which the 
"demon of interpretation" is the principal target. What begins, in other words, as 
a potentially liberating gesture, promising in its inter-disciplinary nature to go 
beyond the opposition between science and literature, ends by surreptitiously 
reinforcing it. Like other masterpieces of literature or the arts, Marcus claims, 
Freud's case histories seem to possess certain "trans-historical qualities" - which 
if they are by no means easy to specify, are nevertheless clearly discernible. The 
implacable "march of science", he writes, has not - or has not yet - consigned 
them to "mere history": "Their singular and mysterious complexity, density and 
richness have thus far prevented such a transformation and demotion" (1985: 56). 
In effect, this is to place art and science on either side of an unbridgeable divide -
one in which science is ephemeral, subject to the relentless passage of history, 
while art is "timeless" and lives forever; it is simultaneously to suggest, in effect, 
that if Freud's case histories are still in circulation, it is to their "trans-historical 
qualities", that is, to their "complexity, density and richness" as works of art not 
science that they owe their life. 
In a more recent confrontation between literary criticism and another of 











a parallel while singularly more direct attack on Freud's scientific integrity. I will 
respond to Fish's essay in detail in Chapter Four of this study. For now, note 
simply that the force ofFish's attack is invested primarily in the by now familiar 
allegation that the greater part of the final interpretation of the dream which is the 
centre-piece of the Wolf-man's analysis, is the product of "persuasion and force" 
on the part of Freud, the analyst, rather than the result of independent work on 
the part of the patient. 
Fish's arguments against the "independence" of the Wolf-man's analysis, 
along with Marcus' claim that in the Dora case history, "it is Freud's story that is 
being written and not Dora's that is being re-told", are situated at the edge ofa 
much broader (and continuing) tradition of criticism which attacks Freudian 
psychoanalysis on the grounds that it "acts by suggestion" - or, in Fish's terms, 
"that what the analyst claims to uncover (in the archaeological sense of which 
Freud was so fond) he actually creates by verbal and rhetorical means." Within 
this tradition, the principal objection to psychoanalysis follows Wittgenstein's 
observation that Freud is constantly claiming to be scientific, but what he gives is 
speculation - "something prior even to the formulation of a hypothesis." 13 In 
Wittgenstein's view, the only reason these "speculations" have gained a certain 
popularity in the mind of the public is through their "appeal" or their "charm" as 
explanations: "the picture ofpeopJe having unconscious thoughts has a charm. 
The idea of an underworld, a secret cellar. Something hidden, uncanny ... A lot 
of things one is ready to believe because they are uncanny" (Cited in Cioffi, 
1969: 186). 14 
The same fundamental objection is embedded in Sebastian Timpanaro's 
reference in The Freudian Slip (1976) to the "captious and sophistical method, 
resistant to any verification, quick to force interpretations to secure pre-ordained 
proofs, employed by Freud and Freudians in their explanations of slips, dreams 
and neurotic symptoms" (1976: 14). Timpanaro's aim in this study, which 
concentrates on The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, is to "demystify a mode 
of reasoning which is also to be found in other of Freud's works - in particular 











dominated by the work of 'interpretation', which belongs to the 'anti-scientific' 
aspect of psychoanalysis. Timpanaro uses the word "anti-scientific" because he 
regards it as the most appropriate to designate the ensemble of diverse objections 
which can be made against psychoanalysis - objections which, as he points out, 
are interrelated if not identical. It is apparent that in both Fish's and Timpanaro's 
view, a method of investigation which admits the practice of interpretation 
b b "fi 15 cannot y nature e sClentl IC. 
Traditionally, and prior to the work of the French women's liberation group 
Psychanalyse et politique, feminists have rooted their objections in similar 
ground. Historically, for many feminists, Freud has been, and indeed still is a 
prime target as a "male chauvinist" whose so-called "scientific" propaganda has 
been responsible for damning a generation of emancipated women to the 
passivity of the second sex (cited in Mitchell, 1974: 303). In her survey of 
traditional feminist attacks on the Freudian notion of femininity (Psychoanalysis 
and Feminism, 1974), Juliet Mitchell elicits the common claim on which their 
diverse arguments rest - namely, that Freud's theories are not based on what may 
justifiably be called scientific evidence. 16 Particularly pertinent here is the work 
of Shulamith Firestone who, taking her cue from Havelock Ellis's remark, in 
1917, that Freud was a great artist but not a scientist, finds "poetic" rather than 
"scientific" genius in Freud's work: 
But was there any value in [Freud's] ideas? Let us re-examine some of 
them once again, this time from a radical feminist view. I believe Freud 
was talking about something real, though perhaps his ideas, taken 
literally, lead to absurdity. In this regard, consider that Freud's genius was 
poetic rather than scientific; his ideas more valuable as metaphors rather 
than literal truths (cited in Mitchell, 1974: 346). 
In the same way, Marcus attributes the fascination of the Dora case history (as 
well as its ultimate failure) to Freud's genius as a story-teller, while for Fish, the 
appeal of Freudian propositions in general (and in the Wolf-man case history 











and by which they have been constructed. The true content of Freudian 
explanations, according to Fish, is the story of their making, the story of 
"persuasion ... practised on a massive scale", in which the reader only believes 
what he is told because he has IIfallen totally under the control of the teller." 
Underlying all these readings is the implicit requirement that (in Barthesian 
terms), even if literature knows that language is never naive, never "transparent" 
- that is, that it can never convey any "truth" which is extraneous to writing, 
which is not a truth having to do with the art of writing itself - the language of 
science, on the other hand, must remain "innocent": a neutral utensil, an 
instrument merely, to convey a "meaning" or a "truth" or a "fact" which is 
beyond it, foreign to it. All these readings, in other words, end by endorsing the 
privileged position assumed by scientific discourse as the referential code for all 
the "ex-centric" languages, which themselves are merely its sub-codes. 
IV 
BEYOND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
. AND/OR SCIENCE 
It has been said that in the history of psychoanalysis, two competing myths 
about Freud have gradually developed. In a recently published reading of Freud's 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, framed as a challenge to both, Arnold 
Davidson characterizes these myths as follows: 
The first myth, that of official psychoanalysis, depicts Freud as a lonely 
genius, isolated and ostracized by his colleagues, fashioning 
psychoanalysis single-handedly and in perpetual struggle with the world 
at large. The history of psychoanalysis under the sway of this myth has 
become the story of Freud as triumphant revolutionary. The second, 











else - usually Wilhelm Fliess, although the names of Jean Martin Charcot, 
Havelock Ellis, and Albert Moll, among many others, are also mentioned 
frequently - and taking credit for what were in fact no more than minor 
modifications in previously developed theories. This is the myth of the 
career discontents, and the history of psychoanalysis dominated by it has 
become the story of Freud as demagogue, usurper, and megalomaniac 
(1987: 256).17 
To these two myths we might now add a third, in which Freud emerges most 
strongly as a literary genius, whose imaginative and rhetorical powers 
occasionally enabled him to seduce his audience into mistakenly identifying his 
theoretical double-talk with scientific fact. This is the Wittgensteinian story of 
psychoanalysis as essentially duplicitous and dangerous, likely to do more harm 
than good: "Because although one may discover in the course of it various things 
about oneself, one must have a very strong and keen and persistent criticism in 
order to recognise and see through the mythology that is offered or imposed on 
one. There is an inducement to say, ' Yes, of course, it must be like that ... ", 
(1972: 52). Under the sway of this representation, the history of psychoanalysis 
is itself the history of a "powerful mythology", the story of Freud as at worst 
hypocrite and dissembler, at best master illusionist. 18 
To the extent that the perpetrators of this myth both recognize and focus upon 
what many of Freud's critics ignore (namely, the place oflanguage in his work), 
my own investigation would go along with them. I would, however, want to give 
this recognition a new emphasis away from the allegiance it so often appears to 
entail to the notion of science as a form of neutral language, an instrument of 
thought - which, if it has a certain need oflanguage, is nevertheless not, like 
literature, in language. It is this allegiance, both implicit and explicit, that 
contributes inevitably to the perception that the so-called literary qualities of 
Freud's writing must necessarily disqualify it as science. 
Consequently, and paradoxically, the very focus of these commentaries on the 











consciousness of scientific discourse called for by Barthes, ends rather by 
confirming its present notion of itself as a superior referential code in relation to 
which all others are mere embellishments. The question of how to avoid 
remaining trapped within the binary system of science and literature will be 
crucial in the readings of the case histories which follow. What would it mean, in 
other words, to read Freud so as neither to elide the place oflanguage in his work 
nor to acknowledge it - whether intentionally or otherwise - only as a threat to its 
credibility as science? 
It is in the response it offers to this question that Davidson's reading of the 
Three Essays seems to me particularly significant. In it, Davidson suggests that 
previous commentaries on these texts have been marked by an under-estimation 
of their historical, rhetorical and conceptual density - an under-estimation 
stemming from what he defines as historiographical assumptions which quickly 
misdirect us away from the fundamental issues at stake in Freud!s work. What 
distinguishes his own reading is an attachment, as he puts it, to a different 
epistemological and methodological orientation from that at work in previous 
material - a "different and particular way of doing the history of 
psychoanalysis." Central to this new epistemological and methodological 
orientation is the archaeological perspective of Michel Foucault, a perspective he 
both "adopts" and "adapts" in his attempt to write a history of nineteenth-century 
psychiatric theories of sexuality (1987: 254-55). 19 
Davidson's reading sets out first .. to determine whether the structure of 
concepts associated with Freud's writings continues, extends, diverges from, or 
undermines the conceptual space of nineteenth-century psychiatry: 
What we need ... is a history ofthe concepts used in psychoanalysis, an 
account of their historical origins and transformations, their rules of 
combination, and their employment in a mode of reasoning. This task 
presumes, first, that we can isolate the distinctive concepts of nineteenth-
century psychiatry, articulate their rules of combination, and thereby 











enterprise for Freud's work, which, with sufficient detail, should enable 
us to see more clearly whether Freud's conceptual space continues or 
breaks with that of his predecessors (1987: 257). 
His emphasis in this undertaking thus lies on the conceptual and historical 
dimensions of language - the conceptual as contingent on the historical - and it is 
this shift from the rhetorical to the historical and conceptual which distinguishes 
Davidson's Freud from the tradition oftextual analysis exemplified in the earlier 
mentioned essays by Marcus and Fish. What then emerges in Davidson is a 
version of Freud's "genius" as neither an imaginative nor a rhetorical one so 
much as a conceptual one, grounded less in his manipulatory powers when 
dealing with the language of nineteenth-century psychiatry than in his ability, at 
the level of conceptual articulation above all, fundamentally to alter it: "Many 
writers before Freud possessed bits and pieces of his terminology and exhibited 
an inchoate, unself-possessed grappling with the problems brought to light by the 
Three Essays," writes Davidson. "But it was Freud who ascended to the level of 
concepts, who systematically and lucidly thought what had previously remained 
in a kind of precognitive blockage ... " (1987: 275). The true source of Freud's 
"genius" thus emerges not so much in his ability to work with language as in his 
power to proceed in spite of it. 
The particular concept on which Davidson focuses his attention in this essay 
is that of "sexual perversion". His analysis thus concentrates primarily on the first 
of Freud's Three Essays, "Sexual Aberrations". He begins with the observation 
that in order even to approximate to a comprehensive reading of this essay, it will 
be necessary to begin before Freud, with the prevailing concept of sexual 
aberration (or perversion) in the literature of nineteenth-century psychiatry - to 
"demarcate the conceptual space of which perversion was an element that 
dominated European psychiatry at the time Freud was writing the Three Essays." 
And he goes on to point out that the best way to begin to understand the 
nineteenth-century conceptual space encircling perversion will be to examine the 
notion of the "sexual instinct": "for the conception of perversion underlying 











class of diseases that affected the sexual instinct was precisely the sexual 
perversions lf (1987: 258). 
To be able to determine what phenomena are functional disturbances or 
diseases of the sexual instinct, Davidson proceeds, one must also specify in what 
the normal, or natural, function of this instinct consists: "Without knowing the 
normal function of the instinct, everything and nothing could count as a 
functional disturbance" (1987: 260). Indeed, by the time Freud inherits the 
concept of the sexual instinct, as Davidson goes on to demonstrate, there is 
virtually unargued unanimity not only on the fact that this instinct does have a 
natural function, but also on what that function is. The view ofKraffi-Ebing (in 
his Textbook of Insanity) is offered as representative: 
During the time of the maturation of physiological processes in the 
reproductive glands, desires arise in the consciousness of the individual, 
which have for their purpose the perpetuation of the species (sexual 
instinct) ... With opportunity for the natural satisfaction of the sexual 
instinct, every expression of it that does not correspond with the purpose 
of nature - i.e., propagation - must be regarded as perverse (1987: 260). 
The natural function of the sexual instinct then, is propagation, and the 
corresponding natural, psychological satisfaction of this instinct must then 
consist in the satisfaction derived from heterosexual, genital intercourse. Sadism, 
masochism, fetishism, and homosexuality must all then be classified together as 
perversions since, as Davidson points out, Ifall exhibit the same kind of perverse 
expression of the sexual instinct, the same basic kind of functional deviation, 
which manifests itself in the fact that psychological satisfaction is obtained 
primarily through activities disconnected from the natural function of the 
instinct If (1987: 262). 
This then is the prevailing conception ofthe sexual instinct and its perversions 
which Freud inherits and with which he is obliged to work in his Three Essays. 











technical terms: The sexual object is "the person from whom sexual attraction 
proceeds," while the sexual aim is lithe act towards which the instinct tends" 
(1987: 263). As far as the "perversions" are concerned, these may now be 
classified in terms of (1) deviations with respect to the sexual object which, in 
relation to the prevalent conception of the natural function of the sexual instinct, 
must necessarily consist in deviations from the natural attraction exercised by 
one sex upon the other; and (2) deviations with respect to sexual aim, which must 
now necessarily consist in deviations from the natural goal of sexual union. 
These, as Davidson points out, are precisely the two conceptually basic kinds of 
deviations we should expect of those writers who subscribed to the popular 
conception of the sexual instinct (1987: 263). 
It is important to recognize at this point that at the time Freud inherits it, 
shared opinion regarding this definition of the concept of the sexual instinct is 
unquestioned: in the nineteenth-century psychiatric theories that preceded Freud, 
both a specific object and a specific aim formed part and parcel of the instinct 
itself. The very nature of the sexual instinct manifested itself, according to these 
theories, in an attraction to members of the opposite sex and in a desire for 
genital intercourse with them. 
In his discussion of those "perversions" which manifest themselves as 
deviations in respect of the sexual object, Freud gives his fullest attention to 
inversion (homosexuality) - the deviation to which most nineteenth-century 
psychiatrists had themselves devoted the most attention. And it is in the 
following passage, with which Freud concludes his discussion on deviations in 
respect of the sexual object, that, as Davidson will demonstrate, he deals his first 
"conceptually devastating blow to the entire structure of nineteenth-century 
theories of sexual psychopathology" (1987: 265). The passage is worth quoting 
in full: 
It has been brought to our notice that we have been in the habit of 
regarding the connection between the sexual instinct and the sexual object 











considered abnormal has shown us that in them the sexual instinct and the 
sexual object are merely soldered together - a fact which we have been in 
danger of overlooking in consequence of the uniformity of the normal 
picture, where the object appears to form part and parcel of the instinct. 
We are thus warned to loosen the bond that exists in our thought between 
instinct and object. It seems probable that the sexual instinct is in the first 
instance independent of its object; nor is its origin likely to be due to its 
object's attractions (SE VII: 147-48). 
In order to show that inversion was a real functional deviation and not merely 
a statistical abnormality without genuine pathological significance, Davidson 
reasons, one had to conceive of the "normal" object of the instinct as part of the 
very content of the instinct itself: "If the object is not internal to the instinct, then 
there can be no intrinsic clinico-pathological meaning to the fact that the instinct 
can become attached to an inverted object" (1987: 265). It is through claiming, in 
effect, in the above passage, that there is no natural object of the sexual instinct, 
that the sexual object and the sexual instinct are merely "soldered together", that 
Freud proves himself worthy of the name of genius, in Davidson's eyes. Freud's 
conclusion, he writes, 
is explicitly and directly opposed to any conclusion that could be drawn 
by using the [prevailing] concept of the sexual instinct. The relationship 
between the concepts of sexual instinct and sexual object found in 
nineteenth-century texts, a rule of combination partially constitutive of 
the concept of the sexual instinct, was completely undermined by Freud, 
and as a consequence of this cutting away of old foundations, inversion 
could not be thought of as an unnatural functional deviation of the sexual 
instinct (1987: 265-266). 
In much the same way, as Davidson demonstrates, Freud's argument, his 
"structure of concepts," leads to the parallel conclusion that the "normal" aim of 
the sexual instinct, genital intercourse, is not part of the content of the instinct; 











object, the sexual instinct and sexual aim are merely "soldered together." If the 
resulting overall structure of Freud's argument is to show that neither a specific 
aim nor a specific object has any constitutive bond with the sexual instinct, and if 
the previously shared concept of the sexual instinct is thus effectively 
dismantled, then, remarks Davidson, it is difficult to see how any conceptual 
foothold could remain for the concept of unnatural functional deviations of this 
instinct: 
In the case of both sexual aim and sexual object, it is only the apparent 
uniformity of normal behaviour that directs us to think otherwise. But this 
apparently well-entrenched uniformity actually masks the operations of 
the sexual instinct, operations which, when conceptualized by Freud, 
show us that the idea of the natural function of the instinct has no basis 
whatsoever. We ought to conclude from what Freud says here that there 
are no true perversions. The conceptual space within which the concept of 
perversion functions and has a stable role has been thoroughly displaced -
and displaced in a way that requires a new set of concepts for 
understanding sexuality and a new mode of reasoning about it (1987: 
270-71). 
Crucial to the difference, then, between Davidson's reading and the tradition 
of literary analysis exemplified by Marcus and Fish et ai, and in Mahony's 
project as a whole, is Davidson's recognition, not only of the rhetorical, but 
especially of the historical and conceptual density of Freud's texts. By 
concentrating almost exclusively on the "literary" aspect of Freud's work, while 
defining it primarily as a function of its rhetorical power, the earlier-mentioned 
critics are led to under-estimate both its historical and conceptual dimensions. In 
Davidson's reading of the Three Essays, Freud's name itself - along with those 
of his predecessors, such as Bloch, Moll and others - are treated as "placeholders 
for certain sets of concepts and the way these concepts fit together to constitute a 
conceptual space." Davidson is appropriately placed to determine the way in 
which Freud's Three Essays provided the resources to "overturn" the conceptual 











perversion that so dominated the period - by fundamentally altering the rules of 
combination for concepts such as "sexual instinct", "sexual object", and "sexual 
aim", with the consequence that these shared objects, among others, were 
destroyed. 
Davidson's innovatory approach has further important implications, I would 
suggest, in relation to the initiative in which Freud's texts, and particularly the 
case histories, are read as exemplary instances of modernist, or even post-modem 
narratives. Freud himself was not always able to grasp the import of his own 
work: thus, in the first of the Three Essays, he continued to use the idea of 
"perversion" as ifhis own conceptual innovations were not wholly accessible to 
him, while he often re-introduced - "behind his own back" as it were - in the 
Three Essays and elsewhere, identifications that he had shown to be untenable. 
The fact that Freud's "genius" was not always conscious of itself as such, is 
explained in Davidson's text by what he calls the "divergent temporality of the 
emergence of new concepts and the formation of new mentalities": 
Automatisms of attitude have a durability, a slow temporality, which does 
not match the sometimes rapid change of conceptual mutation. Mental 
habits have a tendency towards inertia, and these habits resist change that, 
in retrospect seems conceptually required (1987: 276). 
Once this point is taken into account, the hesitations and ambiguities of 
Freud's texts appear less as the result of some "deconstructive indeterminacy or 
undecidability of the text", but are rather the consequence of the "dynamics of 
fundamental change": of the fact that "mentality" and "concept" are two different 
aspects of systems of thought, which we should not expect to be coherently 
connected all at once, "as if forms of experience could be dissolved and re-
constituted overnight. " 
In my view, this approach has significant consequences for a re-assessment of 
major aspects of the critical response to Freud's case histories to date. Once 











language, to its constraining as well as enabling powers in the formulation of 
new discursive practices, an important and, to my mind, fruitful dimension is 
added to current perceptions of the rhetorical force of Freud's narratives, both 
within the case histories and elsewhere. 
V 
EXTENDING THE LIMITS 
OF SCIENTIFICITY 
Beyond the terms of a purely historical inquiry, focused on how Freud shifts 
knowledge-paradigms by way of theory-driven concept-mutations, the question 
remains as to the nature of the knowledge produced by these mutations. What, so 
to speak, is the status of the cognitive product, and above all how does it relate to 
the overarching question of "science" versus "literature"? This is the point at 
which the phenomenon of the case history proves decisive. The case history is 
not simply a kind of laboratory for testing a theory (the failure or only partial 
success of the "experiment" then adduced as the proof of Freud's non-
scientificity). As Carl Pietsch, amongst others, has argued, psychoanalysis 
delivers a quite distinctive kind of knowledge, intimately bound up with the 
transference, dialogue, story-telling, and recognition. Indeed, in recognising an 
intimate connection between the story of the patient's suffering and the nature of 
the pathology, Freud in effect re-introduces literary "style" as a tool of 
investigation in psychology. 20 The case histories thus need to be examined as 
repositories and vehicles of this knowledge, as the site of evolution of the 
character and epistemological status of psychoanalytic knowledge. It may be 
worth pausing for a moment at this point, to consider some recent reflections on 
the nature of this new epistemological practice, or discourse about knowledge. 
In an essay called ttpsychoanalysis: Telepathy, Gossip and/or Science?" John 
Forrester both reflects on the epistemology of psychoanalysis, and debates the 











particularly, he considers the possible connections between the specific forms of 
knowledge ( or non-knowledge) represented by psychoanalysis, telepathy and 
gossip. Invoking Derrida's article "Telepathie" as part of his own attempt to 
define the phenomenon, Forrester implies that the kind of intellectual shift 
Derrida calls for in the formulation of epistemological questions around telepathy 
is necessary for psychoanalysis as well: 
There's no knowing [Derrida writes, but in a voice clearly meant to be 
that of Freud himself...](and on this point I'm in a strong position because 
here there's no question of 'knowledge'. Everything in our conception of 
knowledge is so constructed that telepathy is impossible, unthinkable, 
unknowable. If there is such a thing, our relation to Telepathy won't 
belong to the family of 'knowledge' or of 'non-knowledge' but to another 
genre) (1991: 170). 
If, for Derrida, the question of telepathy leads to an epistemological impasse, 
so too does the question of gossip. And so, by implication, does that of 
psychoanalysis. Crucial to this is the model Forrester draws up for the 
psychoanalytic dialogue, one based on a definition of psychoanalytic practice as 
a specific form of discourse between two people governed by specific sets of 
rules. The fundamental rule dictates that the patient agree to tell the analyst 
everything that comes to mind, while the analyst abstains from such free 
discourse, instead offering interpretations of what the patient has said. Further 
rules govern the relation of this "discursive dyad ll to the outside world. The 
analyst gives an assurance that anything said during the course of an analytic 
session will be treated as confidential; the patient is not required to offer such an 
assurance, but is encouraged not to discuss the analysis with people "outside." As 
a consequence of these rules, what Forrester refers to as a "semi-permeable 
membrane" is placed around the two people talking. 
In Forrester's view, the very existence of the membrane gives psychoanalysis 
and gossip something in common: that is, they are both conversations taking 











parties being gossiped about (although naming them is crucial to the activity). 
Similarly, the rules of analysis require that all participating parties be absent, 
including those addressed in the second person. Even the analyst, that is, is 
absent when addressed in the transferential mode of the second person, the 
"you." Using the technique of transference interpretation, the analyst treats 
sentences containing I!you" as if they were passing him by, as if he were passing 
them on. In Lacan and Derrida's formulation, he acts as a postman, relaying or 
redirecting all the messages that come to him. He tries to act like the lost and 
found department of the Post Office, ascertaining to whom these 
communications are addressed. In this way, a declaration of love or the heaping 
of abuse can be interpreted as being about someone who is not there. 
If this semi-permeable membrane (which in Forrester's terms constitutes 
analysis) allows one to draw analogies between analysis and gossip, what 
happens when the membrane is broken, and the contents leak out? It is clear that 
either the analyst or the patient can do the leaking. In the case of the analyst, 
there are two possible forms for this: first, the so-called "scientific 
communication" - the case history of the patient. Second, the analyst may gossip 
about the patient. Ifwe consider the patient as the source, a further two 
categories of leakage emerge: first, in the form of those analytic communications 
that have been displaced from within the analysis, which should have been 
spoken to the analyst, not to someone outside: what analysts call "acting out." 
Second, there is the category of gossip in the ordinary sense of the word - gossip 
about the analysis, gossip about the analyst, the sort of self-revealing chat that 
analysands sharing an analytic culture would indulge in. 
How does all this bear on questions of science and the literary - of language, 
truth and knowledge? Traditional distinctions between knowledge and non-
knowledge, the scientific and the non-scientific, truth and fiction, start to crumble 
here, in more senses than one: First, within the analytic dyad, psychoanalytic 
knowledge, usually identified with the "penetrating observation", the 
interpretation that uncovers the secret hiding-place of the repressed, is shown to 











by gossip barely maintains its claim on the word). Second, from either side of the 
membrane, a number of questions emerge (and with them a further blurring of 
the divisions between knowledge and non-knowledge, truth and error, science 
and ... ): Under what conditions does talk about an analysis qualify as a scientific 
communication, rather than as gossip? What do we make of the apparently 
uncanny kinship between the analysands' self-revealing gossip outside of 
analysis, and analysis itself? To the purist analyst, all communication about the 
analysis to a third party is taken to be misplaced communication to the analyst 
To the outsider, however, to anyone other than the gossip's analyst, gossip about 
the analysis simply is gossip. And then a further question arises: what are the 
consequences of retaining the symmetry of assimilation, so that where the analyst 
assimilates gossip to acting out, the theorist of gossip assimilates acting out to 
gossip? In this way, Forrester's new emphasis ends in an implicit displacement 
of a whole range of standard epistemological oppositions. 
In another recent essay, Cornelius Castoriadis brings these epistemological 
reflections back to the question of pedagogy, of what exactly it is that 
psychoanalysis can teach us. In the end, his understanding of the pedagogical 
value of the psychoanalytic dialogue - as what he will call a "practical/poetical 
activity" involving both participants as agents - lies in the challenge it poses to 
traditional views on the supremacy of the Lacanian "symbolic" as the instrument, 
or bearer, of all knowledge. 
Castoriadis t argument begins with an extended consideration of the relation 
between what Freud once called the three "impossible" professions: 
psychoanalysis, pedagogy and politics. How accurate, he asks, are the 
historically often pessimistic and reactionary conclusions regarding the political 
implications of psychoanalysis? Is the (psychoanalytic) work directed towards 
the knowledge of the unconscious and the transformation of the human subject 
wholly unrelated to the question of freedom? Can the knowledge of the 
unconscious teach us nothing as regards the socialization of the individual, and, 











perspective adopted by psychoanalysis in the sphere of the individual 
automatically become void when passing over to the collective sphere? 
His response to these questions entails re-interpreting, and in the end 
effectively re-writing Freud's famous maxim "WO Es war, solI Ich werden" 
(translated, SE XXII, p. 80, as "Where id was, there ego shall be".) Contrary to 
what Freud seems to imply here, Castoriadis suggests, the object of analysis is 
not to eliminate one psychical "agency II or "instance" (the id) to the benefit of 
another (the ego), it is rather to alter the relation between them in the following 
way: 
If, as Freud's formulation unfortunately seems to imply when considered 
within the sequence of his text, we take the sentence to mean that the 
That, the Id, Es, has to be eliminated, conquered by the Ich, the Ego, the 
I, dried up and reclaimed like the Zuider Zee, then we propose to 
ourselves both an impossible and a monstrous objective. Impossible of 
course, since there can be no human being whose unconscious is 
conquered by the conscious, whose drives are fully permeated and 
controlled by rational considerations, who has stopped fantasizing and 
dreaming. Monstrous because reaching such a state would entail killing 
what makes us human. This is not rationality, but the uncontrolled and 
uncontrollable continuous surge of creative radical imagination in and 
through the flux of representations, affects and desires. Indeed one of the 
objects of analysis is to free this flux from the repression to which it is 
usually subjected by an Ego which is a rigid and essentially social 
construct. This is why I propose that Freud's sentence be completed with: 
"Wo Ich bin, soIl auch Es aftauchen" - "Where I (Ego) am (is), That (Id) 
should/ought also to emerge" (1994: 4). 
The object of analysis, then, is to work towards altering the relation between 
ego and id, essentially by transforming one of them: the I, the Ego or the 
conscious. The Ego is transformed by taking in the contents of the unconscious, 











ideas it will attempt to enact. In other words, the Ego has to become a II self-
reflexive subjectivity, capable of deliberation and will II. The altered relation 
between ego and id can thus be described as repression replaced by recognition 
of unconscious contents and reflection on them: inhibition, impulsive avoidance 
or acting out give way to lucid deliberation. The importance of this does not lie 
in the elimination of psychical conflict ("nobody ever assured us that we are 
entitled to a conflictless inner life," Castoriadis remarks). It lies in "the 
instauration of a self-reflecting and deliberating subjectivity which has not 
become a pseudo-rational and socially lIadapted" machine, but on the contrary 
has recognized and freed the radical imagination at the core of the psyche" 
(1994: 4/5). 
Castoriadis insists on translating Freud's werden by "become" and not "be", 
because the subjectivity he is attempting to describe is essentially a process, not a 
state reached once and for all. This is why, he suggests, we can lIelucidate" the 
aim of analysis, but cannot strictly define it. What he calls the "project of 
autonomy on the level of the singular human being" is the transformation of the 
subject so that he or she can enter this process; this, in his view, is consubstantial 
with the aim of psychoanalysis. Most importantly, this aim cannot be reached, 
nor even approached, without the self-activity of the patient: remembering, 
repeating, working through. The patient is the main agent of the psychoanalytical 
process. 
The process itself, Castoriadis continues, is analytical in so far as it is always 
both means and ends. Free associations, for example, are not just a means; as 
they unfold they express and realize the patient's developing capacity to free his 
flux of representations and thereby also to recognize his affects and desires. The 
flux of associations, punctuated by the analyst's interpretations, brings into action 
the reflexive activity of the patient: "he reflects himself and reflects upon 
himself, he returns to the material and takes it up again. II In Castoriadis' 
characterisation, psychoanalysis is transformed from technique into activity - a 











Thus psychoanalysis is not a technique, nor is it correct even to speak of 
psychoanalytic technique. Psychoanalysis is rather a practical/poetical 
activity where both participants are agents and where the patient is the 
main agent of the development of his own self-activity. I call it poetical 
because it is creative: its outcome is, or ought to be, the self-alteration of 
the analysand, that is, strictly speaking, the appearance of another being. I 
call it practical, because I call praxis that lucid activity whose object is 
human autonomy, an activity which can only be reached by means of this 
same autonomy (1994: 5, my emphasis). 
In Julia Kristeva's discussion on "Psychoanalysts in times of distress" in the 
same collection of essays, Castoriadis' "practicaVpoetical activity" is re-
described as a form of challenge to the structuralist supremacy of language - or 
the "symbolic" in Lacanian psychoanalytical discourse~ a means of restoring 
access to prelinguistic "semiotic" levels of experience. In this essay, Kristeva 
attempts to demonstrate, through reference to two concrete cases from her own 
psychoanalytic practice, the psychoanalytic access to a signifying process, prior 
to linguistic meaning, pertaining to the psychological drives. The sense of this 
process, she suggests, may be recovered in the highly individualized analytic 
transference situation through psychoanalytic work that is attentive to the indices 
or traces which the drives may leave - for instance, in physical gestures, or in the 
inflection of the voice of the analysand. Situating psychoanalysis specifically 
within its current confrontations with both the neurological sciences and a 
general cultural indifference towards psychological life, Kristeva defines the 
analytic dialogue as an interpretative work of art, a poiesis which is shown to 
apply to the vast areas of suffering not reachable by psycho-pharmacology. The 
psychic, Kristeva writes, 
may be the place where the somatic symptom as well as the delirious 
projection are elaborated and hence clear themselves up: the psychic is 
our protection, on the condition that one does not remain enclosed within 











an act of thought, of interpretation, of relational transformation (1994: 
15). 
For Kristeva, Freudian practice has revealed that the web of signifying 
relations which characterizes the symptom, the transference, the subject itself, 
while being a theoretical construction, remains at the same time, the one and only 
reality in which the psychic life realizes itself, as well as the only reality from 
which the analyst can act in order to modify it. From this, the question arises 
whether the destiny of the "speaking being" is then reducible to speech and 
language, or whether other systems of representation should be taken into 
consideration in order to think this being's logical particularities andlor to reach 
the psychic level on which sense reveals itself to the subject. 
It is in Kristeva's answer to this question that she points to the significance of 
psychoanalysis in the battle against "linguistic imperialism": Since the 1960's, 
Kristeva writes, the development of semiology has led to the conception of 
different signifying systems (iconic code, musical code, etc.) that are irreducible 
to language (the latter being envisaged as a structure or grammar, a language or a 
discourse, a statement or an utterance). Concurrently, a return to Freud, and in 
particular to the Freudian concept of representation, takes into account a plurality 
of psychic representatives: thing-presentation, word-presentation, representation 
of drive, representation of affect. The ensuing result is a "laminated model" of 
the psychic signifying process with heterogeneous traces and signs. The analyst 
has to take this polyphony into consideration in order to hear the discourse 
addressed to her at these different linguistic and translinguistic levels (voice, 
gesture, etc.) and also to tune in to the one among them which makes sense in the 
transference, here and now. 
The ethics of psychoanalysis, Kristeva goes on, thus rests on two exigencies 
proper to the western rationality to which it pertains: 
On the one hand, the maintenance of one sense, of one truth, valid and 










psychoanalysis, the "nonn" being dictated by the state of analytic theory 
and the place which the actual analyst takes in it. On the other hand, the 
maintenance of a respect (in the guise of freedom) for the desire and for 
the jouissance of the patient, which makes it appropriate or not to 
welcome our interpretation ... a respect which at the same time implicates 
the validity of-this very interpretation and also unveils the jouissance of 
the analyst under the cover of the "truth" of her constructive 
interpretation. No other discourse in the history of western rationality 
reaches this aspiration to balance truth and jouissance, authorized and 
implicated by jouissance ... (1994: 19). 
In its attention both to linguistic and "translinguistic" expression of psychic 
detenninants~ in its attention both to the "truth" and the "dramaturgy of the 
drives" (the discourse of knowledge and the discourse of desire), psychoanalysis 
thus suggests new paradigms for the study oflanguage and meaning. Even the 
very absence of words is accessible to this new "translinguistic" linguistics, thus 
adding itself to the "meaning of speech": 
After its linguistic phase and while being attentive, by way of its Freudian 
heritage, to the drive (and more attentive than before due to the pressure 
from the neurosciences), today's psychoanalysis and no doubt that of 
tomorrow will decipher the dramaturgy of the drives beyond it, the 
meaning of language where the sense of the drive disguises itself 
Indications of this sense of the drive may be translinguistic: the voice, for 
instance, its intensities and its rhythms often carry the secret eroticism of 
the depressed who has cut his linguistic ties with the other, but who has 
nevertheless buried the affect in the obscure code of his vocalization 
where the analyst will seek a desire not quite as dead as that. .. (1994: 17) 
Equally challenging to the limits of a structuralist linguistics is William 
Richardson's essay, "The Word of Silence", which explores the issue of silence 
as a fundamental element in analysis. By attending extensively to actual case 











function in the analytic situation. In his reading, analysis is simply not a mutually 
shared exchange between two equal partners in an open wide-ranging search for 
truth. An appropriate analogue for the analyst, he suggests, might be Holderlin, 
the poet - "where he waits through the night for the coming of dawn, so that 
through his attentive response he may help the significant word come to 
articulation". For Richardson, the function of the analyst'S celebrated neutrality 
consists precisely in leaving the word to the Other of Language. In Lacan's terms, 
It is to this Other beyond the other that the analyst leaves room by the 
neutrality through which he makes himself ne-uter, neither one nor the 
other of the two [subjects] who are there, and ifhe remains silent, it is to 
leave the word to [this] Other (1994: 180). 
This is why, in the analytic dialogue "silence ... is not something simply 
negative, but has a value beyond speech. Certain moments of silence in the 
transference represent in the sharpest form the apprehension of the presence of 
the Other as such." It is to Heidegger's account of the ability to be silent as one 
of the conditions for authentic human speech that Richardson then turns to throw 
further light on the Lacanian model. Silence or stillness becomes the very 
foundation of the spoken word and hence of the world according to Heidegger. 
"Language speaks as the ringing of stillness," writes Heidegger. And for 
Richardson, this "ringing stillness" testifies to an otherness which is similar to 
what Lacan sought to explore under the sign of the unconscious in the analytic 
situation. Such silence, indeed, is in the mode of speech itself - in Heidegger's 
terms, in the mode of "the highest form of thoughtful saying": 
The highest form of thoughtful saying consists in this: not simply to be 
reticent in saying what is properly to be said, but to say it in such a way 
that it is uttered in not being said: the saying of thought is a keeping 
silent. This [kind of] saying corresponds to the deepest essence of 











Standard epistemological oppositions - between truth and error, fact and 
fiction, knowledge and non-knowledge, and even between speech and silence -
are thus thrown into question by the theory of psychoanalysis, in a way which 
must also potentially subvert traditional conceptions of the interpretive or reading 
process. In its emphasis on self-reflection and the development of critical 
consciousness, in its potential to liberate what Castoriadis calls the "radical 
imagination", psychoanalysis has obvious political implications as well. And 
finally, in its attention both to linguistic and what Kristeva describes as 
"translinguistic" expression of psychic determinants, in its attention both to the 
"discourse of knowledge" and the "discourse of desire", psychoanalysis suggests 
new paradigms for the study of language and meaning themselves. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
I have already outlined one way oflooking at Freud's relation to the scientific 
endeavour - as an historically grounded activity altering paradigms of thought 
through the mutation of concepts. Recent reflections on the epistemology of 
psychoanalysis have clearly shown, however, that this is not the only kind of 
scientific pursuit we find in Freud. On the one hand, Freud is a producer of 
concepts and theories; but it is arguable that the kind of inquiry illustrated by 
psychoanalysis as a whole - and the case histories in particular - belongs in 
another, and older, tradition of scientific inquiry: the "case-book" tradition, 
which, by virtue of its story-telling properties, is related to what is called the 
"literary" in Freud. However, the very convergence of these different modes of 
scientific inquiry in Freud tells us that those critics who have identified the 
"literary" as the site and demonstration of the "unscientific" in Freud have missed 
the point: they have overlooked the heterogeneity of the scientific endeavour, 
both historically and conceptually, and have accordingly measured the case 











What is called for, then, is a new emphasis which would end essentially by 
extending the idea of what it means to be scientific; and crucially, of what it 
meant to Freud to be scientific. Against the usual interpretations of the famous 
confusions and hesitations in Freud as to whether, in the case histories, he was 
indeed engaging in a "literary" activity, or a "scientific" one, I would thus want 
to argue that what is at stake here has to do less with the "indeterminacies" of the 
modernist literary endeavour than with the multiple senses for Freud of what it 
meant to engage in scientific inquiry. At least one of these takes us back to the 
"literary", but in a way that displaces rather than confirms the standard 
opposition between science and literature. 
The readings of Freud's case histories which follow thus rest neither within 
the limits of a positivist history of science, nor within conventional definitions of 
the "literary" as essentially outside the bounds of science. I shall read the case 
histories not as equivalent to great works of fiction, but rather as representative 
of a particular moment in the development of discursive and narrative traditions 
which embody the relation between subjectivity and language, and the particular 
kinds of knowledge associated with it. It is not least in their articulation of this 
relation, I shall argue, and most importantly, in its implicit extension of 
traditional conceptions as to where and how the limits of scientificity are located, 
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Cixous, "Fiction and its Phantoms: A Reading of Freud' s Das 
Unheimliche, New Literary History, 7 (1976): 525-48; Neil Hertz, 
"Freud and the Sandman", in J. Harrari (ed.), Textual Strategies: 
Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism (London: Methuen, 1979), 
pp. 296-321; rpt in Neil Hertz, The End of the Line: Essays in 
Psychoanalysis and the Sublime (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1985), pp. 97-121; Bernard Rubin, "Freud and Hoffmann: 'The 
Sandman'," in Introducing Psychoanalytic Theory, ed. Sander L. 
Gilman (New York: BrunnellMazel, 1982), pp. 205-17; Francoise 
Melzer, "The Uncanny Rendered Canny: Freud's Blind Spot in 
Reading Hoffmann's 'Sandman'," in Gilman (ed.), Introducing 
Psychoanalytic Theory, pp. 218-39. (cited in EUmann, 1994: 4, fh. 13.) 
See also John Noyes, "The Voice of History: Sigmund FreudlE.T.A. 
HoffmannlG.H. Schubert", Journal of Literary Studies, 6: 112 (1990). 
3. Moller's study is based on a wide range of Freud's writings, but 
concentrates on four central texts: Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's 
Gradiva, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, "The Uncanny", 
and "Constructions in Analysis". Her readings of these texts constitute 
an analysis of Freud's interpretive practice, with special reference to his 
interpretations of literary texts, with the aim of persuading the reader to 
reconsider the traditional conception of a "Freudian reading". 
4. For reference to a number of schools of thought in modem linguistics 
that have yielded significant results for the study of literary texts, see 
J.M. Coetzee: "Linguistics and literature", in Ryan, R. and Van Zyl, S. 
(eds.). An Introduction to Contemporary Literary Theory 
(Johannesburg: Ad. Donker, 1982). In this essay, Coetzee concentrates 
on two schools: that of generative-transformational grammar associated 











particularly the kind of structuralism defined in the writings of Roman 
Jakobson. 
5. For the full account, see Meltzer, 1987. 
6. See Wright, 1998: 34. Here, she points out that the study of an artist's 
life to explain his works, or the study of his works to explain his mind, 
was already an established mode in the latter half of the nineteenth 
Century, when pre~Freudian psychology made various attempts to 
relate genius to madness. Cesare Lambroso, an Italian professor of 
legal medicine, argued that creative genius was a by-product of 
psychosis, in that the advance of this condition can tum someone with 
an average mind into a genius (Lambroso, 1891). This provoked a 
controversy as to who was sick, the creative genius (whose state of 
health does not in any case reflect on his work) or the society which 
chose to assign this status to decadents such as Wagner, Nietzsche and 
Baudelaire. The artistic products of the accused were investigated and 
brought in as proof of their decadence and as evidence of their lack of 
genius. Thus, Max Nordau writes, in his influential Degeneration 
(1895), "Degenerates are not always criminals, prostitutes, anarchists, 
and pronounced lunatics, they are often authors and artists." What was 
at stake was not just the status of the artist, but what the criteria for 
morality were to be: "Books and works of art exercise a powerful 
suggestion on the masses," wrote Nordau (1895: vii). 
7. The classic example of psycho biography, according to Wright (1998: 
35), is Marie Bonaparte's full-length study of Edgar Allan Poe 
(Bonaparte, 1949[1933]). Freud's preface to it shows not only his 
approval, but also his awareness of the delicate ground "investigations 
of this kind" were treading on: "In this volume my friend and pupil, 
Marie Bonaparte, has directed the light of psycho-analysis upon the life 
and work of a great writer of a pathological type. Thanks to her 
interpretative efforts, we can now understand how much of the 
characteristics of his work were determined by their author's special 
nature; but we also learn that this was itself the precipitate of powerful 
emotional ties and painful experiences in his early youth. Investigations 
of this kind are not intended to explain an author's genius, but they 
show what motive forces aroused it and what material was offered to 
him by destiny. There is a particular fascination in studying the laws of 
the human mind as exemplified in outstanding individuals" (SE XXII: 
254). 
8. Exemplary of one application of so-called "French Freud" which I shall 
not discuss here, and in which Lacan is the seminal figure, are-the 
essays introduced by Jeffrey Mehlman in French Freud: Structural 
Studies in Psychoanalysis (Yale French Studies, 48. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1972). In his editorial introductory essay, Mehlman 
notes that lito the extent that the truth of Freud's theory is the fact of 
repression, the very resistance to that truth, the structure of its escape, 











psychoanalytic theory after Freud, in this view, should not be 
(primarily) a "rectification" of Freud's theory on the basis of new data. 
Nor should it be an effort to purge Freud's writings of the elements (eg. 
the "death instinct") with no apparent empirical basis. Analytic theory, 
on the contrary, should be above all the theory of the contradictions in 
Freud's texts, of what we have referred to (all too succinctly) as the 
repression of the discovery of repression" (1972: 6). 
9. Although Derrida's relation to psychoanalysis is often imagined to be 
quite simply one of anatagonism, his dialogue with psychoanalysis 
clearly goes deeper than a purely antagonistic relation with it would 
allow. For some further illustrations of this dialogue, see Derrida, 
1978b and c, 1987a and b, 1996 and 1998. 
10. "PP" is the initial for the French expression for "pleasure principle" - a 
concept developed early in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and in 
Derrida's text. At the same time, the French pronunciation of these 
initials sounds like the equivalent of "granddaddy" (pepe). This 
homonymy links the authority of the pleasure principle and that of the 
grandfather or grandfathers evoked in the text. 
11. For a lucid summary of this aspect ofDerrida's reading - of the way in 
which he not only "overdetermines the scene of writing" but actually 
"inserts the writer into it", see Hartman, 1978: xiii. 
12. Marcus is here referring to the scene between Dora and Herr K. that 
took place when she was fourteen years old, and acted, Freud said, as a 
"sexual trauma". The scene is represented by Marcus as follows: "The 
reader will recall that on this occasion Herr K. contrived to get Dora 
alone 'at his place of business' in the town ofB and then without 
warning or preparation 'suddenly clasped the girl to him and pressed a 
kiss upon her lips.' Freud then asserts that 'this was surely just the 
situation to call up a distinct feeling of sexual excitement in a girl of 
fourteen who had never before been approached. But Dora had at that 
moment a violent feeling of disgust, tore herself free from the man, and 
hurried past him to the staircase and from there to the street door." (All 
italics are Marcus's.) 
13. Cyril Barrett (ed.). Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations 
(University of California Press, 1972, p. 44). For further references to 
the "huge literature focusing on the issue of evidence and testability" 
see Fish's list in The Linguistics of Writing: Arguments between 
Language and Literature, th. 5, pp. 171-172. 
14. In the course of the essay referred tohere ("Wittgenstein's Freud", 
1969), Cioffi repeatedly reveals his own scepticism towards Freudian 
propositions. This he does in a number of ways - for example, by 
likening the notion of the unconscious to the "invisible companion 
phantasies" of our childhood (188); by proffering physiological 











attributing Freud's attempts to illustrate the operation of unconscious 
agencies (in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life and elsewhere) to 
an unacknowledged and underhand "determination to describe familiar 
facts in a novel and congenial idiom" (191). Where Freud is most 
convincing, Cioffi evokes not the probability of his assertions but his 
"grammatical genius", his "ingenuity in devising unconstruable idioms!! 
(194), or his "ingenious exploitation ... of confusion ... in the interests 
of the theory" (195). Alongside Wittgenstein, he suggests that 
psychoanalytic explanations in general are akin to aesthetic ones: " ... 
aren't these [ explanations] once again simply a matter of 'giving a good 
simile', of , placing things side by side'?" And via the work of G.E. 
Moore (Mind, 1955), Cioffi infers that "the world, conceived of 
psychoanalytically, is just the everyday world taken over again with an 
altered expression" (209). In the end, he concludes that "there are good 
grounds for assimilating [Freud's] achievement to that of the 
anonymous geniuses to whom it first occurred that Tuesday is lean and 
Wednesday fat, the low notes of the piano dark and the high notes light. 
Except that instead of words, notes and shades, we have scenes from 
human life" (210). 
15. Amongst those "diverse objections" put forward by Timpanaro are the 
Marxist claims that psychoanalysis is a "bourgeois doctrine" incapable 
of seeing beyond an ideological horizon delimited precisely by the 
class interests of the bourgeoisie; and that it is "anti-materialistic" in 
that it externalizes situations which are historically specific - for 
example, suggests Timpanaro, "it abstracts what truth there is in the 
notion of 'hatred of the father' from an authoritarian structure of the 
family, which remains transient even if it is slow to pass away, and 
transforms it into a sort of eternal destiny of mankind" (1976: 13). 
16. While providing a comprehensive survey of, and response to this 
tradition, the work of Mitchell's text is to defend psychoanalysis against 
it, and to show that because those feminists in opposition to Freud try 
to discuss his concept of femininity outside the framework of 
psychoanalysis, their objections, and even their tributes, cannot be 
made to stand up. She also reveals that their rejection of the scientific 
status of psychoanalysis would be more accurately described as a 
rejection of its two most crucial discoveries: the unconscious, and 
infantile sexuality. Amongst those feminist writers discussed by 
Mitchell are Simone de Beauvoir (The Second Sex, 1949), Betty 
Friedan (The Feminine Mystique, 1963), Eva Figes (Patriarchal 
Attitudes, 1970) and Germaine Greer (The Female Eunuch, 1971). 
17. The strand of criticism referred to in the Introduction, fn. 12 may be 
seen as both contributing to, and developing upon this particular 
mythology. See also the discussion on Frederick Crews' "The 
Unknown Freud" in Section IV (Freud Bashing) of Chapter Four. 
18. For an interesting response to at least one dimension of this 











Freud as "master illusionist", see Patricia Kitcher's Freud's Dream: A 
Complete Interdisciplinary Science of Mind (Kitcher, 1992). Here she 
quotes from the Harvard neurophysiologist and dream researcher Allan 
Hobson (also known as a close associate of Griinbaum and Crews in 
their outspoken criticisms of psychoanalysis), where he effectively 
complains that Freud was too successful to be a good scientist: "The 
Interpretation of Dreams was anti scientific because Freud so forcefully 
dismissed all previous writers that he actually aborted an emerging 
experimental tradition. Psychiatry and psychology have been in 
Freud's thrall for almost a century ... The tenacity of the 
psychoanalytic view remains impressively obstructive to integrative 
theorizing" (1988: 51, my emphasis). Kitcher suggests that this is a 
pervasive complaint about Freud - his huge success is attributed to his 
"magnetic personality, the tight control he exercised over the 
institutions of psychoanalysis, or his strategy of going over the heads 
or, perhaps, under the feet of the established scientific community to 
appeal to an uncritical lay audience." As she goes on to point out, 
however, these criticisms make little sense: "Although popular, the first 
two hypotheses are not very plausible. Freud did not have personal 
contact with the vast majority of people who came to accept 
psychoanalysis, and he could only control those who already wished to 
become members of the psychoanalytic community. Insofar as the third 
hypothesis is meant as a criticism, it is also wide of the mark. As John 
Dewey pointed out long ago, scholars should try to make their learning 
available to the larger society" (Kitcher, 1992: 148; cited in Forrester, 
1997). 
19. See Forrester, 1997, Chapter 5. In this chapter, Forrester reviews the 
historiography of psychoanalysis in the twentieth century. The chapter 
is introduced as follows: "Beyond the studies of Freud as a personal, 
historical, or intellectual figure, beyond the conceptual history of 
psychoanalysis as a set of doctrines and theories, the chapter points 
toward the necessity for a history of psychoanalytic cultures. These 
cultures are multifaceted: part medical, part scientific, part pop, part 
avant-gardist. The many faces of Freud's offspring, sometimes working 
together, sometimes in tension or in conflict, require a more subtle 
history than we have yet been offered. The chapter presents guidelines 
and guesses for such histories, drawing on figures as diverse as Michel 
Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre, Ernest Gellner, Peter Swales, and Bruno 
Latour" (9). 
20. Again, see Forrester, 1997. In response to Sulloway's suggestion that 
Freud's "literary technology" had been used to cover up for the 
deficiencies of his "material technology" (Sulloway, 1991: 265), 
Forrester agrees that Freud's literary technology did indeed "bypass a 
traditional conception of the regulation of scientific knowledge ... 
Freud did go over the heads of scientists. But that is because his literary 
technology was his material technology." Thus Forrester concludes: 
"Psychoanalysis did bypass the normal scientific forum. In doing so, it 











science, recognising that an explanation of human beings must be 
judged by its objects as well as the scientists. Thus it set a new criterion 
that any human science - any psychology, sociology, anthropology 
might now have to meet: the criterion of being judged by those human 
beings the discipline purports to describe rather than by the members of 
the academic community. Any human science that cannot pass this test 
might be said to have failed to be a science of the human, whatever the 












HISTORY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
IN DORA'S CASE 
The subject of this chapter is Freud's first great case history, Fragment of an 
Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, better known as the case of «Dora" (the 
pseudonym given by Freud to Ida Bauer, a young woman who began an analysis 
with him in the autumn of 1900). From early childhood, Dora had suffered 
intermittent "hysterical" symptoms, and was finally presented to Freud for 
therapy at the age of eighteen, after her father's discovery of a note in which she 
threatened suicide. Dora herself had been unwilling to undergo treatment from 
the start: It was only her father's authority, Freud tells us, that induced her to 
begin treatment with him, "in spite of her reluctance" (SE VII: 23). 
Freud never completed the treatment, which was called off by Dora herself 
after only three months - an action which has since prompted Michel Foucault 
(for one) to see in her a champion of those to whom the sexuality of men was 
'foreign' and 'violating': "Dora was cured, not despite the interruption of her 
analysis, but because in taking the decision to interrupt it, she fully and 
completely took on herself the solitude of which her existence up till then had 
only been the wayward wandering" (Appignanesi, 1992: 146). 1 
Since its publication in 1905, Freud's account of his treatment of Dora has 
been widely discussed, not only by analysts but by literary critics as well. A rich 
and varied selection of essays on the case, many of them by literary critics, was 











Case: Freud-Hysteria-Feminism (1985). This volume illustrates the extent to 
which Dora, whose treatment formed the basis of Freud's longest case history of 
a woman patient, has captured the sympathy of feminists in recent years. Indeed, 
in what is to my knowledge the most comprehensive study to date of Freud's 
dealings with, and relation to women in the course of his career (Lisa 
Appignanesi and John· Forrester's Freud's Women (1992)), Dora is described as 
the woman who "sums up for many what is both fascinating and repellent, most 
subtle and most bullying in Freud's relationship with women": 
'The core example of the protesting force of women', 'a resistant heroine' 
for Helt~ne Cixous, the French theorist, Dora's case history has become 
an 'urtext in the history of woman'. She has become the symbol of that 
character-type ofthe nineteenth century, the hysterical woman, symbol of 
the 'silent revolt against male power over women's bodies and women's 
language'. The story of Dora provides a paradigm case for catching 
patriarchy with its pants down ... Dora is a feminist before her time, 'the 
one who resists the system, the one who cannot stand that the family and 
society are founded on the body of women, on bodies despised, rejected, 
bodies that are humiliating once they have been used' (146).2 
For almost a century, psychoanalysts have valued the "Dora" case study as a 
pioneering vehicle in theory and technique, admiring Freud for the courage he 
showed in publishing a case in which he had stumbled so badly. As the above 
quotation suggests, however, in the past couple of decades, feminist critics have 
read the case from a different vantage point, having found both the circumstances 
of Dora's life, and Freud's response to her illness, to support their contentions 
concerning the sexism inherent in modern Western culture. Far from praising 
Freud for his courage, these critics have focussed on what they see as his 
"imperialist tendencies" in the case, suggesting that his account of Dora's 
analysis be scanned "with the utmost suspicion". 3 For these critics, the value of 
Dora's case lies primarily in its exposure of the way in which the potentially 
emancipatory aspect of Freud's psychoanalysis in general- to let the 











suffering - fails in this instance, and conflicts with what they see as Freud's own 
political and social role as, in effect, an exemplary oppressor of women. 
My aim in once again re-opening the case is to introduce a question thus far 
conspicuous only by its absence from current debate - one which historian 
Quentin Skinner has called the "basic question" which necessarily arises 
whenever an historian of ideas 4 confronts a work he hopes to understand: "Such 
an historian," writes Skinner, 
may have focussed his attention on a work ofliterature - a poem, a play, 
a novel - or on a work of philosophy - some exercise in ethical, political, 
religious, or other such mode of thought. But the basic question will in all 
such cases remain the same: what are the appropriate procedures to adopt 
in the attempt to arrive at an understanding of the work? (1988[1969]: 29) 
In one of his earliest papers to deal with the methodology of history, social 
science and literary criticism ("Meaning and Understanding in the History of 
Ideas", 1969) Skinner outlines two conflicting answers to this deceptively simple 
question, both of which, he suggests, command a wide acceptance: 
The first (which is perhaps being increasingly adopted by historians of 
ideas) insists that it is the context' of religious, political and economic 
factors' which determines the meaning of any given text, and so must 
provide 'the ultimate framework' for any attempt to understand it. The 
other orthodoxy, however (still perhaps the most generally accepted) 
insists on the autonomy of the text itself as the sole necessary key to its 
own meaning, and so dismisses any attempt to reconstitute the 'total 
context' as 'gratuitous and worse' (1988[1969]: 29). 5 
In Skinner's view, both these two "orthodoxies" share the same basic 
inadequacy: both commit philosophical mistakes in the assumptions they make 
about the conditions necessary for the understanding of utterances, and both can 











with what Skinner sees as a series of "conceptual muddles" and "mistaken 
empirical claims" (65). Not least amongst their shortcomings, Skinner holds, is 
the failure of either methodology to deal with conceptual questions raised by the 
interpretive activity. These would include the following: How can we prevent the 
models and preconceptions in terms of which we necessarily organize our own 
thoughts and perceptions from influencing our interpretations of the texts of a 
past or alien culture? In dealing with past ideas, how can we avoid 
conceptualizing an argument in such a way that its alien elements are dissolved 
into an apparent misleading familiarity? 
Crucial, then, to Skinner's critique of these two methodologies is the question 
of the perspective (or, as he puts it, "point of vantage") from which historians 
survey the ideas of the past. There is a tendency, he suggests, to suppose that the 
best (not merely the inescapable) point of vantage from which to survey the ideas 
of the past must be that of our present situation, "because it is by definition the 
most highly evolved." In Skinner's eyes, such a tendency cannot survive a 
recognition of the fact that historical differences over fundamental issues "may 
reflect differences of intention and convention rather than anything like a 
competition over a community of values, let alone anything like an evolving 
perception of the Absolute" (67). What is needed, then, is a recognition that our 
own society is no different from any other in having its own local beliefs and 
arrangements of social and political life, as a first step towards arriving at a 
different and more salutary vantage point for viewing the ideas of the past. A 
knowledge of the history of such ideas, Skinner concludes, 
... can then serve to show the extent to which those features of our own 
arrangements which we may be disposed to accept as traditional or even 
'timeless' truths may in fact be the merest contingencies of our peculiar 
history and social structure. To discover from the history of thought that 
there are in fact no such timeless concepts, but only the various different 
concepts which have gone with various different societies, is to discover a 











To neglect to incorporate philosophical problems such as these in the process 
of interpretation is to risk lapsing into one or other of many possible forms of 
what Skinner calls "conceptual parochialism" (48). The resulting 
misinterpretations in the history of ideas are many, Skinner holds, and he has 
little trouble in collecting enough examples both to illustrate the point, and to 
argue convincingly that even when an historian of ideas addresses himself solely 
to the description of a text, and even when his paradigms reflect genuinely 
organizing features of the text, the same essential danger still remains: "the 
danger that the very familiarity of the concepts the historian uses may mask some 
essential inapplicability to the historical material" (48). 
My contention in this chapter will be that the same "conceptual parochialism" 
which, according to Skinner, particularly marks the history of ideas can be shown 
to have long been at work in the history of criticism of Freud's texts in general 
and, specifically, in the recent critical outpouring generated by Dora's case 
history. I shall argue further that in the process of absorbing this outpouring, the 
story of Dora's hysteria, as once re-told by Freud, has become all but submerged 
by the critics' story of Freud's failure to come to te11llSwith it.6 At the same time, 
its crucial place in the history of the development of psychoanalytic theory has 
been all but lost. In the course of my discussion, I will refer extensively to the 
essays published in the collection In Dora's Case - particularly that by Toril Moi 
(1981) as well as to a later essay by Moi, entitled "Patriarchal Thought and the 
Desire for Knowledge" (1989). My reasons for focusing in unusual detail on the 
latter paper in the section immediately following, and its particular relevance to 












(MALE) SCIENCE, THEORY, 
RATIONALITY 
Focusing (in "Patriarchal Thought and the Desire for Knowledge") on 
psychoanalytic theories of knowledge, sexuality, and sexual identity, Toril Moi 
suggests that at one level, Freudian psychoanalysis can be characterized as an 
effort to open up and extend the field of rational knowledge: "Perhaps the 
analytic situation may be seen as a different model of structuring knowledge," 
she writes, "one that forces us steadily to reflect on the points of exclusion, 
repression, and blockage, in our own discursive constructions ... " (1989: 196) 
Moi is here referring particularly to what she calls the very specific "dialogic" 
situation created by psychoanalytic practice as it is known today, and as it 
evolved from the first analytical sessions between Freud and his hysterical 
patients. These sessions between analyst and mental patient were crucially 
different from any that had gone before. As Moi points out: "Unlike Charcot, 
who chose to exhibit his hysterical patients in a gesture of dominance, Freud 
decided to listen to them: psychoanalysis is born in the encounter between the 
hysterical woman and the positivist man of science" (1989: 196). It is in this 
reversal of the traditional roles of subject and object, of speaker and listener, Moi 
suggests, that Freud "more or less unwittingly" opens the way for a new 
understanding of human knowledge. 
Moi has arrived at this point in her essay (to which I will return later) after a 
brief survey of some recent attempts amongst feminists to criticize, and propose 
alternatives to, certain forms of structured thought which have been variously 
labelled "male science," "male theory," or "male rationality." These traditional 
modes of knowledge, they have argued, are inextricably linked with traditional 
sexualized - and sexist categories of dominance and oppression. Their claim 











what you will - constantly re-enacts the Cartesian mindlbody divide, in which, 
the argument goes, 
... always and everywhere the rational, active, masculine intellect 
operates on the passive, objectified, feminized body. To be intellectual-
to think? - under patriarchy ... is willy-nilly to take up a position marked 
as masculine. If one doesn't, one has no option but to embrace the other 
side of the tedious series of homologous patriarchal oppositions, where 
irrationality and thoughtlessness is equated with femininity, the body, 
object-being, emotionality, and so on (1989: 189). 
In Le DoeutPs account (as summarised by Moi), for example, woman (the 
singular here denoting the imaginary, universal fantasy of woman entertained by 
western philosophy) is perceived as lacking the phallus. In the patriarchal 
imagination, what a woman needs is a man, not philosophy. Ifa woman declares 
that she too feels the "philosophical lack", or a desire for knowledge, this can 
only be a compensation for her primary sexual frustration. According to this 
logic, then, the thinking woman necessarily becomes synonymous with the "blue 
stocking" - the frustrated spinster of patriarchal ideology. On the other hand, 
woman is also considered incapable of philosophy, or of rational thought, 
because of her "self-sufficient plenitude." Here, there is no question of lack or 
castration rather, woman becomes the "very emblem of narcissistic self-
sufficiency." According to this logic, women cannot think because they suffer no 
lack at all. Hence Hegel's classic formulation (in Philosophy of Right) that, 
though women may be "capable of education," they are not made for "the more 
advanced sciences" - for "philosophy, and certain forms of artistic production 
which require universality": 
Women may have ideas, taste, and elegance, but they do not have the 
ideal. The difference between men and women is like that between 
animals and plants; men correspond to animals, while women correspond 
to plants because they are more of a placid unfolding, the principle of 











the State is at once in jeopardy, because women regulate their actions not 
by demands of universality, but by arbitrary inclinations and opinions. 8 
According to Moi, the most influential arguments against the so-called "male 
science" have been put forward by Evelyn Fox Keller, whose main enemy is the 
concept of "objectivity", which she sees as the ruling ideological paradigm of the 
natural sciences.
9 
In Keller's critique, scientific ideology divides the world into 
"two parts - the knower (mind) and the knowable (nature)", and insists that the 
relation between the "knower and known is one of distance and separation ... 
that between a subject and object radically divided." Having divided the world, 
patriarchal ideology genders the two halves. Nature, objectified and oppressed, is 
female, whereas knowledge is characterized as male: "The characterization of 
both the scientific mind and its modes of access to knowledge as masculine is 
indeed significant. Masculine here connotes, as it so often does, autonomy, 
separation and distance. It connotes a radical rejection of any commingling of 
subject and object, which are, it now appears, quite consistently identified as 
male and female." Such ideology, Keller claims, excludes women from science 
by casting them as "non-objective," as "non-knowers." Feminists should refuse 
to accept this male vision of the subject/object division, she argues, proposing, 
instead, a "commingling" of the two, or an empathetic "feeling" for the object, 
where it is no longer reified but respected in its integrity. Feeling must thus be 
allowed a place within science, not relegated to a space outside it. 
Moi is sceptical both about the decision to label traditional science "male" 
(Why not "patriarchal"? she suggests; just as all women are not feminist, not all 
males are patriarchal), and to call the new mode of knowledge "female". Why 
imply, she asks, that this new mode is somehow less suitable for males? She is 
also sceptical about the usefulness of seeing all forms of intellectual mastery 
simply as aggressive control and domination. To be consistent, Moi points out, 
the denunciation of all possible forms of mastery would logically have to include 
the rejection, not only of "rapacious exploitation of natural resources, nuclear 
weapons, and dictatorship, but of agriculture, house-building, and bicycling as 











Also, while Moi finds Keller's critique of dominant forms of what she calls 
Cartesian rationalism "inspiring;" her denunciation of the logic of domination 
and objectification at work in the ideology of science "timely;" while she warms 
particularly to the idea put forward by Keller of undoing the split between reason 
and emotion - of finding a place for feeling within science - on the whole, she 
finds Keller's analysis of knowledge and feminism "somewhat disappointing." 
This is because, as she argues convincingly, Keller's analysis never quite 
manages to break free of what Moi calls the "straitjacket of patriarchal binary 
thought," in the end remaining trapped by the very categories of the scientific 
ideology it sets out to read. "There is no attempt here to question the logic that 
underpins patriarchal metaphysics, or to contest the very meaning of terms such 
as masculine/feminine, reason/emotion. And so on ... " For Moi, then, the 
problem with Keller's analysis of gender and science and philosophy is not only 
its "cultural essentialism," but the fact that 
the solution proposed ('commingling,' 'union' of subject and object) 
remains curiously timid and flawed. If the 'union' proposed reinforces the 
separate identities of subject and object, their grand vision of 'female 
science' promises no more than a certain elasticity of boundaries between 
separate, self-identical essences (1989: 193). 
The Tyranny of Thought by Sexual Analogy 
In preference, Moi turns to the "deconstructive onslaughts" on these very sets 
of (patriarchal) oppositions which have come from thinkers such as Helene 
Cixous, and which, she says, contrast sharply with the "curious timidity" of the 
critiques offered by Keller and her followers: 
By focusing on the inevitable struggle, the warring relationship between 
such Wrarchical oppositions [as for example, activity/passivity; 











battle between the sexes insinuates itself in the very structure of the sign, 
and that in the case of such binary oppositions the sexual struggle is 
bound up with the effort to deconstruct phallogocentric logic ... The 
deconstructive move is not to abolish oppositions, or to deny that such 
signifiers exist, but rather to trace the way in which each signifier 
contaminates and subverts the meanings of the others. Such an approach 
opens the sign up, insists that its meaning is always deferred, never fully 
present to itself. In its questioning of the metaphysics of presence and 
identity, deconstruction offers a more radical solution to the problem of 
subject and object raised by Keller and Bordo (1989:194). 
It is from this point, via a brieflook at French feminist philosopher Michele 
Le Doeuff's account of knowledge and patriarchal ideologization, that Moi turns 
towards the Freudian psychoanalytic dialogue. For Moi, the analytical situation 
radically undermines the split between active subject and passive object 
denounced by Keller - not only because the doctor here turns listener, but also 
because the analytical session engages both analyst and patient in transference 
and countertransference. 10 For Moi (as for Lacan) the Freudian dialogue, caught 
as it is in a web of transference and countertransference, "unsettles and undoes 
any clear-cut oppositions between subject and object, self and other" (1989: 
198). Moi turns to Shoshana Felman to draw out the implications of this point: 
By shifting and undercutting the clear-cut polarities between subject and 
object, self and other, inside and outside, analyst and analysand, 
consciousness and unconscious, the new Freudian reflexivity substitutes 
for all binary, symmetrical conceptual oppositions - that is, substitutes for 
the very foundations of Western metaphysics - a new mode ofinterfering 
heterogeneity. The new reflexive mode - instituted by Freud's way of 
listening to the discourse of the hysteric and which Lacan will call the 
"inmixture of the subjects" (Ecrits, p. 415) - divides the subjects 
differently, in such a way that they are neither entirely distinguished, 











rather, interfering from within and in one another (Felman, 1987, cited in 
Moi, 1989: 198). 
There is then in the psychoanalytic situation (concludes Moi) a model of 
knowledge which offers no firmly established binary opposites, which cannot 
therefore be gendered either as masculine or feminine, and which thereby offers 
us a chance to escape the "patriarchal tyranny of thought by sexual analogy": 
«As feminists in search of new ways to think about objectivity," Moi writes, "we 
can ill afford to neglect the model offered by psychoanalysis" (1989: 198). 
However - and here's the catch Moi also points out that if Freud's (and 
Breuer's) act of listening represents an effort to include the «irrational discourse 
of femininity" in the realm of science, it also embodies their hope of extending 
their own rational understanding of psychic phenomena: "Grasping the logic of 
the unconscious, they want to make it accessible to reason" (1989: 197). In other 
words, if on the one hand Freud's and Breuer's "act of listening" can be said to 
constitute a "revolutionary effort to let female madness speak to male science," 
what lurks behind it at the same time is a "colonizing, rational impulse" which 
constantly threatens to undermine it, to "obliterate" the language of the 
unconscious, and to repress the challenging presence of the feminine in the 
process (1989: 197). 
Having once drawn our attention to it, however, Moi dismisses this 
contradiction at the heart of the psychoanalytic project with a surprising rapidity; 
but not without first alluding, even if only in passing, to its significance in the 
case of Dora. In Dora's case, she suggests, Freud allows the "colonizing 
impulse" to gain the upper hand; here, according to Moi, what she now calls the 












Freud and the Demon of Interpretation 
Indeed, the observation is not an original one. It has been made before, in one 
form or another, by almost everyone who has written on Dora in recent years, 
and in almost every one of the essays published in In Dora's Case. I I In Steven 
Marcus' view ("Freud and Dora", 1974) the distinguishing characteristic of 
Freud's technique in this case is the aggressive manner in which he "forces 
interpretations on Dora before she is ready for them or can accept them" 
(1985[1974]: 88). According to Marcus, throughout this "extraordinary work" 
both Dora and Freud insist with "implacable will" upon the primacy of their own 
versions of "the truth," or "reality," which they then use as "weapons" against 
one another. It must be emphasized, he remarks, 
that the "reality" Freud insists upon is very different from the "reality" 
that Dora is claiming and clinging to. And it has to be admitted that not 
only does Freud overlook for the most part this critical difference: he also 
adopts no measures for dealing with it. The demon of interpretation has 
taken hold of him, and it is this power that presides over the case of 
Dora ... In fact, as the case history advances it becomes increasingly clear 
to the careful reader that Freud and not Dora has become the central 
character in the action ... Instead of letting Dora appropriate her own 
story, Freud becomes the appropriator of it (1985[1974]: 85). 
The Freud we meet with in Marcus' reading is indeed a "demonic" figure, 
"pushing on no matter what" - the same "relentless investigator" in fact that we 
encounter in T oril Moi' s 1981 reading of the case, in "Representation of 
Patriarchy: Sexuality and Epistemology in Freud's Dora." Here, Moi had 
developed to the full her allusion, in the later essay, to Freud's "imperialist 
tendencies" in Dora's case, while suggesting that his account of the analysis of 
Dora be scanned with the "utmost suspicion". In the Dora case, she writes, 
Freud's attempts to posit himself as the neutral. scientific observer who is merely 
noting down his observations and reflections can no longer be accepted: "The 











(1985[1981]: 189) As for Dora herself, her condition as a victim of male 
dominance becomes starkly visible in Freud's account, according to Moi: "She is 
a pawn in the game between Herr K and her father; her doctor joins in the male 
team and untiringly tries to ascribe to her desires she does not have and to ignore 
the ones she does have" (1985[1981]: 191). If the "emancipatory project" of 
psychoanalysis fails in the case of Dora, concludes Moi, without mincing her 
words, 
it is because Freud the liberator happens also to be, objectively, on the 
side of oppression. He is a male in patriarchal society, and moreover not 
just any male but an educated bourgeois male, incarnating malgre lui 
patriarchal values. His own emancipatory project profoundly conflicts 
with his political and social role as an oppressor of women (1985[1981]: 
193). 
But if it can be held that, in Dora's case, Freud failed in the potentially 
"revolutionary" project to let the madwoman speak, to inscribe the madwoman's 
discourse into science; that the discourse of the hysteric was allowed only the 
slightest inroad into the "smooth positivist logic" of the man of science, 
becoming if anything submerged by it instead; if it can be held that in Dora's 
case, it is Freud's story that is being written and not hers that is being retold, can 
it not equally be held that in the storm of critical protest that has arisen in its 
wake, Dora's story has become no more her own, still less Freud's, but largely, 
and perhaps even overwhelmingly, that of his critics? Freud's story of Dora's 
hysteria has become the critics' story of Freud's failure to come to terms with it. 
It is to salvage what has been lost in the telling of this tale that I would now 













FRAGMENT OF AN ANALYSIS 
OF A CASE OF HYSTERIA 
An "effort of self understanding" 
Why did Freud publish Dora's case at all? If the analysis failed so dismally, 
and if (as his critics have often conceded) Freud was the fIrst to admit it, what 
could he have hoped to gain from setting down on record this ignominious 
personal and professional defeat? The reasons Freud himself offers in the 
"Prefatory Remarks", and comes back to sporadically in "The Clinical Picture", 
are reiterated as follows in the "Postscript": 
In publishing this paper, incomplete though it is, I had two objects in 
view. In the fIrst place, I wished to supplement my book on the 
interpretation of dreams by showing how an art, which would otherwise 
be useless, can be turned to account for the discovery of the hidden and 
repressed parts of mental life ... In the second place, I wished to stimulate 
interest in a whole group of phenomena of which science is still in 
complete ignorance today because they can only be brought to light by 
use of this particular method. No one, I believe, can have had any true 
conception of the complexity ofthe psychological events in a case of 
hysteria - the juxtaposition of the most dissimilar tendencies, the mutual 
dependence of contrary ideas, the repressions and displacements and so 
on ... 
Some lines later, he moves on to the question of sexuality: 
I was further anxious to show that sexuality does not simply intervene, 
like a deus ex machina, on one single occasion, at some point in the 
working of the processes which characterize hysteria, but that it provides 











manifestation ofa symptom ... I can only repeat over and over again - for 
I never find it otherwise - that sexuality is the key to the problem of the 
psychoneuroses and of the neuroses in general (SE VII: 114-15). 
The usual response to Freud's own characterizations of his labours is to 
dismiss them with the same scepticism he was in the habit of directing at his 
patients.12 Thus for Steven Marcus the above remarks have at most a "fractional 
validity." The real reason behind its publication, he claims, was clearly Freud's 
own "unsettled and ambiguous role" in the case; his need to write it out, in some 
measure, as "an effort of self-understanding" (1985[1974]: 67). This - in some 
measure - may well be so; but the critical energy which has been so forcefully 
directed in recent years, by Freud's feminist critics in particular, at his own 
"unsettled role" in the case has ended, 1 would suggest, by obscuring the substan-
tial contribution it represents in the history of the development of Freud's theory 
as a whole; its crucial place in the building of the very psychoanalytic model of 
knowledge which, for Moi, holds such promise for feminists in search of new 
modes of intellectual activity. 
Where exactly does the case fall in the history of the development of Freud's 
theory as a whole? It is by now widely known that although the first version of 
Dora, originally entitled "Dreams and Hysteria", was written in 1901, the year 
after the appearance of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud delayed publication 
until 1905, the year of the Three Essays on Sexuality. Amongst much 
speculation over the reasons for this, Jacqueline Rose has suggested that Freud's 
hesitancy in publishing the case was a measure of his theoretical uncertainty 
during this period: the period between the first formulations of the theory of the 
unconscious in The Interpretation of Dreams, and the theory of sexuality in the 
Three Essays. In this sense, the history of the case, its "hesitancy", she writes, 
"speaks for itself': 
for [Dora's case] is caught quite literally between those two aspects of 
Freud's work, the theory of the unconscious and the theory of sexuality, 











Dora could only appear finally at the point where the implications of its 
failure had already been displaced onto a theory of sexuality, by no 
means complete and still highly problematic, but at least acknowledged 
as such (1985[1978]: 130). 
This marks the beginning of what is probably one of the most constructive 
analyses to date of the reasons for the case's failure, one in which its transitional 
theoretical status - falling (or "failing") as it does between Freud's theory of the 
unconscious and that of sexuality - is for once recognised and taken into account. 
Unlike most, this is an analysis whose theoretical density takes it beyond any 
fixation on Freud the man, and his narcissistic "fantasies of omniscience;" while 
also, as its author makes clear, going beyond the call for an "alternative reading," 
whose content would then be "the feminine," to recognise the problem of Dora 
precisely as the problem of the feminine within psychoanalysis. 
Thus the history of the case - its original title; the date of its conception and 
the date of its eventual publication; the space between the two, punctuated, as 
Rose observes, by Freud's own comments on his hesitancy regarding a case that 
had promised so much, but had turned out "poorer than [he] could have wished" -
would tend to bear out the double theoretical and methodological purpose stated 
above: to supplement The Interpretation oj Dreams, and to demonstrate the 
importance of sexuality in the aetiology of hysteria. As for the second objective 
- "to stimulate interest in a whole group of phenomena of which science is still in 
complete ignorance today ... "; and to give some conception of the complexity of 
the psychological events in a case of hysteria ("the juxtaposition of the most 
dissimilar tendencies, the mutual dependence of contrary ideas, the repressions 
and displacements and so on ... ") - this second objective marks the beginnings of 
precisely that "effort" Moi discerns in Freudian psychoanalysis to "open up and 
extend the field of rational knowledge" - an effort consisting in its theorisation of 
the properties of the unconscious - and it is clear that the significance of the case 
history for Freud lies not least in the introduction it provides to this new terrain. 
Indeed, at a number of points in the narrative, Freud makes it evident that he 











nevertheless be impossible to chart completely in the space of a single case 
history. 
A New Region of Knowledge 
What is the shape of this new territory, and what is its significance in the 
development of Freud's theory? The first contours are outlined in the opening 
pages of the first chapter of the case history proper, "The Clinical Picture," in 
Freud's description of his patients' inability, in the early stages of treatment, to 
provide a coherent narrative of the history of their lives and illnesses. The first 
account, he tells us, is invariably fragmented and incomplete; comparable, in 
fact, to "an unnavigable river whose stream is at one moment choked by masses 
of rock and at another divided and lost among shallows and sandbanks" (SE VII: 
16). This inability to give an ordered and consistent history, Freud stresses, is not 
merely characteristic of the neuroses; it also possesses great theoretical 
significance with regard to both the conscious and unconscious motivations of 
the patient. 
In the first place, he writes, part of what the patient omits from the story will 
have been kept back consciously and intentionally, for reasons of shame, timidity 
or discretion: "this is the share taken by conscious disingenuousness." In the 
second place, what is left out of the story may have been normally available to 
consciousness, but may have disappeared from memory in the telling, despite the 
patient's having made no deliberate reservations: "the share taken by unconscious 
disingenuousness." In the third place, there may by true "amnesias" - "gaps in 
the memory into which not only old recollections but even quite recent ones have 
fallen" - and "paramnesias" which are formed secondarily to fill in the gaps and 
conceal the presence of the amnesias. In addition, even when the events them-
selves have been kept in mind, the purpose underlying the amnesias may be 
fulfilled by altering their chronological order, thereby destroying the connections 











From a theoretical point of view, the presence of such "amnesias" is 
fundamental, and a necessary correlate of the symptoms. Ideally (as the theory 
has it in this early stage of its development) in the further course of the treatment, 
the patient will supply the facts which had been withheld, or had not come to 
mind. The paramnesias will prove untenable and the gaps in the patient's memory 
will be filled in, until finally, all going well, the patient will come into possession 
of his or her own full and unbroken history. 
Dora's case then, opens by focusing our attention on those very "points of 
exclusion, repression and blockage in ... discursive constructions" whose 
emphasis in the analytic dialogue Toril Moi invokes as the distinguishing 
characteristic of psychoanalytic practice, and because of which she advances it as 
a new - and, for feminists, more promising - model of structuring knowledge. In 
fact, this early discussion on amnesia marks one of the formative moments in 
what will later become the Freudian theory of repression; and a continuation of 
what Freud had first described in the Studies on Hysteria as a "psychical force" 
(or an "aversion on the part of the ego") in his patients which was opposed to 
pathogenic ideas becoming conscious or being remembered; a form of "not 
knowing," which was in fact a "not wanting to know - a not wanting which might 
be to a greater orlesser extent conscious" (1893-1895: 353). Indeed, so 
significant was the development of the theory of repression that in 1914, Freud 
" declared it to be the corner-stone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis 
rests." In the following year, he published his most elaborate formulation of the 
theory in the metapsychological paper entitled "Repression" and in Section IV of 
the paper on "The Unconscious" (see SE XIV: 180-85). 
Ifrepression is the "cornerstone" on which the structure of psychoanalysis 
rests, it also holds potential theoretical value, 1 would suggest, in Moi's search 
for new ways to think about knowledge and modes of intellectual activity. How 
so? Loosely speaking, repression may be defined as a psychical mechanism 
activated when the satisfaction of a drive (or instinct, as Strachey's translation 
has it), though likely to be pleasurable in itself, would be "irreconcilable with 











and unpleasure in another" (SE XIV: 147). If the motive force of un pleasure 
acquires more strength than the pleasure likely to be obtained from satisfaction, 
the instinctual impulse may pass into a state of "repression." In the "first phase" 
of repression, the psychical representative of the instinct is denied entrance into 
the conscious. In the second phase, "mental derivatives" of the repressed 
representative - or trains of thought which, while originating elsewhere, have 
since come into associative connection with it - undergo the same fate as what 
was primally repressed (SE XIV: 148). 
The most striking feature of Freud's theory as fomulated in the paper devoted 
to repression in 1915 (and the most promising, 1 think, for the move away from 
"patriarchal systems ofknowledge ff ) is the continuing active force he ascribes to 
an instinct's psychical (or "ideational") representative even after it has undergone 
repreSSion. Freud insists that "it is a mistake to emphasize only the repulsion 
which operates from the direction of the conscious upon what is to be repressed; 
quite as important is the attraction exercised by what was primally repressed 
upon everything with which it can establish a connection." In other words, it is 
essential to realise that repression does not hinder the instinctual representative 
from continuing to exist in the unconscious; from "organizing itself further, 
putting out derivatives, and establishing connections." Indeed, Freud goes on to 
say, the instinctual representative develops with less interference and more 
profusely if it is withdrawn by repression from conscious influence: 
It proliferates in the dark, as it were, and takes on extreme forms of 
expression, which when they are translated and presented to the neurotic 
are not only bound to seem alien to him, but frighten him by giving him 
the picture of an extraordinary and dangerous strength ... (SE XIV: 149). 
We are now coming very close to another ofMoi's preferred models for 
knowledge - that suggested by the French feminist philosopher, Michele Le 
Doeuff Le Doeuffs analysis marks the transition, in Moi's paper, from the 











and her followers, to the more promising one suggested by psychoanalytic 
practice: 
Focusing [Moi writes] on the double problem of the empirical exclusion 
of women and the theoretical repression of femininity in western 
philosophy, Le Doeuff argues that traditional western philosophy exhibits 
a striking contradiction at its centre. On the one hand, philosophy is an 
activity based on the recognition of lack: philosophy, in other words, 
exists because there is something that remains to be thought. On the other 
hand, philosophy also works from the imaginary assumption that the 
knowledge produced by philosophy creates completion, that its aim is to 
construct a flawless structure without lack. .. (1989: 194) 
The problem for feminists is that invariably, western philosophy posits 
woman as the symbol of lack and negativity, thereby, the argument goes, turning 
her into the ground of its own existence: "by her very inferiority she guarantees 
the superiority of philosophy" (Moi, 1989: 195). Moi supports Le Doeutrs call 
for an alternative philosophy which would be conscious of its own lack, which, 
"aware of its own open and unfinished nature can hope to avoid being caught in 
the sterile dichotomy between reason and unreason, masculinity and femininity" 
(1989: 196). For Moi, the advantage ofLe Doeuif's account (over that of Keller, 
Bordo et al.) is that it "allows us to analyse and deconstruct the opposition 
between inside and outside which structures knowledge itself In this respect, Le 
Doeutrs deconstruction of the boundaries between knowledge and non-
knowledge is not only reminiscent ofDerrida, but of the very specific dialogic 
situation created by psychoanalytic practice" (1989: 195). 
It is also reminiscent, I would suggest, of Freud's theory of repression: In its 
emphasis on the "deceptive (psychical) strength" of the subject's repressed 
instinct - or "amnesia" - normally considered as a form of loss of knowledge, but 
which is now shown to be more powerful in its influence over the subject than 
what he or she knows, or has available to consciousness, Freud's theory of 











psychoanalytic practice in general - provides just such a "deconstruction of the 
boundaries between knowledge and non-knowledge," perhaps in fact the first 
radical questioning of the metaphysics of presence and identity which must be 
the starting point of all deconstructive logic, and, ultimately, all movements 
away from those systems of knowledge trapped in Moi's "straitjacket of 
patriarchal binary thought. II 
In the light ofMoi's earlier-mentioned dismissal of Dora's case as a "failure," 
and Freud's account of her analysis as one to be regarded "with the utmost 
suspicion," this is ironic indeed. But what of her more specific charge against his 
"imperialist tendencies" in the case? 
There has been little dispute over the basic theory underlying Dora's case, 
namely, that hysterical symptoms are "compromise formations" that express 
repressed sexual wishes; nor over the fact that, since Dora did indeed display 
such hysterical symptoms, she must have had a "secret" - an unconscious desire. 
The controversy, and most of the opposition from feminists, arises not in relation 
to the existence of Dora's "amnesias," but to the anamnesis through which we are 
conducted in the psychoanalytic narrative which tells of her treatment, during the 
course of which, it is held, Dora's story becomes Freud's. For Moi, this 
anamnesis is coincident with the point at which Freud's "imperialist tendency" 
surfaces in the case, thereby all but obliterating the discourse of his patient. 
Since Dora's "discoursell - the "language of the irrational and the uncon-
scious", or the "discourse of the madwoman", as Moi has it - is by definition 
unavailable to consciousness, then it must be in the process of "translating" it 
into conscious thought-language, that this "obliteration" takes place. And if 
repression is the process through which the patient's "intimate" and "secret" 
wishes are made unavailable to consciousness in the first place - through which 
they are converted into the symptoms of hysteria - then the dream, according to 
Freud, is one of the roads along which consciousness can be reached by the 
psychical material which has been cut off :from it, and become pathogenic; it is 











interpretations of Dora's dreams have been much discussed, while frequently 
held as evidence of his tendency in Dora's case to substitute his own version of 
reality for hers. But the dream is not the only path along which consciousness 
may be reached by repressed psychical material, and in the following section, I 
would like once again to put Moi's charge against Freud to the test, this time by 
tracing his "translation into conscious thought-language" not of her dreams but of 
another of her "indirect" psychical representations - of what he calls her 
"supervalent" train of thought regarding her father's relations with Frau K. 
III 
THE NARRATIVE OF 
DORA'S DESIRE 
In his 1915 paper "Repression", Freud emphasizes that it would be incorrect 
to imagine that all the derivatives of what was primally repressed are withheld 
from the conscious by the mechanism of repression. If these derivatives become 
sufficiently far removed from the repressed representative, he suggests-
"whether owing to the adoption of distortions or by reason of the number of 
intermediate links inserted" - they have free access to the conscious (SE XIV: 
149). This is significant since the appearance of such "derivatives," produced by 
the patient during analysis in the form of "associations," may lead the analyst to 
the content of the repressed material. Thus Freud writes, 
In carrying out the technique of psychoanalysis, we continually require 
the patient to produce such derivatives of the repressed as, in 
consequence either of their remoteness or of their distortion, can pass the 
censorship of the conscious. Indeed, the associations which we require 
him to give without being influenced by any conscious purposive idea 
and without any criticism, and from which we reconstitute a conscious 
translation of the repressed representative - these associations are nothing 











If the condition for such derivatives gaining access to consciousness is a 
function of their remoteness (through distortion) from the repressed repre-
sentative, then their initial formation is a function of the existence of a 
"continuous pressure" exercised by the repressed itself in the direction of the 
conscious, so that if the repression is to be kept from breaking through to 
consciousness, this pressure must be balanced by an unceasing counter-pressure: 
"Thus the maintenance of a repression involves an uninterrupted expenditure of 
force, while its removal results in a saving from an economic point of view" (SE 
XIV: 151). In Chapter IV of his 1915 paper on "The Unconscious" Freud 
describes this process - the process whereby the repression is not only established 
but continued and maintained - as an anticathexis "by means of which the 
system Pes. protects itself from the pressure upon it of the unconscious idea" (SE 
XIV: 181). It is this which represents the permanent expenditure of energy ofa 
primal repression, and which also guarantees the permanence of that repression. 
The notion of "anticathexis" is prefigured in Freud's analysis of the uncon-
scious force underlying Dora's reaction to her father's affair with Frau K. 
According to Freud, Dora herself complained that she could not account for its 
apparently disproportionate strength: 
"I can think of nothing else", she complained again and again. "I know 
my brother says we children have no right to criticize this behaviour of 
Father's. He declares that we ought not to trouble ourselves about it, and 
ought even to be glad, perhaps, that he has found a woman he can love, 
since Mother understands him so little. I can quite see that, and 1 should 
like to think the same as my brother, but I can't. 1 can't forgive him for it" 
(SE VII: 54-55). 
Dora's inability in the face of her own repeated attempts to dissipate or 
remove this particular train of thought leads Freud to suspect the presence of a 
pathological component: "A train of thought such as this," he writes, "may be 











its pathological character in spite of its apparently reasonable content, by the 
single peculiarity that no amount of conscious and voluntary effort of thought on 
the patient's part is able to dissipate or remove it. A normal train of thought, 
however intense it may be, can eventually be disposed of' (SE VII: 54). Freud 
concludes that such a thought must owe its reinforcement to the unconscious: "It 
cannot be resolved by any effort of thought, either because it itself reaches with 
its root down into unconscious, repressed material, or because another 
unconscious thought lies concealed behind it" (SE VII: 55). 
In the latter case, Freud goes on, the concealed thought is usually the direct 
contrary of the supervalent one: "Contrary thoughts are always closely connected 
with each other and are often paired off in such a way that the one thought is 
excessively intensely conscious while its counterpart is repressed and uncon-
scious." This relation between the two thoughts is proffered as an effect of the 
process of repression, in which repression is in fact achieved by means of the 
excessive reinforcement of the thought contrary to the one to be repressed. The 
"reactive thought" keeps the objectionable one under repression by means ofa 
certain "surplus of intensity;" at the same time it itself becomes "damped" and 
proof against conscious effort of thought. In this scenario, conscious thought 
itself becomes a symptom of the repressed, and the task of the analyst to strip the 
supervalent thought of its excessive intensity by bringing its repressed contrary 
into consciousness. 
A "fine poetic conflict" 
Freud's response to this particular point of "exclusion" or "blockage" in Dora's 
discourse is given in two essentially contradictory narratives, each of which 
(following the above formulation) serves as an attempt to identify and give 
substance to the "repressed contrary" to which the supervalent thought owes its 











Following what most critics have identified as the general scheme of Freud's 
interpretation of the case as a whole, the first scenario is based on what Rose 
describes as a "simple identification of the oedipal triangle." The starting point 
for this is Dora's protest at her place in the relationship between Frau K and her 
father; that is, her objection to being "prof erred as a pawn" to Herr K Her 
repudiation of Herr K is then the inevitable consequence of an outrage that takes 
Herr K as its immediate object, and yet behind which is the figure of the father, 
who is the object of real reproach (see Rose, 1985[1978]: 132). 
Specifically, at this point in the narrative, the obsessive character of Dora's 
preoccupation with her father's relations to Frau K - along with her "ultimatum" 
to him ("either her or me ... "), her "scenes," her suicidal intentions - is taken to 
constitute a form of behaviour which, exceeding filial concern, would be more 
appropriate in a "jealous wife" and must therefore signify her newly revived 
( unconscious) sexual attraction to her father, now manifested in an (unconscious) 
identification with "both the woman her father had once loved and the woman he 
loved now." This, in turn, is diagnosed as a "reactive symptom" to cover the 
suppression of her love for Herr K" l3 
Thus, as in Freud's analysis of Dora's second dream (see Rose, 1985[1978]: 
132), Dora's infantile love for her father is here summoned up secondarily, as a 
defence against her continuing love for Herr K In this scenario, then - and in 
Freud's general interpretation of the case as a whole - Dora's rejection of Herr K 
is defined as simultaneously oedipal and hysterical (repudiation of her own 
desire); and her desire itself as unproblematic - heterosexual and genital. 
But if this is the point at which Freud's interpretation can be seen to endorse a 
patriarchal definition of Dora's desire, it is also the point at which the narrative 
which contains it strains most insistently against such an endorsement. For if the 
above scenario provides a motivation for the revival of Dora's infantile affection 
for her father, it nevertheless fails (as Freud himself implies) to account satisfac-
torily for the fact that she was almost incessantly a prey to lithe most embittered 











complicity in the affair between her father and Frau 1(, nor her persistent loyalty 
to the woman who had ostensibly replaced her in her father's affections. 
Furthermore, it cannot account for Dora's "unmistakable identification with her 
father," revealed in the symptom of the cough, nor her further "masculine 
identifications" at various points in the case history (see Rose, 1985[1978]: 133). 
Most crucial of all, however, the first scenario cannot explain the "obstinacy" 
with which Dora retained the particular amnesia concerning the sources of her 
"forbidden" knowledge - the knowledge whose main source, as Freud realizes 
only too late, "could have been no one but Frau 1(," and which Frau K will later 
use to betray her. And it is Freud's refusal to let go of this most "remarkable" of 
Dora's blockages and repressions - ("her knowing all about such things and, at 
the same time, her always pretending not to know where her knowledge came 
from ... ") - which prompts him finally to resist the temptation to settle for less 
when he offers in the concluding pages of "The Clinical Picture" to "obscure and 
efface" what he now revealingly refers to as the "fine poetic conflict" it has thus 
far been possible to ascribe to Dora. The second scenario which Freud now puts 
forward in its place· and which he describes as a "complication" of the first, but 
which in fact crucially displaces it - reveals Frau K rather than her husband as the 
real object of Dora's desire and obsessive jealousy, and the reason for her 
exaggerated reproaches against her father. Although what Freud now perceives 
as the "strong homosexual current" in Dora's mental life becomes submerged 
again in his analysis of Dora's dreams, the deep significance he attached to its 
discovery - however belated - is stressed in a lengthy footnote to his closing 
remarks on the case (SE VII: 120, fn. 1). 
Thus the anamnesis through which we are conducted in this sequence - the 
product of Freud's attempt to "fill the gaps" in Dora's memory - appears in two 
contradictory narratives, each with its own central character. In the first, the 
protagonist, and the object of Dora's repressed desire, is Herr K; in the second, it 
is his wife. It is the persistence with which Freud clings to the first of these two 
narratives, while marginalising the second, that has attracted most hostility, 











"reality" Freud insists upon here is very different from the "reality" Dora is 
claiming and clinging to; and second, that not only has Freud assigned Herr K a 
far more favourable position than he deserved in Dora's mental life, in doing so 
he has at the same time - in his identification with Herr K, and in his failure to 
recognize the counter-transference (the place of his own desire in the narrative) -
made himself rather than Dora the central character in the action. 
Indeed, there is no denying that Freud underplays, or is perhaps simply blind 
to the extent to which his second tale - the tale of Dora's homosexual desire for 
Frau K - contradicts and undermines the first, his only offer to deal with this 
problem appearing in what Rose perceives as a "mandatory appeal" to the 
properties of the unconscious itself ("in the unconscious contradictory thoughts 
live very comfortably side by side" (SE VII: 61)). Rose notes the tenacity with 
which Freud hangs on to a notion of a genital heterosexuality throughout the case 
- so much so that in consequence, he is led to pursue a number of blatantly false 
. trails in his interpretation of both her dreams. 14 Yet Freud's apparent failure to 
grasp the full significance of his move should not be allowed to undermine it, nor 
to efface the brief but telling comparison inscribed within it between his vision of 
himself as "man ofletters" in the first tale while "medical man" in the second; 
creator of a "fine poetic conflict" in the first scenario and a "world of reality" in 
the second. Nor, finally, should the theoretical distance be underestimated, and 
thus the radical break: it represents, between the notion of a problematic, 
differential and component sexuality suggested, however tentatively, by Freud's 
second narrative - and elaborated in his Three Essays on Sexuality - and the 
nineteenth century medical conceptualization of the sexual instinct from within 
which it was produced. 
For Rose, Freud's unconvincing attempt to resolve the contradictions he 
himself has created reveals a theory of interpretation functioning as "resistance" 
to the pressing need to develop a theory of sexuality - whose "complexity" and 
"difficulty," as she points out, manifests itself time and again in the case. But 
what is not mentioned here is the already existent, and indeed powerfully in-











time. Freud's "resistance, II according to Rose, appears most strongly in relation to 
Frau K's status as an object of desire for Dora: "Thus this aspect of the case 
surfaces only symptomatically in the text, at the end of the clinical picture that it 
closes, and in a series of footnotes and additions to the interpretation of the 
second dream and in the postscript" (1985[1978]: 134). Read against the 
conceptual and historical background of nineteenth century psychiatry, however, 
the marginal status of this aspect of the case becomes symptomatic, I would 
suggest, not so much of Freud's resistance as that of the psychiatry of the day; of 
the absence of any conceptual backing for an analysis of Dora's homosexuality 
which could assign it a central position in the narrative without converting the 
story of her hysteria into a tale of perversion instead. 
Coming back to Arnold Davidson's account (1987) of the historical 
background against which Freud wrote his Three Essays on Sexuality (and thus 
Dora's case history too), we learn that in nineteenth century psychiatric circles 
there is virtually unargued unanimity both on the fact that the "sexual instinct" 
has a natural function and on what that function is. Kraffi-Ebing's view is given 
as representative: 
During the time of the maturation of physiological processes in the 
reproductive glands, desires arise in the consciousness of the individual, 
which have for their purpose the perpetuation of the species (sexual 
instinct) ... 
With opportunity for the natural satisfaction of the sexual instinct, every 
expression of it that does not correspond with the purpose of nature - i.e., 
propagation - must be regarded as perverse (1987: 260). 
Should anyone doubt the representativeness ofKrafft-Ebing's conception, 
Davidson cites a long passage from Moll's Perversions o/the Sex Instinct (1891) 
(since, he suggests, Moll is often considered to be a direct anticipator of Freud) 
which demonstrates that Moll's conception of the nature of the sexual instinct and 











psychiatry silently adopted this conception of the function of the sexual instinct. 
It was often taken as so natural as not to need explicit statement. .. " writes 
Davidson (1987: 261). "In fact," he adds later, "many writers before Freud used 
the terms 'sexual instinct' and 'genital instinct' interchangeably, as if the latter 
were simply a more precise name for the former. This identification was not in 
the least bit arbitrary, since the sexual instinct was conceived of as psychically 
expressing itself in an attraction for members of the opposite sex, with genital 
intercourse as the ultimate aim of this attraction" (1987: 273). Since the natural 
function of the sexual instinct was thus taken to be propagation, and the 
corresponding natural, psychological satisfaction of this instinct to consist in the 
satisfaction derived from heterosexual, genital intercourse, then any deviation 
from this function, including homosexuality, was taken to be a perversion. 
Beyond Patriarchal Models of Knowledge 
Juliet Mitchell has warned against the dangers of extrapolating Freud's ideas 
about femininity from their context within the larger theories of psychoanalysis -
a practice which, she suggests, can be held responsible for much of the hostility 
his work has provoked amongst feminists. For, as Mitchell points out, it is only 
this context which prevents such notorious concepts as for example, "penis-
envy," from becoming either laughable or ideologically dangerous: "In the 
briefest possible terms, we could say that psychoanalysis is about the material 
reality of ideas both within, and of, man's history; thus in 'penis-envy' we are 
talking not about an anatomical organ, but about the ideas of it that people hold 
and live by within the general culture, the order of human society" (1974: xvi). 
The same hostility must naturally result from any attempt to read Freud without 
constantly bearing in mind both the conceptual framework in which he was 
working, and the ideological and social order in which he lived. 
Further, while it is one thing to pay lip-service to the question of history, it is 
another to integrate it into the practice of interpretation itself There are, of 
course, many patriarchal judgements to be found within Freud's work, and the 











understandably, where his feminist critics are concerned. Not infrequently, the 
link: between these judgements and the prejudices of Victorian society is also 
both recognised and made explicit. Yet, more often than not, if the question of 
history is not being raised purely as a way of rejecting psychoanalysis as the 
"culture-bound product of a small-minded 'Victorian' patriarch," it is raised only 
to accuse Freud of having had a part in it at all- as if his complicity with the 
ideology of his day were something he might easily have avoided - while what is 
ignored is the explanatory potential of history with respect to the processes of 
intellectual production, both for Freud and in general. Thus we can now turn 
again to Moi, in her essay on Dora: 
Now if the hysterical woman is gagged and chained, Freud posits himself 
as her liberator. And if the emancipatory project of psychoanalysis fails in 
the case of Dora, it is because Freud the liberator happens also to be, 
objectively, on the side of oppression. He is a male in patriarchal society, 
and moreover not just any male but an educated bourgeois male, 
incarnating malgre lui patriarchal values. His own emancipatory project 
profoundly conflicts with his political and social role as an oppressor of 
women (1985[1981]: 193). 
This is eloquently put, but it is insensitive - as, 1 would suggest, is the essay 
as a whole - to the complexity of the charge it lays. For if the "conflict" that it 
raises is essentially an historical one, and if behind it, in the final analysis, lies 
the reason for the case's failure, then why is this the single occasion in the space 
ofMoi's discussion that the category of history is allowed to surface at all? Also, 
if Freud is an "incarnation" (malgre lui) of patriarchal values, then what, in this 
equation, we can only wonder, is the content, for Moi, of lui? Important though 
it is to distinguish and bring to light the moments at which, bourgeois patriarchal 
male that he was, Freud reproduced the values of his bourgeois patriarchal 
society, these should not be allowed to obscure those other moments when, 












DORA IN HISTORY 
What has been lost in most recent commentary on Freud's Fragment of an 
Analysis of a Case of Hysteria is any abiding sense or acknowledgement of its 
groundbreaking significance in the history of psychoanalytic thought. Read in 
conjunction with the Studies on Hysteria, The Interpretation of Dreams and the 
Three Essays on Sexuality (as Freud explicitly intended it to be), Dora's case can 
be seen to straddle three of the founding moments of Freudian psychoanalytic 
theory. How then can the case at the same time be said to represent its failure? 16 
Would it not be more accurate to suggest that Dora's case, rather than 
representing the failure of psychoanalytic theory - "in its inability to account for 
the feminine" - represents the point at which that theory begins; the first 
significant attempt, in fact, to "write the history of femininity, to understand 
female subjectivity, or simply to imagine woman as mythical and social subject" 
(De Lauretis, 1984: 131). Rather than the moment at which Freud s "colonizing 
impulse ... gains the upper hand", Dora's case represents the moment at which that 
"colonizing impulse" is first relaxed, however tentatively or incompletely; the 
moment at which the "language of the irrational and the unconscious" makes its 
first, tremulous appearance in the discourse of science. 
Clearly, one of the aims of the recent wave of feminist literary critical 
response to Dora's case was to clear the way for a reading in which Dora's 
"desires" would no longer be submerged within the narrative of her chauvinistic 
analyst, in which the story which emerged from the case would at last be Dora's, 
rather than Freud's. Ironically though (as already suggested), it has in fact been 
Freud himself who has remained the protagonist in Dora's case throughout this 
storm of feminist critical protest - as villain, rather than hero, to be sure, but as 
protagonist nevertheless. 
A very different narrative has emerged with the appearance of Hannah 











is precisely in this, I would suggest, that the interest of her exploration lies, both 
for feminism, and in general. 17 Now, as an historian, Hannah Decker sets out to 
"mine Freud's text as one would a rich lode, following its many glimmering 
veins ... " (xi). The result is a narrative in which, perhaps for the first time (and 
despite the theoretical claims of Freud's feminist readers), Freud's young patient 
emerges as an historical figure in her own right. Let us dwell for a moment on 
this narrative. 
Freud, Dora and Vienna 1900 
Decker's methodology is intriguing. The book's nine chapters take as their 
titles quotations from Freud's case history itself, and the procedure is to elaborate 
on these at length with an accumulation of details which lend historical substance 
to Freud's words. Thus the title of Chapter One ("In Spite of Her Reluctance") is 
a reference to the line in which Freud reveals, famously, that it was only Dora's 
father's authority which had induced her to see him at all, so that the analysis had 
proceeded without her spontaneous consent and II in spite of her reluctance. II The 
chapter itself gives substance to the word "reluctancell by surveying, in often 
gruesome detail, the history of Dora's unsuccessful medical treatment before she 
had been brought to Freud - a history guaranteed to have made just the thought of 
placing herself in the hands of yet another doctor a terrifying one for the patient. 
Indeed, some physicians at the turn of the century still held to what was 
known as the "uterine" theory of hysteria. This was based on the belief that the 
uterus (hysteria in Greek) was an independent entity in a woman's body, that it 
had an ardent desire to create children, and that if it remained empty too long 
after its owner's puberty, it became unhappy and angry and began to travel 
throughout the body. In its wanderings, it pressed against various bodily organs, 
creating "hysterical" - that is, uterus-related - symptoms. So, if a woman felt she 
could not breathe, it was because the uterus was in the throat, or pressing against 
the bronchial tubes. If a woman was lethargic, it was because the uterus was 











palpitations occurred when the womb, in its meanderings, bumped up against the 
heart. The mind boggles to think of the treatments dreamt up to deal with 
prognoses such as these. 
By the onset of Dora's symptoms, most physicians had in fact discarded the 
uterine theory, diagnosing "hysterical" symptoms as nervous in origin, and 
responding with a wide variety of treatments including, in Dora's case, electro-
therapy and hydro-therapy. Yet after several years of subjection to a range of 
different physicians, none of their efforts or experiments had produced any 
positive effect on Dora's symptoms. The array of unpleasant reactions she would 
have suffered at their hands, however, makes her eventual "reluctance" to try her 
luck with Freud, or anyone else, only too understandable. Common reactions to 
electro-therapy, for example, included dizziness, nausea, trembling, feelings of 
faintness, involuntary defecation, muscle pain, headache, insomnia and increased 
nervousness. Minor electrical burns were inflicted, inducing pricking and 
burning sensations, redness, pimples and welts, followed by the formation of 
scabs, which left small indentations and permanent, pigmented scars after they 
dropped off. And so on ... By the time Dora was presented to Freud, at the age of 
seventeen, she had been enduring effects such as these for years, and had already 
lost all confidence in the abilities of physicians. 
Within this first chapter, then (and in many of the chapters to come), we are 
given more than just the cursory glimpse granted us by Freud himself into the 
"pre-history" of the case, in a way which turns out to be essential for any depth of 
understanding as to the patient's psychological state as she began her analysis. 
Crucial to this were the effects of repeated unhappy experiences at the hands of 
medical practitioners; no less so were the deeply misogynistic and anti-Semitic 
attitudes to which Dora had been exposed throughout her childhood and early 
adolescence in Vienna. 
As Decker points out, Dora's family was representative of many hundreds of 
Bohemian Jews who had emigrated to Vienna in the latter decades of the 











economic hardship which had been their lot in the neighbouring rural areas. By 
1910, Vienna had become the largest Jewish city in Europe after Warsaw and 
Budapest, both of which had unusually high Jewish populations of about 25 
percent. Yet, despite odd periods of relative dormancy in anti-Semitic sentiment 
in the Austrian capital around the tum of the century, the experience of Viennese 
Jews here would, in the end, tum out to be no better than it had been in the rural 
areas. Decker is particularly thorough on the complex history of the growth of 
anti-Semitism in Vienna throughout the course of Dora's life, culminating in her 
eventual emigration to the United States in 1938, the same year Freud was 
himself finally to escape to England. 
So by the time she was eighteen, Dora had been a victim of both the 
primitivism of the medical establishment, and an ever-strengthening Viennese 
anti-Semitism. Added to this were the society'S increasingly repressive attitudes 
to women. Anti-Semitism and misogyny went hand in hand, the combination 
apparent in the publication of what Decker describes as the "psychological hit of 
1903" in Vienna, Otto Weininger's expanded doctoral dissertation, Sex and 
Character (Weininger, 1903). Originally a student of philosophy, Weininger was 
himself the son of a Jewish anti-Semite, and his highly acclaimed bestseller was 
a diatribe against women and Jews, remarkable not least for the linkage it 
displayed between the author's self-hatred as a Jew, and his misogyny. Weininger 
wrote that even the most superior woman was immeasurably below the most 
debased man, just as Judaism at its highest was immeasurably beneath even 
degraded Christianity. Judaism was so despicable precisely because it was shot 
through with femininity. As women lacked souls, so too did Jews. Both were 
pimps, amoral and lascivious. Women and Jews did not think logically, but 
rather intuitively, by association. Weininger declared his era to be not only the 
most feminine but the most Jewish of all eras. Jews were even worse than 
women; Jews were degenerate women (39). 
Such was the social and cultural climate in Vienna by the time of Dora's first 











Dora's intelligence and background to develop symptoms of severe depression. 
Decker sums up her situation as follows: 
Consider, then, Dora's state of mind at eighteen. She belonged to the very 
frrst generation of Jews to be born to equal legal status after hundreds of 
years of officially decreed inferiority and familial disruption. But neither 
the state nor the populace was reconciled to emancipation, and as the 
years went by Dora encountered more, not less, anti-Jewish sentiment. As 
woman, she heard the faint beginnings of cries for female equality, but 
the hard fact is that the confident voices that preached women's inherent 
inadequacy drowned out any contradiction. It was the general consensus 
that women were inferior and the insistent proclamation of anti-Semites 
that the proof of the Jews' deficiency lay in their exhibition of traits 
commonly associated with women. Thus did anti-feminism and anti-
Semitism unite at the tum ofthe century. A young Jewish woman like 
Dora could be filled with even more self-doubt, and even self-loathing, 
than a Jewish man (1991: 40). 
Dora's life within her immediate family did nothing to alleviate the depression 
brought on by the broad social milieu in which she was raised. From her earliest 
years, Dora had lived amongst chronic illness, both psychological and physical. 
Her mother, Kathe, had married at the age of eighteen, unaware at the time that 
her husband had syphilis. From him, she contracted gonorrhea, thus condemning 
herself to a life of chronic abdominal pains and a permanent vaginal discharge. 
To give an idea what it is like for a woman to have gonorrhea before antibiotics 
had been discovered, Decker quotes from a German physician's discussion of the 
disease in 1908: 
The infection of a woman with gonorrhea ... is a disaster ... Gonorrhea 
selects by preference the internal reproductive organs of woman; upon the 
extensive mucous membranes of these organs the gonococci find the most 
favorable conditions for their persistent life ... "They grow luxuriantly, 











rise to sterility ... This disease has ... a miserably depressing effect, and in 
contradistinction from men, [women] are likely to suffer for many years 
from intense pains ... often horribly severe ... In most cases they are 
condemned to a life of deprivation and misery - not usually for any fault 
of their own, since most women are infected by their husbands" (cited in 
1991: 51/2). 
Because of both her parents' illnesses, Dora spent much of her early life in the 
atmosphere of the numerous health spa's and resorts surrounding Vienna. For as 
long as she could remember, her mother had been obsessed with attempts to 
cleanse herself of her venereal disease, the activity of cleaning itself becoming 
the ruling passion of Kat he's life. One of her son's friends described her as "a 
literal Puritan [who] strove for total cleanliness." Another concluded: "It is clear 
that a wife and mother, who dwelled under this compulsion, was never in the 
position of giving her husband or children joy, or indeed, any warmth." Kathe 
was far more preoccupied with her gynaecological complaints and her persistent 
constipation than with her children, and she insisted on absolute cleanliness in 
the house, to the point where it became almost unlivable. 
As Decker puts it, in a life where so much was out of her control, Kathe 
sought, by ruling the household with an iron hand, to retain some fragments of 
power. Her incessant housekeeping was one outlet for her anger, aroused by her 
forced move from Vienna to a health resort owing to her husband's ill health, the 
venereal disease she had contracted from him, his consistent infidelity 
throughout their marriage, and her daughter's contempt. Kathe's cleaning was a 
hostile action, and her daughter felt it as such. While it was relatively easy for 
Philipp, her husband, and Otto, her son, with their paths to autonomy largely 
open, to acquiesce to Kathe's obsessions, and even support them to some extent, 
Dora, in an essentially powerless position herself, rebelled as much as she could, 
and relations between mother and daughter were always poor. 
Thus Decker's accumulation of historical detail concerning the circumstances 











contemporary reader with a curious sense that there should never have been a 
problem at all deciphering the causes for Dora's hysteria: common sense alone 
should have been enough to explain her psychopathology by the time she was 
brought before Freud. How could her reactions have been otherwise? In the case 
history itself, however, Freud makes little connection between the roots of her 
illness in the larger social world, focussing instead on their relation to one of the 
more specific circumstances of her family life - the special friendship between 
Dora's family and another family, the K's. 
At the heart of this was her father's extended affair with the young and 
attractive Frau K - in response to which her husband, Herr K, turned his attention 
to the fourteen year-old Dora, making several attempts at seduction between then 
and her first visit to Freud. These attempts, whose effect on Dora was clearly 
traumatic, were ignored when she complained of them to her father (since of 
course, it suited him to have his daughter distract the attention of his lover's 
husband, thereby keeping him out of the way). Thus, at the impressionable age of 
fourteen, Dora found herself a pawn in a sordid love-triangle, ruthlessly 
exploited by the three adult figures closest to her, all of whom were bent on using 
her for their own gain. Little wonder she had become suicidally depressed by the 
time she turned eighteen, and little wonder she was "reluctant" to comply with 
her father's demand that she undergo treatment with Freud. 
While recent critical history has figured the outcome of the case largely in 
tenns of the battle of wills it entailed between analyst and analysand, Decker's 
historical investigation helps shift the emphasis to the complex conflicting 
motives and goals detennining the roles of its three principal characters - Dora, 
her father Philipp, and Freud. Freud recognized that Philipp had brought his 
daughter to him in the hope that he would convince Dora to accept her father's 
relationship with Frau K, stop threatening suicide, and make things easier for 
everyone at horne; that his motivations, in other words, were largely selfish. At 
the same time, he became aware that Dora had her own goals: she wanted Freud 
to recognize the injustices done to her, convince her father that Herr K's 











affair. Of course, he too had his own motivations in pursuing the analysis, which 
differed both from Dora's and her father's. 
Besides hoping to cure his patient of her symptoms, Freud had theoretical 
goals, hoping to use Dora's case to prove the validity of The Interpretation of 
Dreams. Earlier in the year, he had been criticized in reviews for not providing 
detailed case material that showed how dream interpretation could remedy a 
neurosis. Now an opportunity to do just that had presented itself in Dora's 
analysis. Indeed, the original title of the paper he wrote on Dora's treatment was 
"Dreams and Hysteria." Only later did it become "Fragment of an Analysis of a 
Case of Hysteria. " 
Thus, as Decker's reading shows, Freud hoped to use the treatment to "subject 
[certain theoretical] assumptions to a rigorous test" (96). He wished to verify his 
new theory of instinctual infantile sexuality; to demonstrate the detrimental 
effects of masturbation on mental health (since he believed that Dora's illness had 
begun as a result of her masturbating); and to consolidate his ideas on the 
existence of bisexuality and its application in psychoanalysis. Freud also wanted 
to use the case to explore more fully his ideas on the motives for illness in 
hysteria, on the two kinds of "gain" - primary and secondary - a patient could 
derive from an illness. The neurosis itself was the "primary gain"; albeit an 
uncomfortable or disabling symptom, it was the person's unconscious, 
psychological solution to a mental conflict. The "secondary gain" involved 
staying ill to "gain" attention. It was this type of gain that Freud sought to 
prevent Dora from attaining lest it result in her remaining permanently ill. 
Indeed, there can be no doubt that Freud attempted to use Dora's case as an 
arena for conducting theoretical research, and that his research interests at times 
took precedence over the treatment. In fairness to Freud, however, it should be 
said that balancing research interests with strictly therapeutic ones remains a 
troublesome issue in psychoanalytic practice today. As Decker puts it, "How can 
the therapist who is trying to gather clinical data or test a hypothesis do so 











attitudes about hysterical patients further contributed to Freud's "failures" in the 
case, as did nineteenth-century views about women, and late Victorian customs 
and conventions. 
At the end of the day, however, it is Freud's relative successes in the case 
rather than his failures which are thrown into reliefby Decker's historical 
analysis. In Decker's words, "at least Freud did not physically torture Dora," 
as did some of his colleagues with their own hysterical patients. There is ample 
historical data to show how doctors' recommendations included suffocating 
hysterical women until their fits stopped, beating them across the face and body 
with wet towels, ridiculing them and exposing them in front of family and 
friends. One gynaecologist trained his patients not to have hysterical attacks by 
inserting tubes into their rectums after each episode. Another advocated "making 
a strong mental impression" by threatening hysterical women with the 
application of hot irons to their spines. For a while, the famous gynaecologist 
Alfred Hegar (1830-1914), and his pupils performed ovariectomies in cases of 
"intractable" hysteria, and the renowned neurologist, Nikolaus Friedrich (1825-
82), was at the forefront of a medical cohort who cauterized their patients' 
clitorises. 
Freud was thoroughly convinced, by the time he saw Dora, that all such 
methods for the treatment of hysteria were both inhumane and futile. By 
comparison with his peers, his own approach to the problem was progressive to 
say the least. Decker's contribution, then - both to the Freudian critical tradition, 
and to feminism - is to shift the emphasis from Freud's narrative in Dora's case, 
to its historical context, so that in the end, it is history itself, rather than Freud, 













It is ironic that the very "drive for knowledge" (Freud's own theory, in fact, of 
epistemophilia) which Moi holds responsible for Freud's failure in the Dora case 
(see Moi, 1985[1981]) is also the theory she invokes in her later essay as most 
promising for feminism in the directions it offers for a departure from the 
"dualisms" of patriarchal thought. In particular, Moi claims, since the Freudian 
drive for knowledge, or the capacity for intellectual speculation, takes the human 
body as its point of departure, the theory of epistemophilia can be seen to provide 
us with a first outline ofa theory of knowledge which undoes and displaces the 
reason/emotion (or head/heart; mind/body) dualism which is invariably read 
through the male/female paradigm (For elaboration, see Moi, 1989: 198-203). 
The theory is further valuable, in Moi's view, for its demonstration of the 
imaginary nature of (male) philosophy's "dream of self-contained plenitude": 
Self-defeating, always frustrated by the limitations of the body, the 
Freudian drive for knowledge is structurally incapable of achieving total 
insight or perfect mastery: the philosopher's dream of self-contained 
plenitude is here unmasked as the imaginary fantasy it is. Freudian 
theory posits the drive for knowledge (epistemophilia) as crucially bound 
to the body and sexuality. If reason is always already shot through with 
the energy of the drives, the body, and desire, to be intellectual can no 
longer be theorised simply as the "opposite" of being emotional or 
passionate ... (1989: 203) 
Thus Moi invokes the theory of epistemophilia as the rationale behind her 
own conviction that a new feminist philosophy of science has much to gain from 
Freud and Lacan. Curiously, however, her own criticism of Freud would seem to 
demand of him the very achievement of "complete elucidation," "total insight" or 
"perfect mastery" whose impossibility she would now seek to endorse. The same 











is only if we take an interpretive stance which insists on seeing the whole of 
psychoanalytic theory as present in one piece of writing - in effect ignoring the 
historicity of intellectual production in general - that we can easily make such 
demands. 
In this chapter, I have tried to do two things: First, to restore some sense of 
the theoretical moment represented by the Dora case, particularly in its 
anticipation of later formulations of the crucially significant theory of repression, 
and in its movement - however halting - towards a new theory of a problematic, 
differential and component sexuality. Second, I have tried to re-introduce the 
question of history into what has become the critics' story of Freud's failure to get 
to the bottom of Dora's case. In doing so, 1 hope to have suggested a way beyond 
the contradiction in which Freud is persistently invoked, in feminist criticism, as 
both liberator and oppressor, hero and villain. The distinction drawn by Mitchell 
between Freud's theory itself: and the ideological uses to which it is put (1974: 
xxii) seems especially pertinent here. As Mitchell points out, psychoanalysis, like 
any other system of thought, was formed and developed within a particular time 
and place: "but that does not invalidate its claim to universal laws, it only means 
that these laws have to be extracted from their specific problematic - the 
particular material conditions of their formation. In this connection we need to 
know of the historical circumstances of their development mainly in order not to 
limit them thereto" (1974: xx). 
The difference between ignoring the historical circumstances of the 
production of Dora's case history, and incorporating them in the process of its 
interpretation, I would suggest, amounts to the difference between reading it as 
the moment at which the "emancipatory project" of psychoanalysis fails, and the 











L As Appignanesi and Forrester (1992) point out, however, the way in 
which Dora walked out on Freud is "not unambiguously the victory of 
her desire for self-determining solitude, it is not necessarily a 'proto-
feminist political vote'." For these writers, Dora's departure may not 
have been so much the "incarnation of the revolt of women forced to 
silence", but rather a "declaration of defeat" (146-7). The question of 
whether or not she was ever finally "cured" of her hysterical symptoms 
is also debatable. For an historically-based response to this question, 
see Decker, 1991 and 1992. 
2. For an interesting discussion ofCixous' position on the Dora case 
history, see "Keys to Dora" in Gallop, 1982. Here, Gallop suggests that 
Cixous' portrait of Dora is "also a portrait ofH6lene Cixous is also a 
portrait of women (in general)." Her response to Cixous and Dora is 
written in the context of her view on the necessity for a creative 
encounter between psychoanalysis and feminism. In order for each to 
exercise their strength and flexibility, Gallop suggests, psychoanalysis 
and feminism must meet. 
3. See Moi, 1985[1981] and 1989. 
4. For an analysis of the now confusing variety of ways in which this 
phrase has been used, Skinner's reference is to Maurice Mandelbaum, 
"The History of ideas, intellectual history and the history of 
philosophy", in The Historiography of the History of Philosophy, 
BeiheJt 5, History and Theory (Middleton, Conn., Wesleyan University 
Press, 1965), 33n. For his own part, he notes, he uses the tenn 
"consistently but with deliberate vagueness, simply to refer to as wide 
as possible a variety of historical inquiries into intellectual problems." 
5. Skinner takes his quotations from one of the many confrontations in the 
debate at the time among literary critics between the 'scholars' and the 
'critics'. The tenns and issues of this debate, he suggests, seem to be 
repeated in an identical (though less conscious) manner in histories of 
philosophical ideas. The belief in 'contextual reading' comes from 
F. W. Bateson, "The functions of criticism at the present time", Essays 
in Criticism, 3 (1953), p. 16. The contrary belief in the text itself as 
'something detenninate' is taken from F.R. Leavis, "The responsible 
critic: or the functions of criticism at anytime', Scrutiny, 19 (1953), p. 
173. 
6. The titles of many recent essays - even those written from a 
sympathetic perspective - reflect this obsession with Freud's failure in 












7. I choose Moi' s work as one of the clearest examples of a certain 
feminist critique, in which (as I shall point out later) Freud is 
persistently invoked in a contradictory light - as both liberator and 
oppressor of women, both hero and villain in the feminist cause. The 
ongoing history of feminist responses to Freud and psychoanalysis is of 
course extensive. For a brief but excellent outline of some of the most 
significant strands of this critical history, and of its present state, see 
EHmann, 1994, pp. 20-26. In an illuminating summary of this complex 
field, EHmann starts with Karen Homey's challenge to the theory of 
penis-envy as early as the 1920's (Homey, 1967), moving to 
developments on Homey's position in such classics as Simone de 
Beauvoir's The Second Sex (1949). From here, she discusses the 
seminal work of Juliet Mitchell (in Mitchell, 1974, and Mitchell and 
Rose, 1982), explaining how Mitchell's defence of the psychoanalytic 
theory of castration in her 1974 study served to liberate feminist theory 
from a narrow-minded hostility to psychoanalysis (21). She outlines 
Elizabeth Grosz's position, in her feminist introduction to Lacan 
(1990), in which Grosz challenges Lacan's claims that the phallus is a 
'neutral' term functioning equally for both sexes, insisting instead that 
the prestige accorded to the phallus in psychoanalysis derives from the 
privileges of the penis in reality. She also discusses the shift of focus to 
the pre-Oedipal dimension of the female psyche in French feminism, 
exemplified in the work ofLuce Irigaray (1985 and 1991) and Julia 
Kristeva (1980 and 1986), along with Judith Butler's "trenchant 
critique" of Krist eva in Butler, 1990. A selective bibliography of works 
in the field of Feminism and Psychoanalysis is given (pp. 269-271). In 
particular, see Brennan, 1989 and 1992, and Wright, 1992. For a useful 
summary of the femininity debate in psychoanalysis see Hazel Rowley 
and Elizabeth Grosz, 1990. 
8. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, para. 166, Zusatz, trans. Knox (modified 
by Le Doeuff), pp. 263-4; quoted in Michele Le Doeuff, "Women and 
Philosophy", reprinted in Toril Moi (ed.) French Feminist Thought 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 190. 
9. For a useful selection of varied positions on the competing discourses 
of science and their material effects on women, see Mary Jacobus, 
Evelyn Fox Keller and Sally Shuttleworth (eds.), Body/Politics: Women 
and the Discourses of Science (London: Routledge, 1990). The volume 
includes essays by Donna Haraway, Mary Poovey, Susan Bordo and 
Mary Ann Doane, amongst others. 
10. Transference is roughly defined by Moi as "the process whereby the 
patient transfers earlier traumas and reactions, whether real or 
imaginary, on to the analyst". Countertransference, may be 
characterized as "the analyst's more or less unconscious reactions to 
the discourse of the patient." Transference and countertransference, she 
goes on, engage analyst and analysand in a "complex, differential set of 
interactions, which may literally 'make or break' the analysis. The truth 











transferential network. Transference and countertransference tum the 
analytic session into a space where the two participants encounter each 
other in the place of the Other, in language" (197). For Lacan, the fact 
that the analysis is constructed in language implies that analytic 
dialogue is essentially triangular, rather than dualistic: "[It] is not a 
dialogue between two egos, it is not reducible to a dual relationship 
between two terms, but is constituted by a third term that is the meeting 
point in language ... a linguistic, signifying meeting place that is the 
locus of ... insight:" (Transcribed from a recording of a talk by Lacan 
at the Kanzer seminar, Yale University, 24 November 1975, translated 
by Barbara Johnson, quoted by Shoshana Felman in Jacques Lacan and 
the Adventure oj Insight: Psychoanalysis in contemporary Culture 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 56. 
11. For example: for Maria Ramas ("Freud's Dora, Dora's Hysteria") such 
is the obliterating force of Freud's blindness in his treatment of Dora 
that in the end her hysteria - her "repudiation of sexuality" - is not 
explained by Freud but, rather, "explained away"; in the course of the 
analysis, according to Ramas, Freud literally "abandons" his initial 
concern - the elucidation of Dora's hysteria to present us instead with 
a series of "ideological constructs" manufactured purely as a defence 
for his own "patriarchal fantasies of femininity and female sexuality" 
(1985[1980]: 151). Particularly striking to Neil Hertz ("Dora's Secrets, 
Freud's Techniques") are Freud's moments of "exuberant intellectual 
narcissism" in the case, his moments of "investment" in the "beautiful 
totality" of his own imaginative products, the "vigor" with which he 
"differentiates" himself from Dora, his own "mode of knowing" from 
hers. For Hertz, while Freud's "overflowing fondness" for his subject 
in the Dora case is noteworthy, it can hardly be said to include Dora 
herself: "if anything, she is diminished by it, seen thoroughly through" 
(1985[1983]: 233-34). 
12. It may be worth noting, at this point, Skinner's deep scepticism 
regarding the "astonishing" while "not unusual" assumption amongst 
historians of ideas that it may be quite proper, in the interests, for 
example, of extracting a message of higher coherence from an author's 
work, to discount the statements of intention which the author himself 
may have made about what he was doing, or even to discount whole 
works which would impair the coherence of the author's system. In the 
case of Hobbes, for example, he writes, it is well known from his own 
explicit statements what character he intended his political thought to 
bear: "Leviathon, as Hobbes put it in the review and Conclusion, was 
written 'without other design' than to show first that the 'civil rights of 
sovereigns and both the duty and liberty of subjects' could be grounded 
'upon the known natural inclinations of mankind', and second, that a 
theory so grounded would centre on the 'mutual relation of protection 
and obedience': a politics of rational calculation is thus predicated on 
something like an assimilation of politics to psychology. Yet it has still 











is nothing more than a rather ineptly detached aspect of a transcendent 
'religious whole'. The fact, moreover, that Hobbes himself appeared 
unaware of this high order of coherence provokes not retraction but 
counter-assertion. Hobbes merely 'fails to make clear' that his 
discussion of human nature 'in fact' sub serves a religious purpose. It 
'would have been clearer' if Hobbes had 'written in terms of moral and 
civil obligations' and thus brought out the 'real unity' and basically 
religious character of his whole 'system'." (1988[1969]: 41; for 
Skinner's sources, see the original.) In Dora's case history, Freud's 
statements of intention are simply ignored or dismissed by his critics, 
while he is regularly accused of not having achieved a level of 
coherence in the analysis to which, as the very title ("Fragment of an 
Analysis of a Case of Hysteria") indicates, it lays not the slightest 
claim. 
13. "I could not avoid the assumption that she was still in love with him," 
Freud writes, "but that, for unknown reasons, since the scene by the 
lake her love had aroused in her violent feelings of opposition and that 
the girl had brought forward and reinforced her old affection for her 
father in order to avoid any further necessity for paying attention to the 
love which she had felt in the ftrst years of her girlhood and which had 
now become distressing to her. In this way I gained an insight into a 
conflict which was well calculated to unhinge the girl's mind. On the 
one hand she was ftlled with regret at having rejected the man's 
proposal, and with longing for his company and all the little signs of his 
affection; while on the other these feelings of tenderness and longing 
were combated by powerful forces, amongst which her pride was one 
of the most obvious. Thus she had succeeded in persuading herself that 
she had done with Herr K. - that was the advantage she derived from 
this typical process of repression; and yet she was obliged to summon 
up her infantile affection for her father and to exaggerate it, in order to 
protect herself against the feelings of love which were constantly 
pressing forward into consciousness" (1905 [19011: 93). 
14. Thus Rose points out how Freud is led, ftrst, "to identify the fantasy of 
childbirth that analysis revealed behind the second dream as an 'obscure 
maternal longing', outdoing in advance Karen Horney's appeals to such 
a longing as natural, biological and pre-given, in her attacks on Freud's 
later work on femininity, and second, to classify Dora's masculine 
identiftcation and desire for Frau K. as 'gynaecophilic' and to make it 
'typical of the unconscious erotic life of hysterical girls', that is, to use 
as an explanation of hysteria the very factor that needs to be explained" 
(1985[19781: 134). 
15. For an amusing account of Freud's response to Moll's The Sexual Life 
a/the Child, see Gay, 1988: 195. 
16. In relation to this point too, Skinner's ftndings are illuminating, in 
particular the examples he gives of those instances in which classic 











that they must have intended whatever writings they produced to 
constitute the most systematic contributions to their subject which they 
were capable of executing. To quote just a few of the examples Skinner 
summons to illustrate the point: " .. .if it is first assumed that one of 
Machiavelli's basic concerns in the Prince is 'the characteristics of men 
in politics', then it is not hard for a modem political scientist to go on to 
point out that as such, Machiavelli's poor effort is extremely one-sided 
and unsystematic'. Again, if it is first assumed that Locke's Two 
Treatises include all the doctrines he might have wished to enunciate 
on 'natural law and politica1.society,' then doubtless 'it might well be 
asked' why Locke failed to 'advocate a world state'. And again, if it is 
first assumed that one ofMontesquieu's aims in L 'Esprit des lois must 
have been to enunciate a sociology of knowledge, then doubtless 'it is a 
weakness' that he fails to explain its chief determinants, and doubtless 
'we must also accuse him' of failing to apply his own theory 
(1988[1969] 1: 38; for Skinner's sources see the original). But, Skinner 
continues, with all such alleged "failures", we are still left confronting 
the same essential and essentially begged question: "the question of 
whether any of these writers ever intended, or even could have 
intended, to do what they are thus castigated for not having done" 
(1988[19691: 38). For the most part, the question of whether Freud 
ever intended, or indeed could have intended to do what he is so 
regularly accused, by his feminist critics in particular, of not having 
done in Dora's case, is similarly left begging. 
17. For a similarly historically-based view on hysteria in general, see 
Showalter, 1985 (The Female Malady) and 1997 (Hystories). In The 
Female Malady, Showalter demonstrates how cultural ideas about 
"proper" feminine behaviour have shaped the definition and treatment 
of female insanity for 150 years, and given mental disorder in women 
specifically sexual connotations. Along with vivid portraits of the men 
who dominated psychiatry, and descriptions of the therapeutic practices 
that were used to bring women to their senses, she draws on diaries and 
narratives by inmates, and fiction from Wollstonecraft to Doris Lessing 
to supply a cultural perspective usually missing from studies of mental 
illness. Hystories is the name Showalter gives to the "cultural narratives 
of hysteria," which, she suggests, are mUltiplying "rapidly and 
uncontrollably in the era of mass media, telecommunication and e-
mail" (5). As hysteria has moved from the clinic to the library, from the 
case study to the novel, from bodies to books, from page to stage and 
screen, Showalter writes, it has developed its own prototypes, 
archetypes, and plots, which are themselves adapted from myth, 
popular culture, folklore, media reports, and literature. Drawing on that 
literature, she attempts, in this study, to "unravel some of the threads 












CULTURE AND PSYCHOSIS 
IN THE CASE OF 
DANIEL PAUL SCHREDER 
With the publication in 1903 of his psychotic narrative, Denkwiirdigkeiten 
eines Nervenkranken (Memoirs of My Nervous Illness), 1 Daniel Paul Schreber 
was to become arguably the most famous patient in the history of psychiatry. 
Indeed, he himself predicted as much in a wish he formulates at the end of his 
book: "And so I believe I am not mistaken in expecting that a very special palm 
of victory will eventually be mine. I cannot say with any certainty what form it 
will take. As possibilities I would mention ... that great fame will be attached to 
my name surpassing that of thousands of other people much better mentally 
endowed" (Memoirs, 214). Not just your average personal memoir, but rather (in 
the words of a recent commentator) a "grandiose fantasy combining theology 
with science fiction" (Robertson, 1996: 16), Schreber's extraordinary account of 
his nervous breakdown continues to fascinate a wide range of readers, from 
psychoanalysts to political and cultural historians, from language theorists to 
social anthropologists to literary critics. 
But who exactly was Daniel Paul Schreber? A lawyer by profession, and 
second son of a well-known German physician, educator and social reformer, 
Schreber began his encounter with psychiatry following a breakdown apparently 
connected with a momentary political failure - his unsuccessful candidacy for 
the Reichstag in 1884. After some months under the care of his psychiatrist, 











severe breakdown some years later, this time following his appointment to the 
prestigious position of Senatsprasident (presiding judge of the appeal court for 
Saxony) in 1893. Around this time, Schreber remembers a curious incident 
which made a strong impression on him - waking in bed one morning, he feels 
overcome by a strong desire to be a woman "submitting to intercourse", as he 
describes it in the Memoirs. This incident seems to have sewn the seeds of his 
later conviction that his psychiatrist, in cahoots with God, was plotting to 
transform him into a woman. In response to this idea, Schreber spins out an 
elaborate and highly imaginative scenario in which Flechsig and God conspire to 
take possession of his soul and commit "soul murder", while his body is turned 
into a woman's, subjected to sexual abuse, and finally left to rot. 
The murder of Schreber' s soul is carried out by divine "rays" directed at him 
by God over a number of years. These rays manifest themselves in abusive 
voices, which harass him with nonsensical or disparaging remarks. They also 
effect a number of radical and painful physiological changes - substituting 
another heart for his own, squeezing and misplacing his internal organs, 
removing his penis, and implanting female nerves in his body. But if his 
transformation into a woman begins as a fantasy of degradation, by the end of 
Schreber's Memoirs, it has come to signify the opposite - a state of "self-
contained limitless pleasure for which Schreber has been singled out by a 
cooperative God" (Robertson, 1996: 16) 2. Furthermore, Schreber's sufferings 
turn out to serve a sublime purpose: having previously destroyed the rest of 
mankind, God now needs Schreber, transformed into a woman, to re-populate the 
world with a new race of men. To this end, he commands Schreber to engage 
constantly in the "voluptuous enjoyment" that Schreber imagined to be 
characteristic of the feminine response to sex. 
During the past century, Schreber's autobiographical account of his mental 
illness has become the locus classicus for the study of paranoia in the psychiatric 
and psychoanalytic literature, and beyond. As mentioned earlier, so extensive is 
the body of commentary now in existence on Schreber that scholars refer, quite 











had become the basis for a new academic discipline in its own right. Yet had it 
not been for Freud, it seems almost certain that this unusually substantial (and 
ongoing) critical history would never have come into being. This is implicit in 
the most recent full-length contribution to it that I know (Eric L Santner'sMy 
Own Private Germany: Daniel Paul Schreber 's Secret History of Modernity, 
1996), where the author suggests that after Freud, one cannot read Schreber 
except in some sort of dialogue with his case study, however agonistic this may 
be: " ... because of the interpretive force and strong canonical nature of Freud' s 
study, Schreber is always, at some level, still Freud's Schreber," he writes (1996: 
17). Jay Geller remarks that although, in the early pages of his case study, Freud 
admonishes his readers to make themselves acquainted with Schreber's text 
before reading his analysis, this has not happened: "Despite this advice, virtually 
all subsequent interpretations of Schreber' s dementia have been based upon 
Freud's selective citations in his 'Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical 
Account ofa Case of Paranoia'. Displaced by Freud's case study, Schreber's text 
became thereby the 'most-quoted unread book of the twentieth century'" (1994: 
180) 3. 
Ironically, however, if the "interpretive force" of Freud's case study (rather 
than the intrinsic interest of Schreber' s Memoirs themselves) can be held 
responsible for initiating, and ultimately establishing, the field of Schreber 
studies, this same interpretive force has also, in my view, become hopelessly 
diluted - indeed, virtually written out of existence - as the field itself has 
blossomed and grown. This is because, more often than not, wherever the above-
mentioned "dialogue" with Freud's case history exists, if it has not been focussed 
on Freud's transferential problems in the case, it has been both limited to, and 
dominated by, one narrow and over-riding question: Was Freud right or wrong? 4 
In the rush to out-think Freud, and supercede his theoretical conclusions in the 
case, in other words, little attention has been paid to understanding precisely that 
which gave his case study its canonical force in the first place - its value, 
precisely, as a work of interpretation, and a seminal text in the development of 











In this chapter, then, I would like to return to Freud's study, not, for once, to 
speculate about Freud's own homosexual leanings, or to quibble about whether 
or not he got it right in the case of Schreber, but to try and establish exactly why 
and how in spite of its obvious shortcomings Freud's study ofSchreber's 
paranoia has nevertheless become the founding text of what could feasibly be 
called an entire new field of study. I shall begin, in the first section, with a brief 
look at the critical tradition to date, and move on to a discussion of the Case 
Study itself in the second. 
I 
THE CRITICAL TRADITION 
The store of fantasies which together form the product ofSchreber's 
unleashed imagination has, as already mentioned, elicited a wide variety of 
interpretations from diverse commentators over the years. Changing the 
emphasis from Freud's concern with questions of sexuality, many of these have 
focussed on Schreber's apparent obsession with power. Here, for example, is the 
dominating image from Elias Canetti' s reading of Schreber' s memoirs in the 
final two chapters of Crowds and Power, a lengthy treatise on mass psychology 
first published in 1960: 
Schreber ... wants to be the only man left alive, standing in an immense 
field of corpses; and he wants this field of corpses to contain all men but 
himself It is not only as paranoiac that he reveals himself here. To be the 
last man to remain alive is the deepest urge of every seeker after power ... 
Once he feels himself threatened his passionate desire to see everyone 
lying dead before him can scarcely be mastered by his reason 
(1978[1960]: 447). 
In this study, Canetti draws a direct parallel between Schreber' s Memoirs and 











psychic dispositions of Schreber and Hitler, of paranoid and dictator, is a 
pathological drive for power, involving a desire to be sole survivor and an 
accompanying need to sacrifice the rest of the world in the name of that survival~ 
This reading of the Memoirs - as a storehouse of proto-fascist fantasies and 
fantasy structures - has helped initiate an ongoing critical tradition in which 
Schreber's extraordinary account has become widely regarded as a unique textual 
archive, particularly valuable in the study of German fascism. A powerful link 
has been established, in other words, between the Memoirs and some of the core 
features of the ideology of National Socialism. 6 
A parallel while somewhat different approach to the broader political 
implications of Schreber's Memoirs was initiated in the 1950's by the American 
psychoanalyst William Niederland, who focused on the part played by 
Schreber's father, Daniel Moritz Schreber, in the aetiology of his son's mental 
illness.
7 
According to Niederland, Schreber's paranoia was best understood as a 
function of his severe traumatization at the hands of his father, an ambitious 
physician, author and promoter of exercise and physical fitness, who 
systematically abused his son by subjecting him, throughout his childhood, to a 
series of extreme and aggressive orthopaedic and pedagogical controls. 
Niederland's approach was expanded and popularised in the 1970's by Morton 
Schatzman, who proposed a direct link between the "micro-social despotism in 
the Schreber family and the macro-social despotism of Nazi Germany." 
Schatzman claimed that "Hitler and his peers were raised when Dr Schreber's 
books, preaching household totalitarianism, were popular," and added that 
"anyone who wishes to understand German 'character structure' in the Nazi era 
could profitably study Dr Schreber's books." 8 
A 'Secret History of Modernity': 
Perhaps the most stimulating intervention into the critical tradition to have 
appeared in the last decade (and a good starting point for the present discussion) 











Modernity (1996). In a number of crucial ways, Santner's investigation departs 
from the two strands of criticism mentioned above, while nevertheless remaining 
indebted to the same insight upon which both are founded, namely that there 
existed deep connections between the Schreber material and the social and 
political fantasies at work in Nazism. Santner's study puts to the test his idea that 
the series of crises precipitating Schreber's breakdown were largely the same 
"crises of modernity" for which the Nazis would elaborate their own series of 
radical solutions. In Santner's eyes, Schreber's beakdown and efforts at self-
healing undoubtedly introduced him to the deepest structural layers of the 
historical impasses and conflicts that would provisionally culminate in the Nazi 
catastrophe. 
More interesting, however, than Santner's views on the exact nature of the 
relation between Schreber's delusions and totalitarianism is his analysis of 
precisely how those "historical impasses and conflicts" which, in his view, 
contributed both to the precipitation of Nazism and of Schreber' s breakdown, 
were constituted. These relate to what Santner perceives as the effects of a "crisis 
of symbolic authority" at the time, or, more specifically, to what he describes as 
an historical moment marked by the "attenuation" of those "performatively 
effectuated social bonds" upon which society depends for its social and political 
stability, and the psychological well-being of its members: 
My hypothesis is that these impasses and conflicts pertain to shifts in the 
fundamental matrix of the individual's relation to social and institutional 
authority, to the ways he or she is addressed by and responds to the calls 
of 'official' power and authority. These calls are largely calls to order, 
rites and procedures of symbolic investiture whereby an individual is 
endowed with a new social status, is filled with a symbolic mandate that 
henceforth informs his or her identity in the community. The social and 
political stability of a society as well as the psychological health of its 
members would appear to be correlated to the efficacy of these symbolic 
operations - to what we might call their performative magic - whereby 











them by way of names, titles, degrees, posts, honors and the like. We 
cross the threshold of modernity when the attenuation of these 
performatively effectuated social bonds becomes chronic, when they are 
no longer capable of seizing the subject in his or her self-understanding 
(1996: xii). 
What the analysis of paranoia reveals, Santner proceeds, is that an "investiture 
crisis" of this kind has the potential to generate feelings of extreme alienation, 
anomie and profound emptiness in the individual, who may then experience it as 
"the collapse of social space and the rights of institution into the most intimate 
core of one's being." For Santner, it is crucially significant that Schreber's 
breakdown occurred at the moment he entered, by way of a symbolic investiture, 
one of the key centres of power and authority in Wilhelmine Germany, the Saxon 
Supreme Court. Indeed, Schreber himself expresses an intuition that his 
symptoms were a form of knowledge concerning profound malfunctions in those 
politico-theological procedures through which such centres of power and 
authority sustain themselves. In his study, Santner sets out to describe and 
"evaluate" this knowledge, along with the difficult pathways by which Schreber 
came to possess it. 
Santner,s study opens in direct dialogue with Freud's famous account, in a 
long response to Freud's reading focussed (all too predictably, it must be said) on 
the transjerential dimension to Freud's obviously passionate involvement with 
the Schreber material. Basing their observations on a series of confessional 
remarks regarding his own homosexually charged relationship with Wilhelm 
Fliess (which appeared in Freud's correspondence around the time of his interest 
in the Schreber case), most critics have deduced this to be a crucial determining 
factor in Freud's response to Schreber's paranoia. 9 Peter Gay's conclusion is 
fairly typical: 
Freud's rather manic preoccupation with Schreber hints at some hidden 
interest driving him on: Fliess. But Freud was not just at the mercy of his 











Schreber... Still, Freud's work on Schreber was not untouched by anxiety. 
He was in the midst of his bruising battle with Adler, which, he told Jung, 
was taking such a toll "because it has tom open the wounds of the Fliess 
affair." ... He blamed his memories ofFliess for interfering with his work 
on Schreber, but they were also a reason for his intense concentration on 
the case. To study Schreber was to remember Fliess, but to remember 
Fliess was also to understand Schreber ... Freud used the Schreber case to 
replay and work through what he called (in friendly deference to Jung, 
who had invented the term) his "complexes" (1988: 275). 
While agreeing with the general understanding of Freud's analysis of 
Schreber as in some way connected with his attempts to work through his own 
homosexuality, Santner shifts the emphasis to a new transferential dimension to 
Freud's engagement with Schreber - his anxieties concerning the originality of 
the views presented in the case study. There is indeed a fair amount of evidence 
within Freud's narrative to suggest that he had such anxieties. At one point, for 
example, Freud remarks that certain details of Schreber' s delusions "sound 
almost like endopsychic perceptions of the processes whose existence I have 
assumed in these pages as the basis of our explanation of paranoia." And he goes 
on to reassure the reader that he has at least one witness who can testify "that I 
had developed my theory of paranoia before I became acquainted with the 
contents ofSchreber's book" (SE XII: 79, Santner's emphasis). Later, in a now 
famous ironic aside, he writes that it "remains for the future to decide whether 
there is more delusion in my theory than I should like to admit, or whether there 
is more truth in Schreber's delusion than other people are as yet prepared to 
believe" (SE XII: 79). 
Both Schreber and Freud, in other words - albeit in different ways and with 
different degrees of intensity - express concern that they may only be repeating 
thoughts, words and phrases originating elsewhere. Thus Santner concludes: "If 
there is indeed a transferential dimension to Freud's passionate involvement with 
the Schreber material, then it concerns not only matters of same-sex passion but 











knowledge and authority in the very domain that Freud was staking out as his 
own" (1996: 21). 
This, of course, brings Santner back to the notion of a "crisis of investiture" as 
the major point of identification between Freud and the Schreber memoirs. As he 
points out, Freud's obvious concern with issues of originality and influence 
around the composition of the Schreber essay had a particular historical context 
These were crucial years in the consolidation of the psychoanalytic movement in 
the face of constantly growing internal divisions (the final break with Adler 
would come in 1911, that with Jung two years later) which intensified the 
ongoing struggle for recognition from the larger scientific and intellectual 
community. The institution was both in a state of emergence as well as one of 
crisis and endangerment. This was a period during which the basic language of 
psychoanalysis, and the boundaries that would determine the inside and outside 
of psychoanalytic thought, were being bitterly contested. What Santner is 
suggesting, in other words, is that Freud's attraction to and passion for the 
Schreber material was above all a function of his own deep involvement with the 
"rites of institution" at a moment of significant crisis within the institution of 
psychoanalysis. Thus he concludes: 
Freud's study of the Schreber material was conducted ... at a moment in 
the history of psychoanalysis when the symbolic authority of that new 
institution was being strongly contested from within the ranks as well as 
from without - at a moment of institutional stress that, I will argue, made 
Freud particularly sensitive to the nature of Schreber' s investiture crisis 
even though Freud never explicitly addressed it (1996: 17). 
With Freudian psychoanalysis as the starting point, then, Santner's study both 
broadens and to some extent re-defines the theoretical terrain within which 
Schreber's psychotic breakdown has traditionally been discussed. Within the 
general project of attempting to account for the «demonic" in human affairs in a 
post-Enlightenment framework, Freud had argued that Schreber's traumatization 











previously repressed libidinal desires). In the 1950's, the work of Niederland had 
shifted the focus from Schreber himself to his relationship with his father. More 
recent efforts to flesh out the "historical truth" behind Schreber's delusions of 
persecution have taken Schreber at his word that the real persecutory figure in his 
life was not his father, but rather his psychiatrist Paul Emil Flechsig. 
From 'tradition of the soul' to 'reign of the brain': 
A neuroanatomist of some considerable renown at the time, Flechsig was 
professor of psychiatry at Leipzig University, a position that in 1882 would 
include the directorship of the new Psychiatric Clinic of the University Hospital. 
As Lothane has noted, the appointment of a brain anatomist with no real 
psychiatric experience to the directorship of a psychiatric clinic signaled a 
historical shift of paradigms in the discipline of psychiatry toward extreme 
medicalization: "in one fell swoop, through Flechsig's nomination, the tradition 
of the soul ended and the reign of the brain began." 10 
Recent readers of Schreber, then, have tried to discern in the Memoirs specific 
references and allusions to Flechsig's theories and practices, to discover in the 
latter's approach to mental illness the key to his demonization by Schreber. 
Indeed, Friedrich Kittler, for one, has suggested that an overemphasis on Moritz 
Schreber's role in his son's psychosis amounts to a failure to appreciate the 
historical rupture signaled by Flechsig's "psychophysics", which along with 
Schreber's delusional text, is seen as the elaboration of a new paradigm of social 
and psychic organization - of nothing short of a second industrial revolution. For 
Kittler, Schreber's language, the language "spoken" by his over-excited nerves, 
is the language of the experimental neurologist Flechsig: " ... Beyond the 
mechanical head bandages, Schreber's paranoia followed the lead of an insane 
neurologist" (1990: 71). 
Flechsig's neuroanatomical paradigm, which, according to Kittler, ultimately 
figures the brain as a network of channels and relays in which personhood is 










radical and efficient intervention of power into the body of its "object" than 
Moritz Schreber's merely mechanical manipulations of children's muscles and 
activities: "nothing allows us to equate the classical pedagogical power of 
Schreber senior with the incomparably more efficient disposition of power in 
1900." In Kittler's view, the "second industrial revolution" is not only capable of 
producing soul murder, it is conceived from the start as soul murder - as the 
annihilation of the very horizon of intelligibility in which words like soul, 
psyche, or spirit would make any sense. 
In effect, Kittler understands Schreber literally when, in the open letter to 
Flechsig published in the Memoirs, Schreber writes, "1 have not the least doubt 
that the first impetus to what my doctors considered mere 'hallucinations' but 
which to me signified communication with supernatural powers, consisted of 
influences on my nervous system emanatingfrom your nervous system" 
(Schreber, 1988[1903]: 34). Flechsig's "nervous system", understood here as the 
"radical medicalization of all disturbances of the soul", their ultimate reduction 
to "anomalies in the hard wiring of the brain", brings to its logical conclusion the 
subject already explored to excess at the end of the nineteenth century by the 
likes of Moritz Schreber. As Santner writes, "A clinical environment organized 
under the sign ofFlechsig's psychophysical research paradigm would be, in this 
view, inherently traumatizing. Or to return to Niederland's formulation, in such 
an environmnet 'castration' would have been in the air" (1996: 74). 11 
What links Niederland' s approach to Moritz Schreber and Kittler's approach 
to Paul Flechsig, in Santner's eyes, is an intuition that Schreber was traumatized 
not, as Freud had argued, by a close encounter with purely intrapsychic demons 
but rather by exposure to particular forms of intersubjective power, in the one 
case of a more paternal and pedagogical nature, in the other, of a more scientific 
and institutional kind. This leads Santner into an extended dialogue with the 
work of Michel Foucault, whose writings on institutional power and and the 
history of sexuality he uses to help situate the discussion of Moritz Schreber's 











larger history of post-Enlightenment transformations of symbolic power and 
h . 12 aut onty. 
Drawing on the writings of Walter Benjamin and Pierre Bourdieu, Santner 
shifts the theoretical terrain further still from the intrapsychic domain where 
Freud locates his analysis to a concern with the operation of the law and of all 
rites of institution and their procedures of symbolic investiture. 13 This leads him 
to interpret Schreber's paranoia in light ofBourdieu's emphasis on the 
imperative and indeed coercive nature of acts of symbolic investiture, acts such 
as the call issued by the Ministry of Justice to Schreber in 1893 nominating him 
to the position of Senatspriisident. 
According to Bourdieu, the repetitive demand to live in conformity with the 
social essence with which one has been invested, and thus to stay on the proper 
side of a socially consecrated boundary, is one that is addressed not only or even 
primarily to the mind or intellect, but to the body. The naturalization of a 
symbolic identity is, Bourdieu emphasizes, a process involving ascetic practices, 
training, even physical suffering: "All groups entrust the body, treated like a kind 
of memory, with their most precious possessions" (1991, 123). In light of this, it 
may then be in a more than metaphorical sense that, as Bourdieu puts it, "elites 
are destined to 'waste away' when they cease to believe in themselves, when 
they ... begin to cross the line in the wrong direction" (1991, 122). Similarly, it 
might be said that the crucial lesson of Benjamin's "Critique of Violence" is that 
this process of internal decomposition afflicting elites in crisis is, in fact, the 
normal state of things, which is then only more or less successfully disavowed, 
more or less successfully repressed into the unconscious. Santner's argument 
pivots on the idea that Schreber's Memoirs tells the story of a massive return of 
this repressed knowledge. 
As psychoanalytic text, despite its real departures from Freud's ground-
breaking analysis of the Memoirs, My Own Private Germany also marks a 
development on some of the most remarkable aspects of Freud's approach. In 











in other words, by reading madness and irrationality as positive forms of 
knowledge. As Samuel Weber points out in his Introduction to the most recent 
edition of the Memoirs, when Freud asks (in the famous remark referred to 
earlier) whether there is more truth in Schreber's delusion than many are yet 
prepared to believe, he means us to take the question seriously. This is not mere 
"coquetry" on his part, Weber writes: "rather, it indicates what is essentially new 
in a theory that, unlike traditional psychiatry, no longer unquestioningly 
presupposes a boundary between madness and truth, between the pathological 
and the normal, between irrationality and reason" (1988[1955]: xvii). 14 Thus 
Freud, in the early pages of his analysis, suggests that 
[Schreber] himself not infrequently presses the key into our hands, by 
adding a gloss, a quotation or an example to some delusional proposition 
in an apparently incidental manner, or even by expressly denying some 
parallel to it that has arisen in his mind. For when this happens, we have 
only to follow our usual psycho-analytic technique - to strip his sentence 
of its negative form, to take his example as being the actual thing, or his 
quotation or gloss as being the original source - and we find ourselves in 
possession of what we are looking for, namely a translation of the 
paranoic mode of expression into the normal one (SE XII:35). 
Like Freud's, Santner's method of reading is to focus on what Weber calls the 
text's "stains" or "marks" - on that which has been added or appears incidental, 
that which would normally be considered unimportant or that which has been 
denied - as the carriers of meaning (and, in this case specifically, of "historical 
truth", the "truth" which is embodied in Schreber's "secret history of 
modernity"). However disguised and distorted these "truths" may be, their status 
as knowledge is taken seriously both by Freud, and, in a different light, by 
Santner. Like Freud, what Santner ends up with, once the process of reading is 
complete, could easily be described (in the terms Freud uses above) as a 











While thus remaining faithful, in one sense at least, to the hermeneutic 
tradition Freud might be said to have initiated, Santner's study at the same time 
extends and broadens the theoretical bounds of the existing critical tradition on 
Schreber. It also develops the work of recent critics such as Slavoj Zizek, whose 
application of psychoanalysis to the study of society has demonstrated how 
fiuitfully psychoanalytic notions can be put to work in the analysis of ideological 
and political phenomena. 15 The book is thus valuable in the challenge it 
embodies to the standard critique of psychoanalysis as essentially a "bourgeois" 
science, potentially useful only in what it can tell us about a relatively narrow 
group of culturally specific individuals. 16 
At the same time, Santner's many lengthy forays into recent cultural and 
social theory (both in the text itself and in the extensive footnotes which follow), 
tend to distract from his central historical thesis, and in the end, little concrete 
historical evidence is provided to support the notion (on which Santner's 
argument as a whole rests) that Schreber's breakdown exemplified a chronic 
breakdown of symbolic power in the Wilhelmine era. The historical research 
undertaken is not substantial enough, in other words, to convince the reader that 
such a breakdown of symbolic power necessarily occurred, nor are we told of 
any historical figures other than Schreber himself who were driven insane by 
appointments to positions of power and authority at the time. For Schreber's 
breakdown to have stood as representative, or even symptomatic of the broader 
historical moment (as Santner obviously wishes to suggest it was), evidence of 
others having suffered in similar ways would have been essential. In Santner's 
reading, then, Schreber is less an historical figure than a metaphorical one, whose 
breakdown is used arbitrarily - even if at times persuasively - to illustrate 
Santner's theories concerning the crises of symbolic authority that, for him, mark 
the onset of modernity. 
Whatever its limitations or otherwise, Santner's reading is nevertheless 
representative of what seems to me to be the most important shift, since the field 
of Schreber studies opened with Freud's 1911 case study, in critical attitudes to 











from Freud's narrow focus on the individual- on Schreber himself - to a deeper 
concern with the social and political context within which his series of 
breakdowns occurred. Since Freud, increasing recognition has been given to the 
Memoirs both as a product of the historical moment, and as a unique series of 
documents which, in tum, allows us greater insight into it. 17 
Within this trend towards a more sophisticated grasp of the significance of the 
historical and socio-political context which gave rise to Schreber's delusional 
imaginings, the actual content of Freud's original interpretations, and the 
theoretical conclusions he draws from these, appear simplistic and too narrow, if 
only because he bases them almost exclusively on Schreber's text itself Where 
then does the enduring significance of Freud's reading lie? And why then, as 
Santner remarks, is Schreber always, at some level, still Freud's Schreber? The 
answer to these questions, I want to suggest, depends on how exactly one sees 
the status or value of the psychoanalytic case study, as a vehicle of knowledge. 
In a brief but important essay ("Freud's Case Studies", 1982), Carl PIetsch 
focuses his discussion on the distinctive nature of psychoanalytic case studies 
(and Freud's in particular), without an understanding of which, he implies, we 
cannot read them in a useful way. Two notions taken from the discourse of the 
philosophy of science are used to assist him in his examination of Freud's case 
studies: "exemplars" and "personal knowledge". Pietsch's understanding of the 
way in which Freud's (and later psychoanalysts') case studies constitute 
exemplars in psychoanalysis diverges in one important respect from the meaning 
of the term given by Thomas Kuhn, who in his later essays (as Pietsch points out) 
used "exemplars" to mean "shared examples of successful practice, which 
students of these disciplines learn, and which then serve to maintain the 
coherence of their research community." 18 This is because, in PIetsch's view, 
"psychoanalytic case studies - and Freud's in particular - help all psychoanalysts 
to identify the problems posed by their patients, and to proceed in similar 
fashion, even though the examples are not always successful. The familiar case 
of Dora comes to mind: its practical failure does not detract from its value as an 











Where then, despite its "practical failure" does the value of a case study such 
as that of Dora lie? In PIetsch's view, regardless of their success or otherwise, 
Freud's case studies still communicate essential knowledge to psychoanalysts 
today. Where the examination of Freud's case histories leads, however, rather 
than to any deepening of purely theoretical insight, is, inexorably, to "questions 
of psychoanalytic knowledge - its locus, character and epistemological status" 
(101). Significantly, Freud himself never claimed for the case studies the value of 
illustration of theory. What psychoanalysts seem to derive from their study of 
Freud's cases, PIetsch suggests, rather than any specifically theoretical 
knowledge, is 
a sense of how Freud thought, more particularly, how he thought with his 
patients. Even to the non-psychoanalytic reader, Freud's case studies 
seem to communicate how it feels to do psychoanalysis and to learn from 
patients. In contrastto his theoretical writings, Freud's case studies may 
be the locus of inter subjectivity in psychoanalysis. If this is true, it 
suggests, borrowing now from Michael Polanyi, that Freud's exemplary 
cases function as a kind of 'personal knowledge.' Studying them, 
psychoanalysts tacitly learn to think like Freud (10111 02). 19 
The foremost question then, for PIetsch, is that of the status Freud accorded 
his case studies - an inquiry which is given greater significance by the fact that 
psychoanalysts have studied Freud's cases as exemplary solutions to problems 
and seem to have learned more from the case studies than from Freud's 
theoretical propositions. Indeed, the process of psychoanalytic education 
enshrined in the institutes of psychoanalysis suggests that it is largely the case 
studies - Freud's and those published subsequently in the same spirit by his 
followers - that have enabled psychoanalysis to maintain its methodological 
coherence for so long. This leads Pietsch to conclude that the nature of 
psychoanalytic knowledge as located in case studies is distinctive, requiring both 
an initial recognition of its distinctiveness and an appropriate critical approach to 











The location of psychoanalytic insight in case studies rather than in 
theory suggests that the knowledge peculiar to psychoanalysis is 
constituted differently than the knowledge of a more thoroughly theory-
based science. If so, the great energy expended in trying to reformulate 
Freud's theoretical propositions to make them experimentally testable 
may not, despite the value such efforts may have for other purposes, 
contribute much to our understanding of what psychoanalytic knowledge 
really is. A fully descriptive account of psychoanalysis would have to pay 
more attention to case studies as repositories and vehicle of this 
knowledge than has been done thus far. Such an account would involve 
an extensive study of the periodical literature of psychoanalysis, its 
monographs, and of psychoanalytic education as practiced in the 
institutes. This essay is only an attempt to see how Freud came to the 
tentative conclusion that case studies were the genre of psychoanalytic 
knowledge par excellence, and how he came to direct his more theoretical 
statements to the extrapsychoanalytic reader. It is also an attempt to pose 
the question of psychoanalytic knowledge as a question of discourse 
(1021103, my emphasis). 
By thus shifting the emphasis in traditional conceptions of the "exemplar", 
PIetsch offers a way beyond the terms of the usual debates on Freud's case 
histories, where the major concern lies with the accuracy or otherwise of his 
theoretical propositions and conclusions. In any case, since all of Freud's patients 
are now long dead, all such debates, however sophisticated the arguments, must 
ultimately remain confined to speculation. Was Dora in love with Herr K. or his 
wife? Was Schreber a repressed homosexual? Was Freud right or wrong? These 
are questions which can never finally be answered. What we can learn from the 
case histories, however - as PIetsch suggests - is how Freud thought, how 
psychoanalysis works as a new mode of knowledge. It is with this object in mind 
- to read the text as repository and vehicle of psychoanalytic knowledge - that I 
would now like to return to Freud's "Psycho-analytic Notes on an 












RE-READING "PSYCHO-ANALYTIC NOTES ON AN 
AUTOBIOGRAPIDCAL ACCOUNT 
OF A CASE OF PARANOIA" 
Schreber was convinced that his was a distinctive and therefore notable case 
one which he describes in his own words as "quite remarkable ... unique in the 
field of psychiatric experience" (Memoirs, 292). His physician, Geheimrat (privy 
Councillor) Dr. Weber, had his own views on the matter: 
But however varied and differently coloured the individual cases may be, 
however characteristic and singular an individual case may appear to 
careful observation, yet ... one cannot deny that ... certain groupings 
emerge, certain complexes of pathological manifestations, which in their 
development, course and outcome, in the involvement of single psychic 
functions are more or less demarcated from each other [and] ... have led 
to the delineation of a certain number of different disease forms. As 
colourful and inexhaustible the individual variations of cases of mental 
illness may be, as constant are the main outlines, and apart from the 
arabesques of the individual case the basic characteristics of the forms of 
illness are repeated with almost surprising, monotonous regularity 
(Memoirs, 317). 
Later, Dr Weber goes on to suggest that "considered from this scientifically 
established point of view, [Dr Schreber's] mental illness and its peculiarities, far 
from not being known to psychiatry, clearly belong to a well-known and well-
characterized form of mental illness, paranoia, and show all its important 
distinguishing features" (Memoirs, 317). As Samuel Weber points out, this 
exposition and these remarks clearly demonstrate what for traditional psychiatry 
an exemplar or case is: subsumption under the well-known "paranoia," by 











the Schreber case, then, they did so because they saw it not as something unique, 
but rather as a particular example, replete with "all [the] important distinguishing 
features", or symptoms, of paranoia. Thus, Weber concludes, we find that 
psychiatrists essentially knew Schreber long before they ever met him either in 
person or through his writing: 
They valued his writing but only as a particular case in which they 
thought they found what they had already always known: that cluster of 
characteristics which they termed "paranoia". As an individual case 
Schreber mirrored their knowledge, and the persons thus reflected were 
delighted. In this individual instance of the pathology of paranoia, 
psychiatry discovered its own image and thought it had thereby 
recognized Dr Schreber as well (Memoirs, xv). 
It is the contrast between this attitude - the attitude, that is, of traditional 
psychiatry - and Freud's, that Samuel Weber finds particularly remarkable: "No 
doubt about it: the contrast apparent here between the traditional psychiatrist and 
the founder of psychoanalysis marks a change, from a concept of science 
characterized by a narcissistic self-satisfaction with the well-known, to an effort 
to bring these 'fixed points' into motion and to pose questions which might lead 
to new knowledge" (Memoirs, xvi). 
This then, is the first dimension of Freud's case history which gives it its 
lasting historical significance: the extent to which it represents a break with 
traditional psychiatry. thus opening the way for new knowledge. In a certain 
sense, for Freud, just as for traditional psychiatry, Schreber's text remained a 
description of a particular instance or case, a medical record. And it cannot be 
denied that, through his interpretation of the case, not the least of Freud's 
preoccupations was to demonstrate the legitimacy of his own conceptual 
apparatus. As Samuel Weber remarks, the goal behind Freud's exploration of 
Schreber's "proliferating phantasms" was to draw them ever closer to a fixed 
point within his theory in order, effectively, to substantiate and confirm it. Thus 











case of Schreber, "we find ourselves once again on the familiar ground of the 
father-complex" (Memoirs, xvii). 
Yet at the same time, even as Freud's translation of Schreber' s "paranoic" 
mode of expression into a "normal" one (the psychoanalytic) provided him with 
the evidence he was looking for to confirm his hypotheses, it also raised a new 
set of anxieties. Indeed, it worked almost too well, so that Freud felt compelled 
to assert the independence of the theory, and to pose the now famous question, 
"whether there is more delusion in my theory than I should like to admit, or 
whether there is more truth in Schreber's delusion than other people are as yet 
prepared to believe." And it is this question that leads Samuel Weber to the 
important earlier mentioned injunction, that we recognize within it, the 
extraordinary originality of Freud's new mode of psychoanalytic "translation". 
To repeat: This remark, writes Weber, is no mere coquetry on Freud's part; 
Rather, it indicates what is essentially new in a theory that, unlike 
traditional psychiatry, no longer unquestioningly presupposes a boundary 
between madness and truth, between the pathological and the normal, 
between irrationality and reason. Hence the special structure of 
psychoanalytic "translation": it is no longer merely a procedure of 
subsumption but now also a practice of reading and interpretation ... 
(Memoirs, xvii). 
Towards a New Concept of Science: 
Let us dwell for a moment on the implications of Weber's remark. As in the 
other case histories, Freud's analysis of Schreber marked a break from an old to a 
new concept of science - from a procedure of subsumption (as W eber suggests) 
to a practice of reading and interpretation, from a traditional to an entirely 
innovative mode of scientific inquiry. Illustrative of this break, is the 
contradictory tension apparent throughout the case study, between Freud's 










fact far more telling disrespect he expresses, from beginning to end, for the same. 
That the long history of psychoanalysis' relation to science finds its origins in 
Freud's unrelenting attempts to persuade the scientific community to accept his 
efforts as "serious scientific work carried on at a high level" has of course been 
S I pointed out many times by now (~ee Forrester, 1998: 74). Nevertheless, it is 
always interesting, and indeed revealing, to note the diverse forms in which 
Freud invariably contradicts, in the course of his writing, his own neo-positivist 
claims for the scientificity of psychoanalysis. 
To a significant degree, Freud's analysis ofSchreber is conducted in dialogue 
with, and often in distinct opposition to, the psychiatric establishment of the day. 
Throughout the case study, Freud draws on reports from Schreber's physicians 
and psychiatrists to support his own assessment of Schreber' s considerable 
intellectual powers. At the same time, however, when taken as a whole, Freud's 
references (to Dr. Weber's reports in particular) end simply by laying bare the 
discrepancy between Dr. Weber's repeated descriptions ofSchreber as a man of 
"sound judgement" and considerable "common sense", and his final judgement 
of Schreber as irredeemably insane. 
Far from appearing as a measure of his respect for Schreber's psychiatrists 
then, Freud's use of their reports simply shows up their shortcomings in Freud's 
eyes. The longest of Freud's quotations from Dr. Weber's 1899 report is perhaps 
the most damning of all. This effectively brings to an end the introductory 
section to the case history proper (pp. 141-148) and concerns Dr. Weber's 
description of Schreber' s delusions as they appeared in their final shape - a 
description Freud reproduces at some length, only to dismiss it in a devastating 
final paragraph as essentially the product of its author's "marvelling", while 
devoid of all understanding. 
For Freud, Dr. Weber's attempts at interpretation for which his contempt is 
barely disguised - sum up the "interest felt by the practical psychiatrist" in 
delusional formations such as Schreber's - an interest barely worth the name 











delusion and thus formed an estimate of their influence on the patient's general 
behaviour. "In his case," (the case, that is, of the "practical psychiatrist") Freud 
concludes disdainfully, "marvelling is not the beginning of understanding." 
There is no practice of reading and interpretation here, in other words. In the case 
of the psychoanalyst, however, a very different approach can be expected: 
The psychoanalyst, in the light of his knowledge of the psychoneuroses, 
approaches the subject with a suspicion that even thought structures so 
extraordinary as these and so remote from our common modes of 
thinking are nevertheless derived from the most general and 
comprehensible impulses of the human mind; and he would be glad to 
discover the motives of such a transformation as well as the manner in 
which it has been accomplished. With this aim in view, he will wish to go 
more deeply into the details of the delusion and into the history of its 
development (SE XII: 18). 
With this dismissal of the superficiality of the efforts of "practical 
psychiatry", Freud effectively distinguishes his own discipline as the only one 
worthy of true scientific respect not only in its implicit refusal to settle for what 
he characterizes as the "estimates" of the practical psychiatrist, but also in its 
promise to probe the deepest layers where the motivations behind the patient's 
symptoms, and the history of their development, lie hidden. At the same time, he 
also manages to slip in an allusion to what he clearly wishes his readers to accept 
as the "normality" at the heart of Schreber' s delusions - a judgement Freud 
motivates with the injunction that, however bizarre and outlandish we might 
consider Schreber's fantasies (or "thought structures"), we should at least begin 
to entertain the possibility that these have their roots in the most general and 
comprehensible impulses of the human mind; that there is a Schreber at least 
potentially in the making, in other words, in every one of his readers. 
With this remark, then, Freud both insists on the scientific respectability of his 
new discipline - its superior drive for truth and accuracy, and its capacity to 











unconscious depths where the roots of every pathology can be found and, at the 
same time, signals the conceptual shift initiated by psychoanalysis, within which 
the boundary between what constitutes the normal and the pathological begins to 
break down. In psychoanalysis, Freud suggests here, the question, Are we normal 
or abnormal? can no longer be answered - a point I will return to later. 
Against Censorship: 
Having dismissed the efforts of the traditional psychiatrist as essentially 
shallow and superficial, Freud will later be equally scathing - even if only 
implicitly - of traditional psychiatry's squeamishness in confronting the details 
of Schreber' s delusional formations. Again, his criticism is directed at Dr. 
Weber. During the lawsuit, for example, in which Schreber went to such pains to 
challenge and overturn the decision to place him under tutelage for reasons of 
. insanity, Dr. Weber had responded to several requests from the court for his 
professional opinion on the case by expressing the view that the proposed 
publication of the Memoirs only confirmed the author's irredeemable mental 
derangement. Though it may have been understandable, Weber had allowed, that 
Schreber might have wished to describe the "history of his latter years", that he 
should have wished to make them public was the surest evidence available of his 
insanity. This, according to Weber, was why: 
When one looks at the content of his writings, and takes into 
consideration the abundance of the indiscretions relating to himself and 
others contained in them, the unembarrassed detailing of the most 
doubtful and aesthetically impossible situations and events, the use of the 
most offensive vulgar words, etc., one finds it quite incomprehensible 
that a man otherwise tactful and of fine feeling could propose an action 
which would compromise him so severely in the eyes of the public, were 
not his whole attitude to life pathological, and he unable to see things in 
their proper perspective, and if the tremendous overvaluation of his own 











appreciation of the limitations imposed on man by society (cited in 
Memoirs, 282-283, my emphasis). 
In a footnote responding to Weber's horror (in the extract quoted above) at the 
indiscretions of Schreber' s document - the "vulgar", "offensive" and 
"aesthetically impossible" nature of many of its revelations - Freud retorts with 
evident disbelief: "Surely we can hardly expect that a case history which sets out 
to give a picture of deranged humanity and its struggles to rehabilitate itself 
should exhibit 'discretion' and 'aesthetic' charm" (SE XII: 37). In relation to the 
original censoring of Schreber' s memoirs, occasioned by the opposition of the 
psychiatric establishment, Freud cannot disguise his irritation: "In working upon 
the case of Schreber I have had a policy of restraint forced on me by the 
circumstance that the opposition to his publishing the Denkwiirdigkeiten was so 
far effective as to withhold a considerable portion of the material from our 
knowledge - the portion, too, which would in all probability have thrown the 
most important light upon the case" (SE XII: 37). On the subject of "soul 
murder", Freud feels himself further constrained by the gaps imposed by the 
censorship: "We should be glad to learn more of the meaning ofthis 'soul 
murder', Freud complains, but at this point "our sources relapse once more into a 
tendentious silence: 'As to what constitutes the true essence of soul murder, and 
as to its technique, ifI may so describe it, I am able to say nothing beyond what 
has already been indicated. There is only this, perhaps, to be added ... (The 
passage which follows is unsuitable for publication.)''' (SE XII: 38-39), As a 
result of this omission, he continues, "we are left in the dark on the question of 
what is meant by 'soul-murder'," 
This attack on the numerous attempts on the part of traditional psychiatry to 
censor Schreber's writings is reinforced in the form of a defensive counter-attack 
Freud then delivers in the face of a number of objections he anticipates from 
within its ranks, as he makes his ftrst strong statement of his theory - that the 
"exciting cause" ofSchreber's illness was "an outburst of homosexual libido," 
and that the object of this libido was "probably from the very ftrst his doctor, 











measure of resignation - "to meet a storm of remonstrances and objections. 
Anyone acquainted with the present state of psychiatry must be prepared to face 
trouble" (SE Xll: 43). 
The first major objection he anticipates concerns the social standing of the 
subject of his case history. The psychiatric establishment, Freud feels sure, will 
recoil in horror against the charge he has made against Schreber, and will 
condemn Freud for "an act of irresponsible levity, an indiscretion and a 
calumny" for having levelled it against a man of such "high ethical standing" as 
the former Senatsprasident (SE Xll: 43). The second major objection he 
anticipates relates to the nature of the charge itself - whoever it may have been 
levelled against. No-one, Freud fears, will take seriously the notion that 
Schreber's fantasy of being transformed into a woman was anything other than a 
"pathological idea" from the start - a consequence of his mental breakdown, 
rather than its motivating cause. Both anticipated objections, in other words, are 
borne of Freud's view of contemporary psychiatry as either too prudish, too 
hypocritical or simply too myopic to countenance the idea that a man of "high 
ethical standing" should have fallen into the grip of insanity as a result of 
repressed homosexual impulses. 
Freud's objections to the "squeamishness" of his psychiatric predecessors 
could be seen to form part of a much broader attack, embedded in the very idea 
of a psychoanalytic mode of knowing, on the notion of censorship itself - an 
attack within which, I want to suggest, the Schreber case history forms a 
significant landmark. A brief look at the particular historical moment in which 
Freud was working with Schreber's Memoirs, and which gives his case history 
its context, will help explain why. 
Historians of psychoanalysis have noted that the period from 1905 to the 
Great War was undoubtedly the "high point of Freud's liberal views, both in 
sexual morality and in the extension of the psychoanalytic ethos of honesty to all 
cultural life" (Forrester, 1997: 45). There are numerous remarks, through much 











"On Beginning the Treatment", for example, Freud declared that the fundamental 
rule of psychoanalytic technique, which the patient has to observe from the 
beginning, and upon which the analyst must insist, is the requirement of absolute 
honesty. "Never forget that you have promised to be absolutely honest," should 
be the analyst'S first instruction, he wrote, "and never leave anything out 
because, for some reason or other, it is unpleasant to tell it" (SE XII: 135). The 
whole task of psychoanalysis becomes impossible, Freud warns in an important 
footnote in the same essay, if a reservation is allowed at any single place: "I once 
treated a high official who was bound by his oath of office not to communicate 
certain things because they were state secrets, and the analysis came to grief as a 
consequence of this restriction. Psycho-analytic treatment must disregard all such 
considerations, because the neurosis and its resistances are themselves without 
any such regard" (SE XII: 135-36, fn. 1). 
The important essay of 1908 (" 'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern 
Nervous lllness", in SE IX) ruthlessly exposed the hypocrisies - the wholesale 
lack of honesty - underpinning sexual morality at the time. Here Freud 
condemned as an "obvious social injustice" that the "standard of civilization 
should demand from everyone the same conduct of sexual life - conduct which 
can be followed without any difficulty by some people ... but which imposes the 
heaviest psychical sacrifices on others ... " (SE IX: 192). Too strenuous an 
attempt to adhere to the norms of "civilized" sexual morality was bound to lead 
to "nervous illness" in large numbers of people, Freud wrote, concluding that, in 
view of this, "we may well raise the question whether our 'civilized' sexual 
morality is worth the sacrifice which it imposes on us ... " (SE IX: 204). Yet, as 
Forrester is careful to point out, one should not confuse Freud's "liberalism", as 
expressed in essays such as this, with that "enthusiastic proclaiming of utopia 
through sexual emancipation" associated with radical Freudians such as Wittels, 
and later, Reich: 
There is no doubt that the historical destiny of psychoanalysis was bound 
up with the early twentieth century debates about sexual morality and 











customary circumspection - that characteristic reluctance to venture 
beyond his own ground onto the ground of others, a reluctance born of a 
mixture of apprehension and calculation that told him no good would 
come to him or his science from any such trusting open-handedness. The 
doctrines of psychoanalysis - of the sexual etiology of the neuroses, of 
the polymorphous perversity of children - pointed toward the toxic 
character of modern social arrangements. "It is one of the obvious social 
injustices that the standard of civilization should demand from everyone 
the same conduct of sexual life," Freud could write, putting the accent on 
the fundamental variety of men, women, and their sexual desires. But this 
diversity did not sanction sexual liberation and free-thinking 
licentiousness. Freud did not assent to that version of positivism which 
declares that what is natural is what is good. "If Freud takes sides against 
culture, it is only for therapeutic purposes. He believed no more in 
instinct than in culture," Rieff observes accurately. It was the radical 
Freudians - Wittels, later Reich - who saw in psychoanalysis the 
scientific wing of that enthusiastic proclaiming of utopia through sexual 
emancipation which has been a persistent current of twentieth-century 
social thought (1997: 46). 
Interestingly enough, the man closest to Freud during the period in which he 
wrote his interpretations of the Schreber Memoirs, and in the company of whom 
Freud first began working on them, was himself an enthusiast for a society 
reformed on psychoanalytic principles, a "proselytizer who unabashedly 
attempted, in the name of psychoanalysis, to convert a reluctant Freud to his 
vision of a society transformed by a generalized ethic of honesty" (Forrester, 
1997: 46). This was Sandor Ferenczi, Freud's foremost Hungarian disciple, who 
was 34 when he first wrote to Freud in January 1908. They became friends 
quickly (so evidence from the recently released voluminous correspondence 20 
suggests), Ferenczi "always taking the position of the filial disciple whose 
privilege it was to be intimate with the master, while also exercising the privilege 
of the disciple to take his master's ideas to what were in his view their logical 











1997: 47). Since Ferenczi believed that psychoanalysis as a world-view should 
disregard the boundaries between the private and the professional- should apply 
as much, that is, in private matters as in professional - he soon came to challenge 
Freud about what he saw as the limits (with regard to openness and honesty) that 
Freud imposed on their friendship. 
In early 1910, Ferenczi's idealization of the relationship that he imagined 
psychoanalysis made possible between individuals, reached its peak. In a number 
of successive letters, Ferenczi lectured Freud on psychoanalytic honesty and its 
importance as a template for a transformation in human society: 
It is my unshakeable conviction ... that these adherents [of 
psychoanalysis] are but the predecessors of all humanity. 21 ... Once 
society has gone beyond the infantile, then hitherto completely 
unimagined possibilities for social and political life are opened up. Just 
think what it would mean if one could tell everyone the truth, one's 
father, teacher, neighbour, and even the king. All fabricated, imposed 
authority would go to the devil what is rightful would remain natural. 
The eradication of lies from private and public life would necessarily 
have to bring about better conditions. 22 
Around much the same time as Ferenczi was pressurizing Freud into a more 
rigorous application of the psychoanalytic ethos of honesty, Jung had told Freud 
enthusiastically about the Memoirs (in April 1910). Later that year, Freud and 
Ferenczi decided to take off together on a tour ofItaly, and Freud proposed that 
the two of them work on the Memoirs together, with Ferenczi writing down to 
Freud's dictation. Ferenczi refused, feeling that this would force him into an 
infantile position in relation to Freud, and complaining about Freud's automatic 
assumption of intellectual superiority in taking sole responsibility and control 
over the process of writing. Indeed, with this suggestion (and Freud's subsequent 
decision not to include Ferenczi at all in the work on Schreber), Freud had 
effectively destroyed Ferenczi's hopes ofa completely open relationship with 











repeatedly to it over the next few months, and insisting that it had come about 
because of Freud's refusal to treat him as an equal, in a spirit of openness and 
absolute honesty - an objective he felt Freud should not have refused: 
My ideal of truth that strikes down all consideration is certainly nothing 
less than the most self-evident consequence of your teachings ... You 
once told me that psychoanalysis was only a science of facts, of 
indicatives that should not be translated into imperatives - the latter are 
paranoid. According to this conception there is no psychoanalytic 
worldview, no psychoanalytic ethics, no psychoanalytic rules of conduct 
... I believe that you underestimate much too much the ennobling power 
of psychoanalysis if you don't believe that it makes people who have 
completely grasped its meaning absolutely worthy of trust. 23 
It was thus under the sway ofFerenczi's unrelenting attempts to persuade 
Freud to strengthen his allegiance to the psychoanalytic ideal of honesty, that he 
wrote his analysis of Schreber through the summer and autumn of 1910, 
announcing its completion in December that year. It comes as no surprise then, 
that in Freud's eyes, Schreber's determination to follow this imperative himself -
to overcome the prudishness of his psychiatrists, to disregard the numerous and 
formidable difficulties lying in the path of publication (including that of "paying 
due regard to the susceptibilities of certain persons still living"), to "yield all 
feelings of a personal character to the advantage of science", and to press on with 
the memoirs regardless of all resistance - render him nothing short of heroic. 
Certainly the most striking feature of Freud's response to the Memoirs, is the 
attitude of deep respect he demonstrates towards their author - both in relation to 
his courageous refusal to yield to censorship, and to the "mental acumen" with 
which he argued against it. Freud is never in doubt of the strength ofSchreber's 













A Man of Superior Mental Gifts: 
Thus Freud begins his case study by describing Schreber as "a man of 
superior mental gifts and endowed with an unusual keenness alike of intellect 
and of observation", while simultaneously commending him for the calibre of the 
arguments with which he had countered the considerable efforts that were made 
to restrain him from publishing his memoirs. Indeed, Freud responds to Schreber 
not simply with a respectful tone, but with what appears at times as a spirit of 
celebration. In a letter to Jung in April 1910, Freud refers to the "wonderful 
Schreber, who ought to have been made a professor of psychiatry and director of 
a mental hospital." Jung, in turn, wrote later in the same year to Freud that he 
was "touched and overjoyed" by Freud's appreciation of "the greatness of 
Schreber's mind and the liberating UpOI A.O]'tJl of the basic language" - the 
Grundsprache, "a somewhat antiquated but nevertheless powerful German, 
characterized particularly by a wealth of euphemisms" that Schreber claimed was 
the language of God (See Crapanzano, 1998: 738). 
The same respectful and celebratory tone pervades the case history as a 
whole. In the introductory paragraphs of his investigation, Freud's emphasis on 
Schreber's intellectual credibility - his status as an absolutely "reliable narrator" 
- is reinforced with a long list of carefully selected quotations from his 
psychiatrists' medical reports. Thus from Dr. Weber's lengthy report of 1899, 
Freud notes Weber's observation that apart from certain obvious "psychomotor 
symptoms" which must strike "even the most superficial observer as being 
pathological", Herr Senatsprasident Dr Schreber shows "no signs of confusion 
or psychical inhibition, nor is his intelligence notably impaired": 
His mind is collected, his memory is excellent, he has at his disposal a 
very considerable store of knowledge (not merely upon legal questions, 
but in many other fields), and he is able to reproduce it in a connected 
train of thought. He takes an interest in following events of the world of 
politics, science and art, etc., and is constantly occupied with such 











condition would scarcely notice anything peculiar in these directions (SE 
Xll: 15). 
Later, Freud draws our attention to a further report dated 1900, in which, even 
as Weber sets about trying to prevent Schreber from regaining control over his 
own affairs and securing his discharge from the asylum, he simultaneously 
contradicts his own judgements with repeated reference to the soundness of 
Schreber's mind. During the daily meals taken by Schreber at his family board, 
Weber reports that whatever the subject was that came up for discussion, the 
patient gave evidence of "a lively interest, a well-informed mind, a good 
memory, and a sound judgement" (SE XTI: 15). Schreber's "ethical outlook", 
moreover, according to Weber, was one which it was "impossible not to endorse" 
he was both "courteous" and "affable"; he displayed "tact" and "decorum" 
when touching upon matters in a humorous vein, and on one occasion, he is 
reported to have shown considerable "technical knowledge" and indeed, 
"common sense" in helping to solve a business question which arose involving 
the interests of the entire Weber family. These extracts from contemporary 
psychiatric reports, clearly selected to emphasize Schreber's considerable mental 
powers, his fine memory and his credibility as an author, are crowned by Freud 
himself as he notes, with evident pride in Schreber's achievement, his eventual 
success both in securing publication of his memoirs, and restoring his civil 
rights: 
In the numerous applications to the courts, by which Dr Schreber 
endeavoured to regain his liberty, he did not in the least disavow his 
delusions or make any secret of his intention of publishing the 
Denkwiirdigkeiten. On the contrary, he dwelt upon the importance of his 
ideas to religious thought, and upon their invulnerability to the attacks of 
modem science; but at the same time he laid stress upon the 'absolute 
harmlessness' (430) of all the actions which, as he was aware, his 
delusions obliged him to perform. Such, indeed, were his acumen and the 
cogency of his logic that finally, and in spite of his being an 











1902, Dr Schreber's civil rights were restored, and in the following year 
his Denkwiirdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken appeared, though in a 
censored form and with many valuable portions omitted (SE XII: 16). 
This then, I want to suggest, is the next remarkable feature of the case, and an 
essential one to note in a proper assessment of its historical significance - the 
extent to which, within it, Freud demonstrates his willingness to take Schreber at 
his word, and, as part of the same impetus, the lengths he goes to to put before 
his readers a case for doing likewise. Do not dismiss, and above all, do not 
censor the words of the madman, Freud seems to want to say. Listen to them, 
subject them to the most serious procedures of reading and interpretation, and 
you will find that we have much to learn from them. 
Science, Fiction and the Question of Evidence: 
Clearly, Freud's respect for Schreber, both as recorder and as analyst of his 
own psychotic imaginings far outweighed his regard for the opinions of 
Schreber's physicians and psychiatrists. It is hardly surprising then, that Freud 
almost never turns to the psychiatric literature of the day when summoning up 
evidence to substantiate his interpretations in the case. Indeed, Freud seems more 
interested in the insights gained from works of fiction than in any of the 
scientific studies which may have been available to him at the time. At times 
Freud elaborates on Schreber's own allusions to literary and historical myth, 
while also invoking a variety of fictional works Schreber does not mention -
from the classics of Goethe and Nietsche to the Ghazals of Muhammad ibu 
Muhammad, a thirteenth-century Persian mystical poet. The case history as a 
whole is littered with literary references, many of which are summoned at the 
most crucial stages of the interpretive process to substantiate Freud's most 
significant theoretical conclusions. 
On the difficult question of "soul-murder", for example, it is to the legends 
embodied in two plays by Lord Byron, Manfred and Cain (the first of which is 











he learns nothing from Byron's writing about soul-murder, it is in Manfred that 
Freud discovers a major piece of supporting evidence for his theory that 
Schreber's brother was one of the objects of his homosexual attraction: "It is 
plausible, by the way," suggests Freud in a lengthy footnote, "to connect the plot 
of Manfred with the incestuous relations which have repeatedly been asserted to 
exist between the poet and his half-sister. [Hence Schreber's preoccupation with 
it.] And it is not a little striking that the action of Byron's other play, his 
celebrated Cain, should be laid in the primal family, where no objections could 
exist to incest between brother and sister" (1911: 45). 
In his elaborations on Schreber's imaginative conception of the "state of 
bliss" offered by "the life beyond", Freud finds it significant, and a key factor in 
his own interpretations of Schreber' s fantasies in this regard, that here Schreber 
departs from literary myths and legends. This time, he turns to Mignon's song in 
Goethe's Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre as evidence of the fact that the wish-
fulfillment offered by the life beyond most often includes the desire to be "at last 
free from the difference between the sexes" (SE XII: 29, fn. 2). In Schreber's 
case, a distinction is drawn between the male and female "states of bliss" - a 
distinction whose departure from literary mythology Freud sees as crucial to our 
understanding of its meaning. To Schreber, the "male state of bliss was superior 
to the female, which seems to have consisted chiefly in an uninterrupted feeling 
of voluptuousness." Moreover, that element of the state of bliss which literary 
myth has conceived as consisting in the contemplation of God is virtually absent 
in Schreber's conception, so that for him, "heavenly bliss" was to be understood 
as being "in its essence an intensified continuation of sensual pleasure upon 
earth." Crucially, it is in these departures from literary mythology in Schreber's 
imaginative conception of life after death that Freud finds his major interpretive 
clues to the nature of Schreber' s paranoia - in what he describes as this 
"surprising sexualization of the state of heavenly bliss" which will lead him, 












In the case of Schreber' s "Redeemer delusion," once again a crucial departure 
from historical myth offers Freud the key to understanding its significance. In his 
attempt to go beyond the "estimates" of the "practical psychiatrist," Freud 
focuses on two details of Schreber' s delusionary scheme as being of prime 
importance. The first is the patient's asssumption of the role of the Redeemer, 
and the second is his transformation into a woman. As far as the first is 
concerned, Freud points out that the "Redeemer delusion" is a fantasy that is 
familiar through the frequency with which it forms the nucleus of religious 
paranoia. The additional factor, in Schreber's case however, "which makes the 
redemption dependent upon the man being previously transformed into a woman, 
is unusual and in itself bewildering, since it shows such a wide divergence from 
the historical myth which the patient's phantasy is setting out to reproduce ... " 
(SE XII: 18, my emphasis). It is this divergence more than anything else that will 
eventually lead Freud to his most important insight at this point in the case 
history, namely that the idea of being transformed into a woman was the "salient 
feature" and the "earliest germ" in Schreber's delusional system (SE XII: 21). It 
also proves to be the one part of the system that persists after his cure, and the 
one part that was able to retain a place in his behaviour in real life after he had 
recovered. Thus Freud concludes that "[in] contrast to the way in which he put 
his emasculation phantasy into action, the patient never took any steps towards 
inducing people to recognize his mission as Redeemer, beyond the publication of 
his Denkwiirdigkeiten" (SE XII: 21). 
It is also in the wake ofa long string of literary references that Freud is finally 
led to perhaps the most triumphant moment in the course of his interpretation, 
when he feels he can confidently declare that in the case of Schreber, "we find 
ourselves once again on the familiar ground of the father-complex" (SE XII: 55). 
This time Freud summons Goethe's Faust and Nietzsche's Also Sprach 
Zarathustra, along with a series of cosmic myths, to help him explain the 
significance of the sun in the expression of Schreber' s delusions. 
Schreber, as Freud points out, has quite a peculiar relation to the sun: "It 











or as the organ of a yet higher being lying behind it. We learn from a medical 
report that at one time he 'used to shout threats and abuse at it and positively 
bellow at it' and used to call out to it that it must crawl away from him and hide. 
He himselftells us that the sun turns pale before him. The manner in which it is 
bound up with his fate is shown by the important alterations it undergoes as soon 
as changes begin to occur in him as, for instance, during his first weeks at 
Sonnenstein" (SE XII: 53-54). In the attempt at interpretation which follows this 
description ofSchreber's "solar myth," Freud relies entirely on the evidence 
provided by literary and cosmic legends to lead him to the conclusion that the 
sun, in Schreber's delusional system, "is nothing but another sublimated symbol 
for the father ... " (SE XII: 54). For all his declared reverence for science, then, it 
is invariably to works ofjiction that Freud turns when in search of crucial 
evidential support for his major theoretical conclusions in the case. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
Knowledge of, and responsiveness to literature and the linguistic sciences 
was, from the start, an important dimension of psychoanalytic thinking. 24 That 
Freud believed this implicitly, is clear in the literary erudition demonstrated in all 
his great case studies. Yet Freud's conviction that analytic training should 
include instruction in branches of knowledge remote from medicine (including, 
most significantly, "mythology" and "the science of literature"), would find its 
fullest expression only very much later, in a pamphlet he published in July 1926 
called "The Question of Lay Analysis". In the late spring of that year, 
proceedings had been begun in Vienna against Theodor Reik, a prominent non-
medical member of the Vienna Psycho-Analytic Society, following a charge, on 
information laid by someone he had been treating analytically, with a breach of 
an old Austrian law against "quackery" a law which made it illegal for a person 











at once intervened energetically. He argued the position privately with an 
official of high standing, and went on to compose the present pamphlet 
['A Question of Lay Analysis'] for immediate publication. He began 
writing it at the end of June; it was in print before the end of July, and 
was published in September. Partly, perhaps, as a result of his 
intervention, but partly because the evidence was unsatisfactory, the 
Public Prosecutor stopped the proceedings after a preliminary 
investigation (SE 20: 180). 
From early on, Freud had held strongly to the opinion that psychoanalysis was 
not to be regarded as purely a concern of the medical profession. His first 
published expression on the subject seems to have been in his preface contributed 
in 1913 to a book by Pfister; and in a letter written at the very end of his life in 
1938, he declared that 'I have never repudiated these views and I insist on them 
even more intensely than before.' But it was in "A Question of Lay Analysis" 
that Freud argued the matter most closely and fully. Analytic training, Freud 
insisted, "cuts across the field of medical education, but neither includes the 
other." If one had to found a "college of psycho-analysis", he went on, much 
would have to be taught in it which is also taught by the medical faculty, but this 
would not be all: 
... alongside of depth-psychology, which would always remain the 
principal subject, there would be an introduction to biology, as much as 
possible of the science of sexual life, and familiarity with the 
symptomatology of psychiatry. On the other hand, analytic instruction 
would include branches of knowledge which are remote from medicine 
and which the doctor does not come across in his practice: the history of 
civilization, mythology, the psychology of religion and the science of 
literature. Unless he is well at home in these subjects, an analyst can 
make nothing of a large amount of his material. By way of compensation, 
the great mass of what is taught in medical schools is of no use to him for 











other phenomena and other laws. However much philosophy may ignore 
the gulf between the physical and the mental, it still exists for our 
immediate experience and still more for our practical endeavours (SE 20: 
246-47, my emphasis). 
In his analysis of Schreber, as in all his great case studies, Freud was in the 
process of defining the boundaries of this "other world", its distinctive 
phenomena and its particular set of laws. And it is this attempt - to convey the 
specific dimensions of a psychoanalytic mode of knowing - beyond the details of 
the theoretical conclusions he drew from the case studies, that, in my view, gives 
them their significance. His own extensive knowledge of mythology, literature 
and the arts in general proved indispensable to him in this task, in a way that 
would end essentially by extending the idea of what it meant to be scientific, or 
to engage in scientific inquiry. Ironically, however, it was also partly due to 
Freud's literary knowledge and leanings - and to the use he made of these in the 
process of writing - that the case histories turned out to read (as Freud himself 
complained) more "like short stories" than anything else, and that (in his own 
words) they "lacked the serious stamp of science" (See Studies on Hysteria, SE 
II: 160). 
Freud rightly feared that the literary character of his case histories would 
simply contribute to that long-standing theme in the overall critique of 
psychoanalysis - its lack of scientific authority - which dates back to the very 
beginnings of the discipline, and has been its constant companion since then. Yet 
what the Schreber study - and indeed, all the others - suggest, is the futility of 
any debate about psychoanalysis which insists on couching itself in the form, Is it 
an art or a science? Freud's notes on Schreber suggest that it may be much more 
instructive (as Forrester has recently pointed out) to pose the question: "what 
changes in our general categories are required by recognizing that psychoanalysis 
is both an art and a science? Not just the old-fashioned sense of art, as when we 
say that medicine is an art and a science ... But also the recognition that 
psychoanalysis has produced in the analyst a figure whose work is aesthetic as 











words, within which Freud should not only be considered alongside Darwin or 
Einstein (Forrester concludes), but also as "a combination of Darwin with Proust, 
Pasteur with Picasso, or even Weber with HG Wells" (1997: 5). 
Much of the voluminous critical response to Freud's "Psycho-analytic Notes 
on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia" has ignored all these 
issues, focussing squarely and simply on the conftrmation or otherwise of 
Freud's theoretical conclusions in the case - on determining the extent to which 
Freud either failed or succeeded, within the case study, in getting to the bottom 
of Schreber' s paranoia. Yet if we recognize the case study that gradually emerges 
in Freud's work as the "locus of the most speciftcally psychoanalytic 
knowledge," as Carl PIetsch advises, then it becomes clear that criticism that 
supposes psychoanalysis to be located in theories, and approaches its writings 
with this idea principally in mind, is surely misplaced. "[B]ehind the specific 
difference between the genres of Freud's writing intended for different 
audiences," PIetsch writes, "lay a tension between the positivistic notions of 
science that Freud had imbibed with his medical education, in which theory 
predominated, and another notion of knowledge that arose from or was produced 
by the psychoanalytic mode of knowing itself The view of knowledge implied in 
Freud's increasing reliance upon case studies never fully triumphed over Freud's 
commitment to theory, but it represents the more radical departure from the 
tradition of positivistic scientiftc discourse in Freud's oeuvre, and must thus be 
regarded as a distinguishing feature of psychoanalysis" (117). 
Just such a radical departure is, to my mind, the distinguishing feature of 
Freud's case study on Schreber. In its deftnitive break with the conservatism of 
traditional psychiatry, in its opposition to the prevailing culture of censorship and 
in its championing of greater freedom of expression, in its challenge to a too 
rigid deftnition of science and scientific inquiry, and in its liberating attempt to 
allow the "madman" his say, Freud's analysis ofSchreber goes far beyond the 
reaches of a purely theoretical, to a new form of discourse - one which 











knowledge. And it is in this effort to break: new epistemological ground, I want to 












1. All references to the text will be to the following edition: Schreber, 
Daniel PauL 1988[1903]. Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, trans. and ed. 
Ida Macalpine and Richard A. Hunter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press). I will also be referring extensively to Samuel 
Weber's lengthy introduction to this edition - an essay which I consider 
to be one of the more interesting discussions to have appeared to date, 
both in its commentary on Schreber's writing, and in its references to, 
and understanding of, the historical significance of Freud's case 
history. 
2. See Robertson, 1996 for a precise and useful summary of some of the 
most striking elements of Schreber' s complex structure of fantasies. 
3. Similarly, in the introduction to his celebrated reading of the WolfMan 
case history (in Reading for the Plot, 1984) Peter Brooks suggests that 
the WolfMan's public identity remains to this day that effectively 
assigned to him by Freud - that the WolfMan himself has become 
"fixed as a literary figure, a textual creation, evoked to represent a 
certain psychological configuration, an exemplary biography" (264). 
Even though he did in fact have the opportunity to tell his own story 
long after the publication of Freud's case history (in his memoirs 
published in 1971), he signed his own version (The Wolf-man by the 
Wolf-Man, ed. Muriel Gardiner) with the name he had been given by 
Freud in the case history. Thus his identity "remained to the end of his 
life inextricably bound up with his role as the most famous 'case' of 
psychoanalysis, with a biography written by Freud that was essential to 
a certain conceptual moment and theoretical construction in Freud's 
thought" (264-65). 
At this point, it may also be worth noting Lacan's insistence that his 
students read the complete text ofSchreber's memoirs during his 1955/56 
seminar on psychosis (See Lacan, 1981). 
4. Of course there are some notable exceptions to this reductive response. 
These include, amongst others, Samuel Weber's introduction to 
Macalpine and Hunter's 1988 edition of the Memoirs (which I will 
discuss later in the chapter), in which he offers a brief but useful 
discussion of Jacques Lacan's reading of the case (in Ecrits: A 
Selection, 1977), itself a predictably eccentric response, which in turn 
informs Weber's own interpretation. (For a succinct summary of the 
way Lacan differed from Freud in his interpretation of the case, see 
Roudinesco, 1997: 288.) Recent commentaries (notably Santner, 1996) 
have also extended and broadened the theoretical bounds of the existing 
critical tradition, by emphasizing the historical and socio-political 
context which gave rise to Schreber's delusional imaginings. 
5. In relation to the political references and allusions in Schreber's text, 











been accorded high honor: though in a rather cruder and less literate 
form it became the creed of a great nation, leading ... to the conquest of 
Europe and coming within a hair's breadth of the conquest of the 
world" (cited in Santner, 1996: ix). 
6. See, for example, Deleuze and Guatarri, 1983. Although more 
sympathetic to the ambiguously transgressive dimensions of Schreber' s 
delusions, Deleuze and Guattari ultimately second Canetti's reading of 
Schreber's text as a storehouse of proto-fascist fantasies and fantasy 
structures. Curiously, the Schreber case does not figure in Klaus 
Thewelheit's recent study of fascism, Male Fantasies (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1987). 
7. See Niederland, 1984. Earlier discussions by William Niederland 
focussing on the same issue include "Schreber: Father and Son", 
Psychoanalytic Quarterly 28, 1959: 151-169; "The Miracled-up World 
ofSchreber's Childhood", Psycho-analytc Study of the Child 14, 1959: 
383-413; and "Schreber's Father", Journal of the American Psycho-
analytic Association 8, 1960: 492-499. For an interesting critique of 
Niederland's position, see Israels, Han, 1989. Israe1s focuses on 
Niederland's considerable influence anxiety vis-a-vis Freud, which 
prevents Niederland from appreciating the extent of his own critical 
distance from Freud's purely intrapsychic reading of Schreber. 
8. See Schatzman, 1973. Morton Schatzman's contribution to the debates 
on Moritz Schreber's role is largely a radicalization and popularization 
ofNiederland's work. 
9. See, for example Lothane, 1992. Lothane suggests that Freud's focus 
on homosexuality in his reading of Schreber was entirely a product of a 
transferential dynamic on Freud's part and without a counterpart in 
Schreber's life or text: "scientific formulations about paranoia aside, 
latent homosexuality played a role in Freud and in the relations among 
the pioneers [of psychoanalysis] themselves: it was both an overt and a 
covert current in the early days of the history of the psychoanalytic 
movement, when it was an exclusively male club and a mutual 
admiration - and interpretation - society. The earliest personal linkage 
between paranoia and homosexuality was made by Freud himself in 
relation to Fliess ... In addition, homosexual concerns repeatedly came 
up as countertransference in the psychotherapy of male patients. Thus, 
Freud's attribution of homosexuality to Schreber is, among other 
motives, a projection onto Schreber of his own sexual conflicts and 
emotions" (338-9). 
10. Eric Santner suggests that the most significant contribution of 
Lothane's work has been to "profile the role played by the new 
discipline of forensic psychiatry, embodied in the persons ofFlechsig 
and Guido Weber, in Schreber's symptomatology ... " Lothane has 
noted that Flechsig showed special preference for sufferers from 











anomalies. Once patients were admitted, Flechsig's therapeutic 
procedures included surgical interventions, but also a variety of less 
aggressive procedures, such as bed rest, tepid baths, and so on. As far 
as the use of drugs was concerned, Lothane describes Flechsig's 
preferred treatment of epilepsy with opium and bromides as a kind of 
"chemical shock, which helped some patients but caused death in 
others." He concludes: "The striking fact in all this is that there is 
neither awareness nor interest on the part ofFlechsig in anything 
remotely related to psychotherapy, that is, treatment of mental disorders 
by psychological means. In this regard, Flechsig remained an organicist 
to the very end" (212-13). 
11. Niederland argues that, although Schreber's symptoms at times 
resemble the manifestations of the "influencing machines" found in the 
persecutory delusions of many shizophrenics, "there is a realistic core 
in this [Schreber's] delusionary material," the historical truth of which 
is to be found in the father's medical, orthopaedic and pedagogical 
theories and practices. Thus Niederland writes, "With respect to the 
father, one might reason he was the type of' symbiotic father', whose 
all-pervasive presence, usurpation of the maternal role, and other 
domineering features (overtly sadistic as well as paternalistically 
benevolent, punitive as well as seductive) lent themselves to their 
fusion with the bizarre God heirarchy characteristic of the son's 
delusional system" (74). In Niederland's view, the overproximity of 
such a father to a son created an environment in which, as he puts it, 
"there was always castration in the air": "The father's aggressive and 
coercive actions; the orthopedic contraptions; the disrupted, 
dismembered, and dissected aspects of the human body; the violence 
and authoritarian impetus of the injunctions; the sequence 
masturbation-plague-sterility-insanity (castration) - all belong in this 
setting" (82). 
12. In this connection, see Foucault, 1965, 1976, and particularly, 1979. 
13. See, in particular, Walter Benjamin's "Critique of Violence", in 
Reflections, Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans. 
Edmond Jephcott, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken, 1986); and 
Pierre Bourdieu' s Language and SymboliC Power, trans. Gino 
Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1991). 
14. I will return to this point, and discuss its implications more fully, later 
on in this chapter. 
15. See, for instance, the following works by Zizek: The Sublime Object of 
Ideology (1989); For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a 
Political Factor (1991); Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel,and 
the Critique of Ideology (1993); "Cyberspace, or, the Unbearable 











selection, The Zizek Reader (ed. Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Wright, 
1999). 
16. For a classic statement of this critique, see Steiner, 1998. 
17. Representative is Le Rider, 1993. In this recent study of crises of 
gender, national and ethnic identity in fin-de-siec1e Austrian literature, 
Le Rider characterizes Schreber's Memoirs as a "disturbing parody of 
the literary presentations of depersonalization and mystic or narcissistic 
reconstruction of the deeper self', which he analyzes in the works of 
Hofmannsthal, Rilke and Lou Andreas-Salome. 
18. Cited in PIetsch, 1982: 1011102. 
19. See particularly Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post Critical 
Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974). In the early 
fifties, Polanyi was invited to give the Gifford Lectures (1951-1952), 
and from 1952 until 1958, he worked to transform his lectures into 
Personal Knowledge, the publication which best represents Polanyi's 
mature philosophy. As a contribution to the philosophy of science, this 
book criticizes the ideal of objectivity and is part of the mid-century 
shift in philosophy of science toward interest in scientific practice (like 
Thomas Kuhn's more famous The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962), which makes some use ofPolanyi's thought). But Personal 
Knowledge is more than an effort in philosophy of science narrowly 
construed. The critical component of the work is an attack upon the 
ideal of objectivity as it was presented in science and philosophy at 
mid-century. The constructive (as opposed to critical) philosophy in 
this book, however, represents Polanyi's developing interest in 
epistemology; he carefully works out his own epistemological model 
and sets forth a broad framework within which to think about 
knowledge as personaL Especially if one considers the fourth part of 
Personal Knowledge, it is clear that this book is also Polanyi's effort to 
articulate a philosophical cosmology (or a broad metaphysical scheme) 
and a lebensphilosophie. 
20. This appears in two volumes, namely, The Correspondence of Sigmund 
Freud and Sandor Ferenczi, Volume 1,1908-1939, ed. Eva Brabant, 
Ernst Falzeder, and Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch, trans. Peter T. Hoffer, 
with an introduction by Andre Haynal (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1994); and The Correspondence of Sigmund Freud 
and Sandor Ferencz;, Volume 2,1914-1919, ed. Eva Brabant and Ernst 
Falzeder, with the collaboration ofPatrizia Giampieri-Deutsch, under 
the supervision of Andre Haynal, transcribed by Ingeborg Meyer-
Palmedo, trans. Peter T. Hoffer, with an introduction by Axel Hoffer 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). Abbreviated in 
the text as Ffer 1 and Ffer 2. 










22. Fier 1, Ferenczi to Freud, 5th February 1910, p. 130. 
23. Fier 1, Ferenczi to Freud, 3rd October 1910, pp. 219-220. 
24. See Bowie, 1987: 120. As Bowie points out, the psychoanalyst who 
brings a broad reach of knowledge, both scientific and artistic, to bear 
upon his work is not departing from tradition, but "returning to the 
fertile sources of psychoanalytic thinking. For Freud and his early 
followers had an exemplary knowledge of, and responsiveness to, 












POWER, MEANING AND PERSUASION 
IN THE CASE OF THE 
"WOLF MAN" 
Like all Freud's major case histories, that on Serge Pankejeff (the "Wolf 
Man") in "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" (in SE XVII, pp. 3-122) 
continues to generate a wide variety of responses from readers with diverse 
interests. For psychoanalysts, philosophers and literary theorists, for example, the 
concept of Nachtriig!ichkeit (deferred action), which Freud introduced in this 
case, and on which his entire analysis hinged, has been a source of debate and 
discussion for decades. 
1 
Linguists, narratologists and literary critics have long 
been fascinated by the complexity of the case history's narrative structures, while 
others have noted its significance in shaping contemporary approaches to the 
study of sexuality and gender. In an unusual new reading by art historian 
Whitney Davis (Drawing the Dream of the Wolves, 1995), for example, the Wolf 
Man case history becomes "an exemplary instance of the production of sexuality 
through representation." 2 "From medical clinics or psychiatric hospitals to law 
courts and military institutions to kindergarten classrooms and academic 
disciplines such as history or literary criticism," Davis writes in the opening 
pages of his study, "Freud's conception oflatent homosexuality presented in 
From the History of an Infantile Neurosis has had a tremendous influence on all 
twentieth-century approaches to human sexuality and gender" (1995: xv). 3 
Other readers have found the case history illuminating for what it tells us 











its primary value lies in its "detailed demonstration of Freud as a reader." For 
him, the case constitutes "an implicit hermeneutics and a practical criticism, a 
theory of how to read and a detailed demonstration of how reading proceeds" 
(1985: 3). For Peter Brooks, on the other hand, in his celebrated Readingfor the 
Plot (1984), the case represents far more than just a simple theory of reading. 
"We have here," he writes, "one of the most daring moments of Freud's thought, 
and one of his most heroic gestures as a writer." In Brooks' reading, Freud's 
"heroism" here is a product of the bold modernist vision he displays in the case, 
his willingness to embrace in it a "structure of indeterminacy" - one which 
"perilously destabilises belief in ... exhaustive accounts whose authority derives 
from the force of closure" (277). Drawing on Freud's own characterization of his 
labours in the case (in The Freudian Reading, 1991), Lis Moller describes it as 
Freud's "most ambitious attempt to descend 'into the deepest and most primitive 
strata of mental development''' (58). And for Ned Lukacher (in Primal Scenes: 
Literature, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, 1986), the case history is Freud's "most 
daring theoretical and clinical work," representing nothing less than a "challenge 
to the history of Western metaphysics" itself (41 ). 
But it is this very "heroism" - embodied for writers like Brooks, Moller and 
Lukacher in the "challenge" the case presents to Western metaphysics - which 
has also elicited its most aggressively critical opposition, particularly in recent 
decades. Since the 1970's at least, Freud's account of his analysis of the Wolf 
Man has become what John Forrester calls a "test case for the truth of 
psychoanalysis" (1997: 209), often with negative results. Representative is Frank 
Sulloway's 1991 "reappraisal" of all the major case histories ("Reassessing 
Freud's Case Histories: The Social Construction of Psychoanalysis"), in which, 
in the derisory tones characteristic of much of this recent opposition, the case is 
described not only as a therapeutic failure, but a "tacitly recognized 
embarrassment [for psychoanalysis], whose true nature needed to be hidden by 
the arm-twisting and the financial resources of the Sigmund Freud archives" 
(1991: 261). 4 Earlier, at the "Linguistics of Writing" colloquium held at the 
University ofStrathclyde in July 1986, Stanley Fish gave a paper on the Wolf 











against the legitimacy of psychoanalysis" (Forrester, 1997: 209). An abbreviated 
version of the same paper appeared in the Times Literary Supplement of August 
29, prefaced by the following introductory remarks: 
I have two epigraphs for this essay. The first is from James Strachey's 
preface to his translation of Freud's Introductory Lectures. Freud, he says, 
was "never rhetorical," and was entirely opposed to laying down his view 
in the authoritarian fashion. The second is a report by the Wolf-Man of 
what he thought to himself shortly after he met Freud for the first time: 
this man is a Jewish swindler, he wants to use me from behind, and shit 
on my head. This paper is dedicated to the proposition that the Wolf-Man 
got it right (1986: 935).5 
By the end of his paper, Fish claimed to have demonstrated that, in this case 
history, Freud employed nothing but rhetoric, both where his treatment of his 
patient was concerned, and in his relation to the reader of the case history. As for 
the WolfMan himself, in Fish's reading he becomes nothing more than a product 
of the analyst's self-serving imagination and technique - a "piece of language," 
"the perfect rhetorical artifact." Re-published as it was in numerous different 
versions (most recently in 1998), Fish's paper set a new model for literary critical 
approaches both to the case history itself and to Freud's writing in general. 6 
In this chapter, I want to respond at some length to Stanley Fish's essay, in a 
discussion prompted by two striking features of his paper: first, by the 
confrontation it represents between one specialist trained in the art of literary 
interpretation, and another who was discovering a method for the interpretation 
of dreams. Is the dream text fully interchangeable with the fictional text (as 
Fish's paper implies), and to what extent do the two interpretative operations 
(literary and psychoanalytic) really coincide? Second, my response was 
prompted by a sense of deja-vu as I read his paper, as if everything he was saying 
had been said before, perhaps only in a different way. What is the fundamental 
objection underlying most attacks on Freud's work, how is it manifested in Fish's 











not only at Fish's paper, but at the long critical tradition it both reflects and 
perpetuates. 
I 
THE SCENE OF PERSUASION 
Fish's "proposition" is based on the argument that Freud has used and 
manipulated the facts of the Wolf-Man's case to suit his own hypotheses, and, 
more specifically, to defend and justify the theoretical premises upon which the 
discipline of psychoanalysis is built. In Fish's analysis, Freud's account of the 
Wolf-Man's case history proceeds not according to the principles of rationality 
and objectivity, but is characterized by a rhetorical pattern in which repeated 
claims of "independence" - for the analysis itself, for the "materials" upon which 
it is built, and for the patient's share of the work - can be shown to be powerfully 
subverted by the narrative in which they are submerged: "The real story of the 
case," writes Fish, "is the story of persuasion, and we will be able to read it only 
when we tear our eyes away from the supposedly deeper story of the boy who 
had a dream" (1986: 937). 
In the course of his critique, Fish will suggest that the greater part of the final 
interpretation of the dream which is the centrepiece of the analysis, is the product 
of "persuasion and force" on the part of Freud, the analyst, rather than the result 
of independent work on the part of the patient. Even where the patient does 
apparently speak for himself in the interpretation of the dream, the independence 
of his words is compromised, according to Fish, by the method in which they 
have been "induced" by Freud. Fish here refers to the way in which Freud 
attempts to overcome the patient's persistently apathetic attitude to the analysis 
by fixing a particular date on which the treatment would have to end, "no matter 











In so doing, suggests Fish, "the coercion [on Freud's part] could not be more 
obvious ... " By imposing a fixed limit on the duration of the analysis, Freud was 
effectively assuring its advancement, and, what is more, assuring it "in a form he 
[would] approve." As further grist for his mill, Fish goes on to point out that 
"Freud does not shrink from naming [this imposition] as an exercise of 
'inexorable pressure'; yet in the very same sentence he contrives to detach the 
pressure from the result it produces: 'Under the inexorable pressure of the fixed 
limit the patient's resistance gave way, and now in a disproportionately short 
time, the analysis produced all the material which made it possible to clear up his 
inhibitions and remove his symptoms ... '" (1986: 935). In Fish's interpretation, 
the analysis is here cunningly, and indeed falsely, presented "as if it were 
independent of the constraints that father it, and at the end of the sentence the 
clearing up of inhibitions and the removal of symptoms appear as effects without 
a cause, natural phenomena that simply emerge in the course of their own 
time ... " (1986: 935). 
It is in this "remarkable sequence ... repeated in a variety of ways in the 
paragraphs that follow" that Fish detects the "pattern" which he feels to be 
constitutive of the narrative structure of the case history as a whole: "Always the 
pattern is the same," writes Fish, "the claim of independence - for the analysis, 
for the patient's share, for the 'materials' - is made in the context of an account 
that powerfully subverts it, and then it is made again" (1986: 935). 
As suggested earlier, the argument against the independence of the analysis, 
which Fish constructs in this way in the first section of his paper, and elaborates 
in those that follow, is buttressed by a critical tradition that attacks Freudian 
psychoanalysis on the grounds that it "acts by suggestion" - or, in Fish's terms, 
"that what the analyst claims to uncover (in the archaeological sense of which 
Freud was so fond) he actually creates by verbal and rhetorical means" (1986: 
935) - its principal objection to psychoanalysis thus following Wittgenstein's 
refutation of Freud' s claims to be "scientific," his suggestion, that is, that what 
Freud offers is nothing more than "speculation - something prior even to the 











In Wittgenstein's view, the only reason these speculations have gained a 
certain popularity in the mind of the public is through their "appeal," or their 
"charm" as explanations: "The picture of people having unconscious thoughts 
has a charm. The idea of an underworld, a secret cellar. Something hidden, 
uncanny ... A lot of things one is ready to believe because they are uncanny" 
(Cioffi, 1969: 186). 8 Pursuing a similar line of thought, Fish attributes the 
"appeal" of Freudian propositions to the peculiar "discursive power" of and by 
which they have been constructed. The true content of Freudian explanations, 
according to Fish, is the story of their making, the story of "persuasion ... 
practised on a massive scale," in which the reader only believes what he is told 
because he has "fallen totally under the control of the teller" (1986: 936). 
But what ofFish's own formidable powers of persuasion? What of his own 
talent for verbal manipulation, his carefully cultivated discursive skills? Who 
now is the teller, and what, if subjected to closer scrutiny, are the "true contents" 
of his tale? 
II 
PRACTICES OF READING AND 
INTERPRETATION 
We'll begin by examining Fish's investigation of the third paragraph of 
Chapter One of the Wolf-Man case history. In this paragraph, Freud weighs the 
virtues and defects of two possible methods in the analysis of infantile neuroses. 
The two possibilities, as Fish notes, are: 
1. analysing a childhood disorder when it first manifests itself in 
infancy, or 











"Since Freud is at this very moment engaged in the second practice," writes 
Fish, "it is not surprising that he decides in favour of it, but he must find a way to 
defend it against the objection (which he anticipates) that because of the passage 
of time what results will be the product of interpretation. He replies by asserting 
that interpretation will play an even greater part if the child is examined directly 
because 'too many words and thoughts have to be lent' to him. In contrast, when 
one analyses an adult, these 'limitations' do not obtain, although one must then 
'take into account the distortion and refurbishing to which a patient's past is 
subjected when it is looked back upon ... '" (1986: 935). 
On examination, Fish finds this to be a "curious contrast" since, as he points 
out, "it is hard to tell the difference between 'lending words' and 'refurbishing.'" 
The only reason the contrast works, in Fish's eyes, lies in the way that "the 
sentence shifts the burden of 'refurbishing' onto the patient." This Fish interprets 
as a "brilliant move" on Freud's part, which allows him to "admit interpretation 
into the scene while identifying it as the work of another, leaving himself the 
(honorable) work of undoing its effects ... In only a few sentences," concludes 
the critic, "[Freud] has managed to twice distance himself from the charge of 
suggestion, first by pushing it off onto the practitioners of a rival method, and 
second by making it into a property of the illness of which his now innocent 
labors are to be the cure" (1986: 935). 
Embedded in this sequence are a number of accusations directed against the 
analyst: 
1. that Freud's "defence" of his present method is based more on 
expedience than on an objective balancing of the pros and cons of 
both possible procedures; 
2. that underlying this supposed "defence" is an attempt to justify any 
element of interpretation the analysis might entail, and falsely to 
identify it as the work of the patient, whereas in fact it is the work of 











3. that disguised beneath the surface discussion on questions of method 
is a concealed attempt on the part of the analyst to "distance himself 
from the charge of suggestion." 
Considering that the body ofFish's criticism is directed against the power of 
"suggestion," which he feels to be the greatest danger inherent in the practice of 
"interpretation" - one that must necessarily throw into question the results of any 
psychoanalytic session - it is curious to find that his own criticisms are based 
exclusively on the very practice he cannot countenance in Freud: in this case, his 
own efforts to "interpret" the Freudian text in question. 9 Indeed, a return to the 
original paragraph under examination (which Fish significantly does not quote in 
full) reveals the critic's own penchant for "lending words" and "refurbishing." In 
the end, it is tempting to suggest that what is at stake is not Freud's attempt to 
defend himself against the charge of suggestion by identifying his own 
interpretations as "the work of another," but Fish's attempt to deflect the reader's 
critical gaze from his own tendency to "act by suggestion" by attributing this 
tendency to Freud. 
"Since Freud is at this very moment engaged in the second practice, it is not 
surprising that he decides in favor of it, but he must find a way to defend it 
against the objection ... that because of the passage of time what results will be 
the product of interpretation," writes Fish, suggesting, first " a firm rejection on 
Freud's part of what Fish (rather than Freud) describes as the "rival method" in 
favour of that in which he is presently engaged, and secondly, the need to justify 
his decision. 
In fact, no such rejection appears in the original text, which reads, in full, as 
follows: 
My description will therefore deal with an infantile neurosis which was 
analysed not while it actually existed, but only fifteen years after its 
termination. This state of things has its advantages as well as its 











conducted upon a neurotic child itself must, as a matter of course, appear 
to be more trustworthy, but it cannot be very rich in material; too many 
words and thoughts have to be lent to the child, and even so the deepest 
strata may turn out to be impenetrable to consciousness. An analysis of a 
childhood disorder through the medium of recollection in an intellectually 
mature adult is free from these limitations; but it necessitates our taking 
into account the distortion and refurbishing to which a person's own past 
is subjected when it is looked back upon from a later period. The first 
alternative perhaps gives the more convincing results; the second is by far 
the most instructive (SE XVII: 8-9). 
Rather than a firm rejection of one method in favour of the alternative (which 
Fish reads into the text to form the basis of his criticisms), the text itself reveals a 
careful balancing of the advantages and disadvantages of both. According to 
Freud, where the method he is not using is more "trustworthy" - a word Fish 
conveniently ignores - that presently in use is "richer in material"; where the 
alternative would "give the more convincing results," the method in use is "more 
instructive." The previously mentioned charge that Freud's "defense" of his 
technique is based on expedience begins to fall away when what is described by 
Fish as a "defensive strategy" turns out to be little more than a disinterested 
account of alternative methods. 10 
The validity ofFish's critical assertions is further weakened if one stops to 
question not only the strength of his interpretation of Freud's text, but the very 
logic of his assumptions. It is difficult to imagine why Freud, as Fish suggests, 
should feel the need to "defend [his present practice] against the objection ... that 
because of the passage of time what results will be the product of interpretation," 
when the very "products" that interpretation provides themselves constitute the 
material upon which the analyst frames his hypotheses as to the patient's infantile 
sexuality, and through which he is then led to the motive forces of the neurotic 
symptoms oflater life. According to Fish, Freud's choice of procedure is de-
fended by an alleged "assertion" that "interpretation will play an even greater 











to be lent' to him." Once again, it is to Fish that the work of interpretation must 
be attributed. What Freud in fact asserts is that "an analysis which is conducted 
upon a neurotic child ... cannot be very rich in material; too many words and 
thoughts have to be lent to the child, and even so the deepest strata may tum out 
to be impenetrable to consciousness" (my emphasis). What Freud objects to is 
not the part necessarily played by interpretation, but the very sparseness of 
material/or interpretation that such an analysis must provide. 
1 1 
It is also Fish's claim that underlying Freud's "defensive strategies" is an 
underhanded attempt to shift the burden of "refurbishing" on to the patient (my 
emphasis), so as to "admit interpretation onto the scene while identifying it as the 
work of another. .. " Astonishingly, the very introduction of the "patient" into 
Freud's original text is the work ofFish, not of the author. The offending 
sentence - that which, according to Fish, "shifts the burden of refurbishing onto 
the patient ... " - reads as follows in the original: "An analysis of a childhood 
disorder through the medium of recollection in an intellectually mature adult ... 
necessitates our taking into account the distortion and refurbishing to which a 
person's own past is subjected when it is looked back upon from a later period." 
When Fish renders the same sentence, he takes it upon himself to substitute the 
word "patient" for Freud's decidedly more neutral "person," thus introducing into 
Freud's original statement an element of specificity for which the author was 
never responsible, but which nicely supports Fish's central thesis. Indeed, the 
coercion could not be more obvious; but we soon begin to find that it is executed 
by Fish, not, as he would have us believe, by Freud. 
Finally, the isolation of the paragraph in question, and its subsequent 
emphasis for the reader, is itself a coercive strategy employed by Fish to direct 
the reader's attention, in the interests of his own argument, away from what is 
actually at stake: namely, the "high theoretical interest" that any analysis of 
childhood neurosis, whatever the limitations of the method, must hold for 
psychoanalysis. As Freud makes clear in the paragraph immediately following 
the over-emphasised passage in question, "In any case it may be maintained that 











interest" (SE XVII: 9, my emphasis). Later, in Chapter Two, Freud stresses that 
"analyses such as this are not published in order to produce conviction in the 
minds of those whose attitude has hitherto been recusant and sceptical. The 
intention is only to bring forward some new facts for investigators who have 
already been convinced by their own clinical experiences" (SE XVII: 13). Far 
more important than the necessity to confirm the accuracy of all interpretative 
details brought to light by the analysis, is the evidence the case history provides 
for the existence of infantile sexuality. This is the theoretical value of the case in 
Freud's view, and the reason for its publication, and it is this theoretical value 
that Fish evades by distracting the reader's attention to methodological questions 
f d . 'fi 12 o secon ary s1gm lcance. 
III 
THE UNCONSCIOUS DENIAL OF THE 
lTNCONSCIOUS 
We have seen that Fish opens his paper by focusing on questions of method, 
while evading any serious confrontation with the theoretical issues underlying 
the Wolf-Man's case history. We have also seen the extent to which Fish relies 
on purely interpretative procedures to support his arguments, and that the 
accuracy of his interpretations can be questioned on a number of grounds if one 
returns to Freud's texts. 13 As such, Fish's paper both reflects and perpetuates the 
history of reduction and distortion that has characterised the development of 
psychoanalysis. 14 Further examination will reveal that in his criticisms Fish is 
also guilty of what Juliet Mitchell describes as the "unconscious denial of the 
unconscious." Mitchell suggests that no understanding of Freud's work is 
possible without some grasp of two fundamental theories: first. , the nature of 
unconscious mental life and the laws that govern its behaviour; and secondly, the 











It is ... a characteristic of most attacks on Freud's work that, though the 
criticism seems to be over specific issues, what is really being rejected is 
[the] whole intellectual framework of psychoanalysis ... there is formal 
obeisance to Freud's theories, yet behind most criticism of details there 
lies an unacknowledged refusal of every major concept. Time and time 
again, one dissident after another has repudiated singly or wholesale all 
the main scientific tenets of psychoanalysis (1974: 5). 
Narrative strategies and technique: 
The first indication of his denial of the unconscious, among other major 
\b-
concepts of psychoanalysis, is Fish's evasion of . 1 . At no stage, during the 
first section of his paper, does Fish attempt to confront or come to terms with any 
of the theoretical premises upon which the analysis is based. This pattern 
continues well into Section II, at which point Fish gives his fullest attention to 
another passage of secondary significance, this time dealing with questions of 
narrative technique: "I am unable," writes Freud, "to give either a purely 
historical or a purely thematic account of my patient's story; I can write a history 
neither of the treatment nor of the illness, but I shall find myself obliged to 
combine the two methods of presentation" (SE XVII: 13). 
"A 'purely historical' account," responds Fish, "would be a narrative account 
tracing out relationships of cause and effect; and by declaring that he is unable to 
provide it, Freud releases himself from the requirement that in his explanations 
one thing be shown to follow another. A 'purely thematic' account would be one 
in which the coherence of events and details was a matter of their relationship to 
a single master theme; and by declaring that he is unable to provide it, Freud 
releases himself from the requirement that his explanations go together as a 
unified whole. In effect, he neutralizes criticism of his conclusions before they 
are offered and is in the enviable position of being at once the architect and judge 











Fish's response is revealing, for it provides us with evidence for what, in 
Fish's view, constitute narrative "requirements." First, there is the "requirement" 
(from which Freud has ostensibly "released himself") that !lin [the author's] 
explanations one thing be shown to follow another. /I Second, there is the 
"requirement" (which Freud has once again managed to "evade") that U[the 
author's] explanations go together to form a unified whole." These, of course, are 
also the requirements of most forms of conscious perception, which tend to insist 
that it is in the nature of all "explanations" that they proceed according to clear 
relations of cause and effect. In fact, the question of causality is addressed 
directly by Freud, in the final chapter of the Wolf-Man case history, in a 
discussion which Fish ignores, but which other scholars (notably Ned Lukacher 
in The Primal Scene, 1986) have taken more seriously, with interesting results. 
What Freud argues for, in this last chapter, is an understanding of the concept 
of the primal scene which cannot be assimilated by the scientific notion of 
causality. While it is the business of psychoanalysis to "explain the striking 
symptoms by revealing their genesis," he writes, "it is not its business to explain 
but merely to describe the psychical mechanisms and instinctual processes to 
which one is led by that means" (SE XVII: 105). In Lukacher's view, this 
distinction between "explanation" and "description" indicates Freud's effort here 
to "mediate" or "mollify" the explanatory causal power of the primal scene: "The 
primal scene is that without which the symptoms could not have developed; for 
all that it does not explain the causality of the symptoms." The discourse of the 
primal scene, he concludes, "cannot be considered apart from the notion of 
causality; at the same time, [it] cannot fully be assimilated by it" (1986: 33). 
Thus, Lukacher goes on to suggest, in the WolfMan case history Freud, like 
Nietzsche, tries to think differently about causality. "The supposed instinct for 
causality," Nietzsche wrote in his notebooks during the 1880's, "is only fear of 
the unfamiliar, and the attempt to discover something familiar in it a search, not 
for causes, but for the familiar" (1967: 297). For Nietzsche, Lukacher writes, the 
history of metaphysics was an "apotropaic attempt to ward off the Unheimliche". 











cast their shadows over him: "Though Nietzsche entertained the idea of 'positive 
nihilism' - that is, a complete forgetfulness of the question of the origin and the 
subject - he found himself, after writing Thus spoke Zarathustra, in the despair 
of a 'negative nihilism' from which he never emerged." Nietszche' s fate is 
exemplary, Lukacher goes on, because of the "boldness of his effort to forget the 
real." In another notebook entry from the 1880's, Lukacher finds two alternative 
notions of causality which he uses to situate the relation of Freud's "primal 
scene" to causal explanation: 
The explanation of an event can be sought firstly: through mental images 
of the events that precede it (aims); secondly, through mental images that 
succeed it (the mathematical-physical explanation). 
One should not confuse the two. Thus: the physical explanation, which 
is a symbolization of the world by means of sensation and thought, can in 
itself never account for the origin of sensation and thought; rather physics 
must construe the world of feeling consistently as lacking feeling and aim 
right up to the highest human being. And teleology is only a history of 
purposes and never physical (Nietzsche, 1967: 303-4). 
Against Nietzsche's interdiction, writes Lukacher, Freud's primal scene is a 
"carefully staged confusion of these two notions of causality," which Freud 
situates in the "differential space between teleology and the physical 
explanation": "If we regard the wolf dream as the event Freud seeks to 
describe/explain, it is clear that the primal scene is the set of images that precede 
the event." At the same time, however, the primal scene is not a teleological 
notion. The primal scene, Lukacher concludes, is a "deductive, circumstantial 
construction that is put together in the gaps between the mental images or 
symptoms that succeed the dream and those that precede it. Nietzsche's 
alternatives cannot in themselves account for the complexity of Freud's notion. 
Freud relates one set of images to the other, but without either claiming to have 
accounted 'for the origin of sensation and thought' or using those images to 
construe a world of 'feeling and aim. ' Freud constructs a set of images that 











What enables Freud to circumvent Nietszche's alternatives is the concept of 
"deferred action" (Nachtriiglichkeit), which is prominent throughout Freud's 
work and particularly in From the History of an Infantile Neurosis. At its most 
elementary level, Lukacher writes, deferred action is a mode of temporal spacing 
through which the randomness of a later event triggers the memory of an earlier 
event or image, which might never have come to consciousness had the later 
event never occurred. The most obvious and immediate effect of deferred action 
is to undermine and divide the notion oflinear causality that works in one 
temporal direction. Deferred action demands that one recognize that while the 
earlier event is still to some extent the cause of the later event, the earlier event is 
also nevertheless the effect of the later event. One is forced to admit a double or 
"metaleptic" logic in which causes are both the causes of effects and the effects 
of effects: "Rather than offering a simple division between causes and effects, 
Freud confronts us with causes that are also effects and effects that are also 
causes. The random seriality of events that precede and follow the wolf dream 
leads Freud to posit a double logic of causality that repeatedly turns back upon 
itself' (Lukacher, 1986: 35). 
Returning now to Fish's "narrative requirements" (that all explanations 
proceed according to clear relations of cause and effect), Fish is astute enough to 
realize that the explanation behind Freud's inability to meet those requirements 
lies precisely in "the nature of the unconscious, which, [Freud] tells us, is not a 
linear structure ruled by the law of contradiction, but a geological accumulation 
of forms that never completely disappear and live side by side in an uneasy and 
unpredictable vacillation." Fish is disturbed by this explanation, for he fears the 
freedom it allows the narrator, the altogether too "favorable" rhetorical situation 
it seems to provide - one which, according to Fish, "neutralizes criticism" of 
Freud's conclusions "even before they are offered." 
But the real reason for Fish's discomfort is clearly his own underlying denial 
of the unconscious itself - a rejection barely disguised in Fish's allegation some 











holder which can be given whatever shape the polemical moment requires" 
(1986: 936). Later still, we find out that, for Fish, "a rhetorical object ... is entirely 
constructed and stands without external support; it is, we are accustomed to say, 
removed from reality ... " (1986: 938). If the unconscious is, in Fish's view, just 
such a "rhetorical" object, then it can have nothing to do with "reality." Fish has 
recognised, as he tells us at the end of his paper, that "the thesis of 
psychoanalysis is that one cannot get to the side of the unconscious." Indeed, he 
is living proof of the fact - for he cannot get to the side of his own unconscious 
desire that all explanations proceed along the lines of conscious perception, or 
that "one thing be shown to follow another" in the formation of a coherent and 
"unified whole." 
Fish requires no less than a definitive understanding of all psychical processes 
from the point of view of consciousness, a requirement, as Mitchell observes, 
characteristic of most traditional opposition to Freud's theories: "It is no accident 
that, for all their differences, Reich's, Laing's and the feminists' theories come to 
resemble one another in so many ways. All these writers deny the unconscious -
Reich by finding it to be nothing other than a pool of biological energy, Laing by 
treating its constructs as though they were identical to those of consciousness, the 
feminist critics by believing above all in social actuality and conscious choice" 
(1974: 356). 
Literary Interpretation vs. Dream Analysis: 
Ironically, Fish objects to Freud's interpretation of the Wolf-Man's dream on 
the grounds that it is too "authoritative," too "finished" and "enclosed" - the 
same grounds on which he objects to the narrative as a whole, and to Peter 
Brooks' reading ofit (in Readingfor the Plot) as a "radically modernist" text, a 
"structure of indeterminacy" and "undecidability" that "perilously destabilizes 
belief in ... exhaustive accounts whose authority derives from the force of 
closure." On the contrary, suggests Fish, "... we can note that Freud's own 











deny to it: completeness, exhaustiveness, authority, and above all, closure" 
(1986: 936). 
Freud's "own characterization" of his narrative, according to Fish, is to be 
found in a footnote: "it is always a strict law of dream interpretation that an 
explanation must be found for every detail" (SE XVII: 42, fit 1). Fish's objection 
is based on a misunderstanding of - or at least on too simplistic an approach to -
what Freud means when he uses the word "explanation." Because he approaches 
all explanations from the point of view of consciousness, Fish, like Wittgenstein, 
sees explanation as an end-point in interpretation rather than a starting-point. In 
fact, the importance for Freud of finding "explanations" for every detail of a 
dream lies not in the revelation of ultimate meanings they provide - in their 
"completeness ... exhaustiveness" or their "force of closure" - but in the link they 
set up between the latent dream-thoughts and the manifest dream-content. 
Finding this link is paramount in the operation of dream interpretation because it 
is only once this link has been brought to light that the process of interpretation 
can truly begin: 
The transformation of the latent dream-thoughts into the manifest dream 
content deserves all our attention, since it is the first instance known to us 
of psychical material being changed over from one mode of expression 
which is immediately intelligible to us to another which we can only 
come to understand with the help of guidance and effort, though it too 
must be recognized as a function of our mental activity (SE V: 642). 
In relation to this passage, Habermas suggests that "the technique of dream 
interpretation goes beyond the art of hermeneutics insofar as it must grasp not 
only the meaning of a distorted text, but the meaning of the text distortion itself, 
that is, the transformation of a latent dream thought into the manifest dream. In 
other words, it must reconstruct what Freud calls the 'dream-work.' The 
interpretation of dreams leads to a process of reflection that takes the same 
course as the genesis of the dream text, only in reverse. It is complementary to 











individual elements of the dream as well as on subsequent spontaneous additions 
to the dream text as it was first communicated" (Habermas, 1968: 221). 
Far from leading to "completeness" and closure, the explanations Freud refers 
to in his footnote may be seen to open up the dream to a process whereby the 
uppermost dream layer, the "dream facade," can be identified and removed. 
What follows is a complex interpretive operation obstructed by strong forces of 
resistance that may protract the process of interpretation over a number of years 
and may well prevent a point of "closure" from ever being reached. 
This brings us to what is perhaps the most significant feature ofFish's essay-
its failure to distinguish between the operations ofliterary analysis and dream 
interpretation. In "Meaning and Dream Interpretation," Fredric Weiss tackles a 
number of questions relating to this distinction that are blatantly ignored by Fish: 
What type of meaning is Freud establishing for a dream-report? What are the 
relationships between a dream-report, the subject's "associations," and the 
meaning assigned to the report? (1974: 55) Weiss suggests that Freud's dream 
interpretation bears similarities to the interpretation of aesthetic objects, such as 
poems or films. But as soon as the view of dream interpretation as an activity 
analogous to art interpretation is expanded, it runs into difficulties. For example, 
as Weiss points out, 
Freud does not apply to 'associations' the criterion of consistency with 
context which is used to judge an interpretation of a poem as correct or 
incorrect Moreover, he makes no attempt to measure a person's 
'associations' against any criterion, to judge them right or wrong, 
allowable or not allowable ... 'Right; 'wrong,' 'allowable,' 'not 
allowable,' 'plausible,' 'far-fetched,' 'relevant,' 'extraneous,' and any 
other such characterizations do not apply to 'associations.' If the subject's 
associations do lead to a meaning, that is the meaning which the 
psychoanalyst assigns to the dream-report: it cannot be rejected on any 
such grounds as incompatibility with the dream-report, and the analyst 











In psychoanalysis, trains of associations are pursued not simply to discover 
the meaning that may be inherent in a dream-report, but "for the sake of 
whatever they may be leading to, providing that what they are leading to is or 
reveals something about the subject ... There may be no attempt to assign 
everything to which the "associations" lead, to the dream-report as its meaning. 
All reference to the dream-report may be dropped; the question of what meaning 
is to be assigned to it tends to fade out of consideration" (1974: 58). Freud 
establishes during the interpretation of a dream what Weiss calls a "meaning-for 
the subject": "It is a meaning for him in the respect that he gives it: the meaning-
for him of something is what it means to him, not what anyone else might or 
would have to make of it" (1974: 64). 
Recollection vs. Construction: 
Fish's earliest objection to the Wolf-ManIs interpretation of his dream is to the 
"act of construction" that leads the patient to the "explanation" for one 
particularly significant detail: "Freud tells us that although the patient recalled 
the dream at a 'very early stage in the analysis,' its 'interpretation was a task that 
dragged on over several years' without notable success. The breakthrough, as it 
is reported, came in an instant and apparently without preparation: 'One day the 
patient began to continue with the interpretation of the dream. He thought that 
the part of the dream which said ... "suddenly the window opened of its own 
accord" was not completely explained.' Immediately and without explanation, 
the explanation came forth: 'it must mean: "my eyes suddenly opened." I was 
asleep ... and suddenly woke up, and as I woke up 1 saw something: the tree with 
the wolves." It is important to note that the patient does not say, 'Now I 
remember,' but rather, 'It must mean.' His is not an act of recollection, but of 











Fish objects to this interpretation on two counts: 
1. that it is constructed rather than remembered, thereby leaving room to 
question its consistency with the "true" meaning of the dream-report; 
and 
2. that the patient is "compelled" to this particular interpretation (among 
all those he might have hit on) not through his own efforts, but 
through the persuasive techniques of the analyst. 
Freud's theory of dreams itself renders the ftrst objection invalid since the 
criterion of "consistency with context" used to judge the interpretation of a poem 
as correct or incorrect does not apply to the subject's associations in dream 
analysis. Indeed, such acts of "construction" may be essential if the process of 
interpretation is going to lead to the source of the neuroses underlying the dream 
itself Further, they may issue either from the patient or from the physician, in the 
ftrst stage towards, rather than as substitutes for, the patient's recollection. Thus 
the physician "reconstructs what has been forgotten from the faulty texts of the 
[patient], from his dreams, associations, and repetitions, while the [patient], 
animated by the constructions suggested by the physician as hypotheses, 
remembers ... " (Habermas, 1974: 230) Most signiftcant of all, as Habermas 
makes clear, "only the patient's recollection decides the accuracy of the 
construction." Fish fails to grasp either the hypothetical nature of these 
constructions, or their role in the ongoing rather than static process of 
recollection. 
Fish also misses the signiftcance of what Lukacher calls the "ontological 
undecidability" of the Freudian constructed event, both in the interpretation of 
dreams and in the "recovery" of the "forgotten" traumatic events of early 
childhood. The most contentious construction in the Wolf-Man case is of course 
the "event" to which the interpretation of the ~lf-Man's dream leads, the 
"primal scene" (Lukacher, 1986: 21). Freud makes it clear from the outset of his 
case study that the construction of the primal scene is a "supposition": "If it was 











such unknown scene - one, that is, which had already been forgotten at the time 
of the dream - then it must have taken place very early." The task of analysis is 
that of "remembering that the relation of the object of interpretation to the real 
has been forgotten. The primal scene is always a scene that is 'unknown' 
(unbekannte) and 'forgotten' (vergessene)" (SE XVII: 33). 
For Lukacher, then, the "ontological undecidability" that Freud attains in the 
Wolf-Man case history places his theoretical effort here in close conjunction with 
the thought ofNietszche, Heidegger, Lacan and Derrida. For in constructing the 
primal scene, Lukacher writes, Freud constitutes an "event" that remains "outside 
the grasp of metaphysics"; and by insisting on its therapeutic power, Freud in 
effect reverses the conventional wisdom that valued the recollected event over 
the constructed event. Here, then, is Lukacher on the "primal scene": 
Metaphysics is the science of presence. The Freudian Begebenheit, 
however, can be grasped in the mode of neither presence nor absence. At 
the same time, the primal scene is the pre-existent trace underlying the 
possibility of the distinction between presence and absence, and between 
subject and object. It is the enabling mechanism that explains and 
describes, rather than determining or causing, the structure of the Wolf-
Man's experience. The primal scene explains the wolf dream but has not 
caused it and is not present in it (1986: 27). 
Lukacher's reading of the Freudian "primal scene" thus calls the event's 
relation to the Real into question in an entirely new way. He does not restrict 
"primal scene" to the conventional psychoanalytic understanding of the term: the 
child's witnessing ofa sexual act that subsequently plays a traumatic role in his 
or her psycho-sexual life. In Lukacher's understanding, the "primal scene" 
becomes an "intertextual event that displaces the notion of the event from the 
ground of ontology ... Rather than signifying the child's observation of sexual 
intercourse, the primal scene comes to signify an ontologically undecidable 
intertextual event that is situated in the differential space between historical 











interpretive free play" (1986: 24). Unlike Freud and Lukacher, however (and like 
the Wolf-Man himself), Stanley Fish remains uncomfortable with the 
"ontological undecidability" of the constructed event, the primal scene - in effect 
(and ironically enough), remaining firmly rooted, both here and in every facet of 
his reading of the case, in a metaphysics of pure presence. 
As far as Fish's second objection (against Freud's persuasive strategies) is 
concerned, Freud would hardly have stressed the method by which he "induced" 
the patient to speak had he considered it to be inconsistent with his theoretical 
aims. Neither can his reference to this exercise of "inexorable pressure" be 
shrugged off as an unfortunate but revealing verbal slip on the part of the author. 
On the contrary, Freud's reference to his analytical practice in this case would 
have been included precisely to emphasize the necessity for strong forces of 
persuasion to counteract the patient's unconscious forces of resistance to the 
analysis. Certainly Freud would have encouraged, perhaps even "compelled" or 
"persuaded" the patient to speak, for his task as an analyst, as he says in his 1915 
paper on "The Unconscious," is to help the patient "overcome certain resistances 
... those which, earlier, made the material concerned into something repressed by 
rejecting it from the conscious" (SE XIV: 166). 
But it is an "act of construction" par excellence on the part ofFish to suggest 
that Freud's persuasive methods were the content of the interpretation they 
produced. Nowhere in the WolfMan case history (or for that matter in Fish's 
response to it) is there any concrete evidence to suggest that the analogy between 
the window opening and the young boy awakening should have been attributed 
to the analyst rather than to the patient. As we know, Fish's objective is to prove 
that the WolfMan is nothing but a "piece oflanguage," the "perfect rhetorical 
artifact" - and it is in pursuit of this objective that here, and elsewhere, he 
effectively ignores the WolfMan's share in the construction of Freud's 
interpretation of him. In the process, he reduces the relation between them to the 











Certainly, as Whitney Davis recently suggested, we should see the "Wolf 
Man," the subject of Freud's case history, as a figure in Freud's narrative 
construction of him. Even his most intimate manifestations, such as his report of 
his childhood dream, come to us through Freud's transcription of them. But this 
does not eliminate the WolfMan's share in the production of that transcription. 
In Davis"terms, the WolfMan - Serge Pankejeffhimself - "made something 
Freud needed to complete himself as a subject at that point. And although that 
object necessarily became Freud's subjective object, it was distinguished from 
Freud's representation, the 'WolfMan' presented by the case history; it was a 
representation not written by Freud but rather by the WolfMan himself It was 
written into Freud. More exactly, these very terms - representation 'by' Freud or 
'by' the WolfMan - break down completely in certain domains; and it is this 
effective intersubjectivity which is of interest" (1995: 185). 
Fish is right, of course, Davis concludes, that the "WolfMan" is a "piece of 
language." But that language is not wholly Freud's - and it speaks of both 
subjects as "wolf men" in terms partly absorbed from the other: "It is a language 
forged between two subjects seeing and speaking with one another. They jointly 
created a new, intersubjective image out of their separate histories - a partial but 
nonetheless usable palimpsest of all the separate images from Freud's childhood 
picture book, family portrait, scientific education, and creative notation to the 
WolfMan's childhood picture book, family portrait, artistic education, and 
creative notation, all of which had been brought to, were evoked in, and were 
substantially reorganized in the history of their address, interpretation and 
response itself' (1995: 204/205). 
On Resistances and Fantasies: 
We now see that at the same time that Fish rejects the hypothesis of the 
unconscious, he betrays his underlying scepticism with regard to another major 
conception in psychoanalysis: namely, that of resistance. Fish is apparently 
unable to accept that "persuasion" is a necessary counterforce to the patient's 











dialectical process, the patient's resistance tends to force the analyst into an 
authoritarian metaphysical position" (1986: 30). As Lukacher goes on to point 
out, Freud succumbs to this fate not only in the Wolf-Man analysis, but, to one 
degree or another, in each of his well-known case histories. Unlike Fish, 
however, Lukacher is sensitive to the fact that the problem is an "analytic one in 
the largest sense of the term" - one that cannot be easily avoided, in other words, 
by anyone engaged in the process of psychoanalysis. In the case of Lac an, writes 
Lukacher, he suggested that it was 
all a question of timing or rhythm, of knowing or guessing when the 
patient is willing to acknowledge that even though the primal or 
childhood scene cannot be reproduced as recollection, it nevertheless has 
a 'truth' of its own. But if the patient is unwilling to depart from the 
notion of recollection as self-presence, and if the analyst either mistimes 
the construction or proposes it with an inappropriate degree of certainty, 
the analysis is bound to run into difficulties. The problem is an analytic 
one in the largest sense of the term, for it applies to the 'time of 
understanding' that one allows for any interpretation whatever. 
Psychoanalysis thus presents in very vivid terms the dilemma into which 
the modem critic is invariably coerced. The task of accounting for a 
textual event demands that the critic venture, whether intentionally or not, 
into a zone where 'truth' has become a differential notion that is 
constituted somewhere between pure construction and historicity" (1986: 
31). 
Indeed, in Habermas's view, the experience of "resistance" (and, by 
implication, the analytical difficulties that arise from it) constitute no less than 
the "starting point of psychoanalytic theory" (1968: 229) - a claim substantiated 
by Freud himself in a number of passages in which he draws attention to its 
theoretical importance, and to the way in which the patient's resistance 
determines and delineates the nature of the analyst'S task. Here, for example, is 












It is a long superseded idea, and one derived from superficial 
appearances, that the patient suffers from a sort of ignorance, and that if 
one removes this ignorance by giving him information (about the causal 
connection of his illness with his life, about his experiences in childhood, 
and so on) he is bound to recover. The pathological factor is not his 
ignorance in itself, but the root of this ignorance in his inner resistances; 
it was they that first called this ignorance into being, and they still 
maintain it now. The task of the treatment lies in combating these 
resistances. Informing the patient of what he does not know because he 
has repressed it is only one of the necessary preliminaries of the 
treatment. Ifknowledge about the unconscious were as important for the 
patient as people inexperienced in psychoanalysis imagine, listening to 
lectures or reading books would be enough to cure him. Such measures, 
however, have as much influence on the symptoms of nervous illness as a 
distribution of menu cards in a time of famine has upon hunger. The 
analogy goes even further than its immediate application; for informing 
the patient of his unconscious regularly results in an intensification of the 
conflict in him and an exacerbation of his troubles (SE XI: 225). 15 
Freud was acutely aware of the contradictions that his project - to discover 
and explain the mechanisms and effects of the unconscious - entailed. For he had 
to discover how to register unconscious mental processes without this 
registration being distorted by the effects of consciousness. Time and again 
throughout his professional career, Freud would return to the same fundamental 
problem with which he opens his paper on the unconscious in the 
"metapsychological papers" of 1915: "How are we to arrive at a knowledge of 
the unconscious? It is of course only as something conscious that we know it, 
after it has undergone transformation or translation into something conscious ... " 
(SE XIV: 166). And later, in "The Ego and the Id": "Now all our knowledge is 
invariably bound up with consciousness. We can come to know even the Ucs. 











when we say 'making something conscious'? How can that come about?" (SE 
XIX: 19). 
The fact of resistance is crucial in answering these questions, for it is only 
through the clarification and subsequent elimination of resistances that the effects 
of the unconscious can be brought to consciousness. Thus Freud goes on to say 
in the earlier paper that "psychoanalytic work shows us every day that translation 
of this kind [i.e., from unconscious to conscious] is possible. In order that this 
should come about, the person under analysis must overcome certain resistances 
- the same resistances as those which, earlier, made the material concerned into 
something repressed by rejecting it from the conscious" (SE XIV: 166). In "The 
Ego and the Id," Freud elaborates on this statement by suggesting that 
the reason why [unconscious] ideas cannot become conscious is that a 
certain force opposes them, that otherwise they could become conscious, 
and that it would then be apparent how little they differ from other 
elements which are admittedly psychical. The fact that in the technique of 
psychoanalysis a means has been found by which the opposing force can 
be removed and the ideas in question made conscious renders this theory 
irrefutable. The state in which the ideas existed before being made 
conscious is called repression, and maintaining it is perceived as 
resistance during the work of analysis (SE XIX: 14). 
Fish's criticisms reveal his own subjection to powerful forces of resistance -
resistance to what Freud has described as the "first shibboleth of 
psychoanalysis": the fact that the "essence" of the psychical cannot be situated in 
consciousness. His consequent denial of the unconscious entails his denial of the 
concept of resistance, and so the cycle perpetuates itself as, scattered through the 
remaining pages of his paper, we come up against a string of further associated 
rejections. 
Of the theory of distortion in dreams, Fish goes one step further than the 











another purposive strategy to sway the course of the analysis in whatever 
direction the analyst chooses: 
One critic has objected to [Freud's interpretation of the Wolf-Man's suc-
cession of dreams concerned with aggressive actions against his sister and 
governess] as one of Freud's "apparently arbitrary inversions," but it is far 
from arbitrary for it is in effect a precise and concise direction to both the 
patient and the reader, providing them with a method for dealing with the 
material they will soon meet, and telling them in advance what will result 
when the method is applied: "if you want to know what something - a 
dream, a piece of neurotic behavior - means, simply reverse its apparent 
significance, and what you will find is an attempt to preserve masculine 
self-esteem against the threat of passivity and femininity." The real 
seduction in this chapter... is the seduction not of the patient by his sister, 
but of both the patient and the reader by Freud, who will now be able to 
produce interpretative conclusions in the confidence that they will be 
accepted as the conclusions of an inevitable and independent logic (1986: 
936). 
The content of Freud's alleged "precise and concise direction to the reader" is 
(as we are not altogether surprised to discover by this time) another ofFish's 
"acts of construction" - the result of his own work of interpretation neatly 
disguised as a quotation from Freud. What it constitutes is indeed a "precise and 
concise direction to the reader" - but to Fish's reader not Freud's - to attribute his 
own interpretative conclusions to Freud in the interests of strengthening the logic 
of his argument. 
Fish's next rejection concerns the existence of fantasies. Fish objects to the 
uncertainty surrounding the evocation of the "primal scene" - the picture of 
copulation between the Wolf-Man's parents - since its status, as Freud himself 
admits, is that of an "assumption." At another point, Freud refers to the same 
"assumption" as an "unimpeachable fact," which prompts Fish to pronounce, in 











his case against Freud: "Everything happens so fast in this sequence that we may 
not notice that the 'unimpeachable face which anchors it is the assumption of the 
primal scene. In most arguments assumptions are what must be proved, but in 
this argument the assumption is offered as proof; and what supports it is not any 
independent fact, but the polemical fact that without the assumption the story 
Freud has so laboriously constructed falls apart" (1986: 938). Whether the 
"primal scene" ever actually took place or was simply a fantasy on the part of the 
patient is, as Freud stresses, of no significance. But it is significant for Fish, since 
his denial of the unconscious prevents his acknowledging that central to the very 
concept of the fantasy is the thesis that in the unconscious mind of the patient it 
is indistinguishable from fact, and must therefore be treated as such in the 
analytic situation. 
Fish's final claim is that the thesis of psychoanalysis (that one cannot get to 
the side of the unconscious) is "one and the same" with the thesis of his essay 
(that one cannot get to the side of rhetoric). In effect, this is a claim that repeats 
his analogy between the unconscious and "rhetorical objects," both of which are, 
in Fish's definition, constructs, removed from reality, and standing entirely 
without external support. It is a final and conclusive restatement of his denial of 
the unconscious. In the end, we find that Mitchell's assertion - "time and time 
again, one dissident after another has repudiated singly or wholesale all the main 
scientific tenets of psychoanalysis" - holds good for Fish as well. 
IV 
FREUD BASHING 
Fish's essay is characteristic of much recent criticism of Freud, the object of 
which is to discredit the institution and practice of psychoanalysis by attacking 
the figure of Freud himself, and his integrity as a man and a scientist. 
Representative of this continuing strand of anti-Freudian writing is Frederick 











Books in 1993, and in which he reviews four recent "revisionist" studies on 
Freud: James Rice's Freud's Russia: National Identity in the Evolution of 
Psychoanalysis, Lakoff and Coyne's Father Knows Best: The Use and Abuse of 
Power in Freud's Case of 'Dora', Allen Esterson's Seductive Mirage: An 
Exploration of the Work of Sigmund Freud, and John Kerr's A Most Dangerous 
Method: The Story of Jung, Freud, and Sabina Spielrein. 16 
In this by now widely read and much quoted article, a deeply personal attack 
on Freud is used in an effort to prove (in the words of the author himself) that his 
"theories of personality and neurosis - derived as they were from misleading 
precedents, vacuous pseudophysical metaphors, and a long concatenation of 
mistaken inferences that couldn't be subjected to empirical review - amount to 
castles in the air" (55). To give a sense of how this new spate of criticism 
operates (and how it relates to the paper we've been discussing), let us dwell for 
a moment on Crews' article, before returning to Stanley Fish and the WolfMan. 
Crews opens his article with a description of the various different fronts upon 
which recent criticism of Freud has been operating. First, there is the critical 
school which, he says, has now "proved" that psychoanalysis is no good as a 
therapy - that it is little more than an "indifferently successful and vastly 
inefficient method of removing neurotic symptoms," a form of "extended 
meditation" which produces a good many more "converts" than "cures" (55). 
Then there is the school (the father of whom is Adolf Griinbaum in The 
Foundations of Psychoanalysis) which has effectively dismissed psychoanalysis 
as a scientifically reputable theory: "Without significant experimental or 
epidemiological support for any of its notions," Crews reports, "psychoanalysis 
has simply been left behind by mainstream psychological research" (55). 
Taking for granted the reader's blind assent to these two views as already 
firmly established and "no longer in serious dispute," Crews devotes the rest of 
his discussion to a personal attack on the figure of Freud himself - and, 
principally, his "self-description" as a "fearless explorer, a solver of deep 











therapeutic outcomes." According to Crews, the views of a "rapidly growing" 
band of independent scholars (the works of four of whom are under review in 
Crews' article), clearly establish that Freud was none of these things. Though he 
may have been "highly cultivated, sophisticated and endowed with extraordinary 
literary power, sardonic wit, and charm," Crews declares, he was also "quite 
lacking in the empirical and ethical scruples that we would hope to find in any 
responsible scientist, to say nothing ofa major one" (55). 
This, Crews claims, is the collective view of a whole new school of criticism, 
including the four authors under review in his article. But it is clear from the start 
that Crews is less concerned with the business of book reviewing, than with 
marshalling evidence to dismantle what he grudgingly describes at one point as 
the "Freud legend" - a demolition job he pursues with the same "blind, 
combative stubbornness" he attributes, in the course of his argument, to Freud. 
Indeed, so unrelenting is his adherence to this task, and so predictable its every 
outcome, that it is only with the help ofliberal doses of his own brand of 
sardonic wit that Crews can keep the interest of his reader at all. 
Thus Freud is described, in the course of Crews' essay, as "willful," 
"opportunistic," "blind," "stubborn" and "devious"; as "stooping to low tricks" in 
defence of his general vision - a "saturnine self-dramatizer" given to "grotesque" 
diagnoses and a "cavalier" approach to clinical sessions. "Indifferent" as he was 
to his patients' sufferings, Crews tells us, Freud's motivations were dictated 
entirely by his own "immediate self-interest." He was "guileful," "obtuse," and 
"lacking in equanimity," and it was characteristic of his conduct that 
"dishonesty" and "cowardice" would at all times playa larger role than 
"rationality. " 
One can only marvel at the number of derogatory epithets Crews manages to 
summon in the space of a single article. When it comes to the question,. of 
evidence for this thinly disguised exercise in character assassination, however, 
Crews resorts mainly to tabloid-style anecdotes, the most "shocking" of which 











the other quite speculative", both drawn from John Kerr's A Most Dangerous 
Method, and which Kerr regards as having crucially affected Freud's relations 
with lung (64). As it turns out, the only story directly concerning Freud is the 
"speculative" one, in which it is alleged that Freud may have had a sexual 
relationship with his sister-in-law - a story which even Crews admits "should not 
affect our picture of Freud unless it is borne out by further research." Why then 
does he refer to it at all? And why does he dwell at such length on the other 
"shocking" tale in which Freud was not involved - the "better-established case of 
Sabina Spielrein's affair with lung" - if not in the hope that, in a moment of 
inattention, the story of lung's sexual "indiscretions" might somehow become 
associated in our minds with Freud. Indeed, both here, and elsewhere in Crews' 
article, we find ourselves in the presence of exactly the kind of "devious 
rhetorical maneuver" Crews accuses Freud of using in defence of his vision, and 
with which, he implies, Freud habitually discredited his arguments (55). 
Like Stanley Fish, then, Crews is a sophisticated rhetorician, but like Fish 
again, in the end he finds little substantial material evidence for the "unknown," 
"darker" but "far more interesting than the canonical" Freud he promises to 
reveal. This is why he cannot disguise his disappointment when he finds that 
three of the four "revisionist" studies he chooses for his review tum out to be 
quite balanced in their view of Freud - complimentary, even, despite some 
critical views. Thus Crews complains that only Esterson's book (Seductive 
Mirage) takes Freud's "incompetence" as its central theme while, in varying 
degrees, the others all convey "mixed feelings" about Freud's stature and the 
legitimacy of psychoanalytic claims. Lakoffand Coyne's study of the Dora case 
history, Father Knows Best, for example, is judged "insufficiently skeptical" 
toward Freud himself. While, in Crews' opinion, the authors rightly criticize 
Freud for ignoring Dora's "real-life predicaments" in favour ofa too narrow 
focus on her "internal conflicts," at the same time they "rashly concede" the 
accuracy of what he asserted about those conflicts: Thus they conclude that there 
is "no clear reason to dispute any of Freud's interpretations of the material." 
Furthermore, in their judgement, Freud is "precisely on target with every 











"often displays a remarkably subtle ear for language as his patients use it," 
presumably in this case as well as in others. Crews finds it "odd" that such 
complimentary views should be found in a book that is also at times critical, but 
what is even more odd is that he should have chosen such a book as part of the 
evidential base for his demolition job on Freud, and his recent conclusion (in a 
new collection of critical essays entitled Unauthorized Freud) that 
psychoanalysis was "built entirely of straw" (1998: ix). 
Where John Kerr's A Most Dangerous Method is concerned, when he is 
critical of Freud, his book constitutes, for Crews, an "invaluable corrective to 
received ideas about the history of psychoanalysis," a "penetrating discussion" 
and a "powerful account" of psychoanalysis and its discontents. When Kerr 
balances these criticisms with more complimentary views, however - when, for 
example he refers to Freud as a "systematic thinker of the first rank," or when he 
characterizes the Rat Man case as "a stunning demonstration of the method and a 
matchless psychological study in its own right," - he becomes, in Crews' eyes, 
both "inconsistent" and "unhelpful." 
In the same way, when Crews realizes that he has failed, by the end of his 
lengthy account of James L. Rice's study, Freud's Russia (a substantial portion 
of which is devoted to a discussion of the WolfMan case history), to come up 
with any substantial condemnation within its pages, either of Freud or of 
psychoanalysis in general, he refers us instead to another writer, one who is not 
under review at the time, but whose point of view suits Crews' argument better. 
This is Frank Sulloway's "important" 1991 article ("Reassessing Freud's Case 
Histories: the Social Construction of Psychoanalysis"), which reviews not only 
one, but all of the major case histories, and which infers (so Crews informs us) 
that together they compose "a uniform picture of forced interpretation, 
indifferent or negative therapeutic results, and an opportunistic approach to 
truth" (57). Predictably, we are never referred to the many recent discussions-
by writers such as Lisa Appignanesi, Ronald Clark, John Forrester, Sander 
Gilman, nse Gubrich-Simitis, Patrick Mahony, William 1. McGrath, and Carl 











It is this consistent and even brazenly partisan nature of Crews' argument, 
both in this essay and elsewhere, which lends a particular irony to his levelling 
the same charge against Freud - when he declares, for example, that Freud was 
largely motivated by his own "immediate self-interest," or, in a different 
formulation, when he asks whether Freud's "powers of observation and analysis 
ever functioned with sufficient independence from his wishes" (56). Indeed, this 
turns out to be Crews' principal objection to psychoanalysis in his words, the 
"paramount issue confronting Freud studies today" - and the source of the deep 
mistrust so representative of the school of critics he both supports and represents. 
His principal objection, in other words, is to the power of the psychoanalyst and 
the relationship of suggestion that he exerts over the patient. And it is this power, 
he suggests, that contaminates the so-called evidence of analytic sessions by 
rendering it the product of the analyst's rather than the patient's imagination. 
This, then, is the scenario Crews evokes in the earlier Skeptical Engagements 
(1986), when he writes that, so far as we can tell, 
the only mind [Freud] laid bare for us was his own. Once we have fully 
grasped that point, we can begin inquiring how such a mind - rich in 
perverse imaginings and in the multiplying of shadowy concepts, 
grandiose in its dynastic ambition, atavistic in its affinities with outmoded 
science, and fiercely stubborn in its resistance to rational criticism - could 
ever have commanded our blind assent (86). 
And so we see that nothing has changed. We are back in the familiar terrain of 
Stanley Fish's paper, and the long critical tradition it supports. 
The "only game in town" ... 
As for Fish himself, he of course is not a psychoanalyst. He is a literary critic, 
one so finely trained in the art of literary interpretation that he has been moved to 
declare that, where critical activity is concerned, "like it or not, interpretation is 











not embedded in texts, but depend entirely on the interpretative activities of the 
reader; that texts are "unstable entities" whose meanings are determined by, and 
"develop in a dynamic relationship with the reader's expectations, projections, 
conclusions, judgments and assumptions ... " (1980: 2). In this formulation, "the 
reader's response is not to the meaning, it is the meaning ... "; or, in other words, 
"linguistic and textual facts, rather than being the objects of interpretation, are its 
products" (1980: 3). 
According to Fish's theory, the reader's interpretations are shaped by the 
"interpretive community" of which he is a member. Members of the same 
"interpretive community" will, in Fish's view, share the same sets of 
assumptions, the same sets of "interpretive strategies" and, consequently, the 
same "ways of reading." "In other words, there is no single way of reading that is 
correct or natural, only 'ways of reading' that are extensions of community 
perspectives." It follows, for Fish, that "the business of criticism is noLo to 
determine a correct way of reading but to determine from which of a number of 
possible perspectives reading will proceed" (1980: 16). 
Nowhere in Fish's theory of reading does he account for the possibility that 
among those "possible perspectives" from which reading may proceed, there will 
be some that are appropriate to the text in question and some that are not This 
weakness in his theoretical position shows up in practice in his reading of the 
WolfMan case history, for he reads it from a perspective of consciousness, a 
perspective totally inappropriate to it. 
Fish argues for a model of critical activity he describes as a model of 
"persuasion," in which "prejudicial or perspectival perception is all there is, and 
the question is [simply] from which of a number of equally interested 
perspectives will the text be constituted" (1980: 366). The "whole of critical 
activity," argues Fish, "is an attempt on the part of one party to alter the beliefs 
of another so that the evidence cited by the first will be seen as evidence by the 
second." The model of critical activity Fish opposes in this argument is, as he 











apart from any particular belief is brought in to judge between competing beliefs, 
or, as we will call them in literary studies, interpretations. This is a model 
derived from an analogy to the procedures oflogic and scientific inquiry, and 
basically it is a model of demonstration in which interpretations are either 
confirmed or dis-confirmed by the facts that are independently specified" (1980: 
365). 
The business ofthis essay is not to point out the serious limitations ofFish's 
idea of what constitutes "criticism" in the field ofliterary studies. 18 For the 
moment, the theoretical argument drawn up by Fish interests me only to the 
extent that his enthusiasm for the activity of interpretation and for its associated 
model of "persuasion" over that of "demonstration" has led him to superimpose 
the former model on the texts of Sigmund Freud, and to see the whole of 
psychoanalysis, quite unproblematically, as just another form of "interpretation." 
Habermas makes the pertinent observation that although psychoanalysis gives 
the appearance of a special form of "interpretation," it is in fact something more: 
Initially, psychoanalysis appears only as a special form of interpretation. 
It provides theoretical perspectives and technical rules for the interpreta-
tion of symbolic structures. Freud always patterned the interpretation of 
dreams after the hermeneutic model of philological research. Occa-
sionally he compares it to the translation of a foreign author: of a text by 
Livy, for example. But the interpretive effort of the analyst distinguishes 
itself from that of the philologist not only through the crystallization of a 
special object domain. It requires a specifically expanded hermeneutics, 
one that, in contrast to the usual method of interpretation in the cultural 
sciences, takes into account a new dimension (Habermas, 1968: 215). 
What ultimately shapes this "new dimension" in the interpretative efforts of 
the analyst is the unconscious itself. Indeed, it must ultimately shape all 
interpretative operations, for as soon as it is perceived not as a "second 











own mechanisms and specific "energy," eternally present and of which 
consciousness is simply an added "quality," then even the interpretative 
possibilities of the very language we speak must be expanded to take it into 
account Thus Freud has remarked: "In our science as in the others the problem 
is the same: Behind the attributes (qualities) of the object under examination 
which are presented directly to our perception, we have to discover something 
else which is more independent of the particular receptive capacity of our sense 
organs and which approximates more closely to what may be supposed to be the 
real state of affairs" ("An Outline of Psycho-analysis", SE XXIII: 196). Stanley 
Fish would do well to take this "new dimension" into account in any further 












1. See, for instance, Jean Laplanche's essay, written in collaboration with 
l-B. Pontalis, on "Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality," The 
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 49 (1968) and the chapter on 
deferred action, "Sexuality and the Vital Order in Psychical Conflict," 
in his own Life and Death in Psychoanalysis. See also Brooks' reading 
of the case in light of narrative theory in Reading for the Plot, pp. 264-
85, and Jonathan Culler's comments on Nachtraglichkeit in The Pursuit 
of Signs: Semiotics Literature, Deconstruction, pp. 179-81. On 
Strachey's English translation of the tenn itself ("deferred action"), 
note Lis Moller's suggestion that this is an insufficient and even 
misleading translation of the Gennan tenn Nachtraglichkeit. 
Nachtraglich, as she points out, means "supplementary," "additional," 
"later," "subsequent." The German tenn thus emphasizes that 
something new -- a "supplement" -- is brought in, an important sense 
not conveyed in Strachey's translation (Moller, 1991: 149). 
On the theoretical interest of the case for psychoanalysts, note 
too that it is from Freud's discussion, in this case, of the mechanism of 
Verwerfung (foreclosure, repudiation), as distinct from the mechanism 
of Verdrangung (repression) that Lacan derives his concept of 
forclusion, which is essential to his understanding of the structural 
differences between psychosis and neurosis. For Lacan's theory of 
foreclosure, see "On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment 
of Psychosis" (1957-58). See also his discussion ofthe case of the Wolf 
Man in "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in 
Psychoanalysis" (1953). Both papers are reprinted in Lacan, 1977. 
2. See Leo Bersani's comment on the book as re-printed on the back 
cover: "Whitney Davis' emphasis on the visual dimension of the Wolf-
Man case results in a strikingly original reading of a central Freudian 
work. In this important study, Freud becomes an exemplary instance of 
the production of sexuality through representation, its emergence from 
verbal and visual exchanges between human subjects." 
3. Davis goes on to point out that the case history of the WolfMan is, of 
course, not the only place in Freud's work and writing where this idea 
was developed: "Freud's 'Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality', for 
example, presents the elements ofa general sexology, tied in tum to the 
general psychology presented in Die Traumdeuting and elsewhere, 
which provided a basis for his work with and published discussion of 
the WolfMan. Indeed, we sometimes associate the thesis of primordial 
human 'bisexuality,' or undifferentiated sexual potential, including 
'homosexual' potential, with Freudianism as such. The emphasis 
should be placed here on the notion of erotic potentiality. Although 
other observers had identified 'bisexual' attitudes and practices in 
human emotional and social life, and specifically homoerotic 











female eroticism, Freud formulated the most complete account of the 
way in which the mind can be 'predisposed' or (to use one of the 
languages he deployed) of the way in which it must be 'statically 
charged' to become 'homosexual' without ever manifesting any overtly 
homoerotic attitude, practice, or attachment whatsoever. In addition, he 
provided an account of the actual realization of erotic potential - of the 
development or transfer, for example, from the primordial bisexual 
potentiality to an individual homoerotic (or any other sexually specific) 
practice" (1995: xviii-xix). 
4. Similarly, Sulloway suggests that the Rat Man case history is 
"characterized by exaggerated assertions regarding its therapeutic 
outcome," and describes Freud's claim to have cured his patient in this 
case, and brought about the "complete restoration of his personality" as 
"highly implausible on several grounds" (257). Freud's "exaggerated 
claims" in this case, Sulloway concludes, were prompted not by any 
actual success he may have had with it, but by his desire to protect and 
promote the nascent psychoanalytic movement (258). Here again, in 
other words, Freud is represented as an opportunist and, in effect, a liar. 
5. Note the complex publication history of this paper, which has received 
extensive exposure since the 1986 conference at which it was first 
delivered. After its initial publication in the Times Literary Supplement 
in August 1986, it was included in a collection of papers presented at 
the colloquium, and published under the title The Linguistics of Writing 
- Arguments Between Language and Literature, edited by Nigel F abb, 
Derek Attridge, Alan Durant and Colin MacCabe (Manchester: 
Manchester UP, 1987). An expanded version was then published in a 
book version of a special issue of the journal Critical Inquiry as 
"Withholding the Missing Portion: Psychoanalysis and Rhetoric," in 
Francoise Meltzer, ed., The Trials of Psychoanalysis (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 183-210 - although 
Fish's paper did not appear in the special issue of Critical Inquiry 
(Winter 1987, vol. 13, no. 2). A further version, with the same title as 
the latter, but with some variations, appeared in Fish's own collection 
of papers in Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the 
Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Most recently, 
an abridged version of the paper has appeared in Crews, 1999, under 
the title, "The Primal Scene of Persuasion" (pp. 186-199). 
All page references to Fish's article in this chapter will be to the 
TLS version, and will appear in the text. 
6. See Crews, 1998, p. 186. Here he suggests the influential nature of 
Fish's 1986 paper, citing the following works as examples of literary 
critical "exercises" in which, like Fish, the authors have succeeded in 
tracing "just how brilliantly Freud manipulated his readers at every 
juncture": Wilcocks, Robert. Maelzel's Chess Player: Sigmund Freud 
and the Rhetoric of Deceit (Lanham, MD: Rowrnan & Littlefield: 











Princeton University Press, 1994); Farrell, John. Freud's Paranoid 
Quest: Psychoanalysis and Modern Suspicion (New York: New York 
University Press, 1996). 
7. F or further references to the "huge literature focusing on the issues of 
evidence and testability," see Fish's list in The Linguistics oj Writing -
Arguments Between Language and Literature: 171-2 n. 
8. See Chapter One, "Versions of Freud", in which I point out the same 
fundamental objection in Sebastiano Timpanards reference to the 
"captious and sophistical method, resistant to any verification, quick to 
force interpretations to secure preordained proofs, employed by Freud 
and Freudians in their explanations of slips, dreams and neurotic 
symptoms/' in The Freudian Slip (London: New Left Books, 1976), 14. 
I also mention that historically - and prior to the work of the French 
women's liberation group Psychanalyse et Politique - feminists have 
rooted their objections in similar ground. For a comprehensive survey 
of, and response to, this tradition, see Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis 
and Feminism (London: Penguin, 1974). One of the objectives of 
Mitchell's text is to defend psychoanalysis against this claim, and to 
show that because those feminists in opposition to Freud try to discuss 
his concept of femininity outside the framework of psychoanalysis, 
their objections, and even their tributes, cannot be made to stand up. 
She also reveals that their rejection of the scientific status of 
psychoanalysis would be more accurately described as a rejection of its 
two most crucial discoveries: the unconscious and infantile sexuality. 
I am not persuaded by Fish's attempts to dissolve this contradiction in 
the final section of his ~y declaring that no one can get to the side 
of rhetoric, that "being persuasive, assuming the stance of a rhetorician, 
is not something you can choose to avoid" - a stance that in the end 
neither renders his interpretative efforts more convincing, nor 
vindicates his arguments. The rest of this paper will be dedicated to 
demonstrating why. 
10. For further discussion of methodological approaches to the analysis of 
infantile neuroses, see Sigmund Freud, "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-
year-old Boy," (SE X: 3-4). 
11. On the question of the part played by interpretation in Freud's case 
histories, Lukacher makes an interesting point at no stage considered by 
Fish. This he does by locating any problems that may have arisen from 
the part played by interpretation in Freud's methodology - or his "mode 
of intervention" - rather than in his constructions themselves. While he 
notes what he describes as psychoanalysis's evident compulsion 
repeatedly to "proclaim its capacity to go beyond interpretation and 
beyond conviction," he also suggests that the virtue of Freud is that 
even though he makes such claims, the honesty with which he presents 
his case histories invariably undermines the very ground on which 











so much [Freud's] constructions that are at fault as it is his mode of 
intervention and the alienation which that mode creates in his patients. 
It is Freud's timing rather than his technique of construction that brings 
the analysis to grief" (Lukacher, 1986: 30) 
12. For an expansive and informed discussion of the case's theoretical 
interest in Freud's work as a whole, see "Construction in the Case of 
the WolfMan" in Moller, 1991. Unlike Fish (and his followers), Moller 
takes a sympathetic view of what she sees as numerous "moments of 
crisis" in Freud's writing - moments, that is, where Freud pushes his 
inquiry to the point where he encounters something he cannot explain, 
or that he can only explain by potentially overturning previous 
conclusions, or calling into question the theoretical foundation of his 
argument. The dominant line of argument in Freud's writing is thus 
frequently punctuated with problems and questions. If we concentrate 
on these moments, Moller argues, we are forced to reconsider the 
traditional conception of a "Freudian reading" and reassess our 
received notions of just what kind of reader Freud was. 
13. For further evidence ofFish's manipulative rhetorical maneuvering in 
this paper, see Iohn Forrester's discussion ofFish's paper in Forrester, 
1997, Ch. 6: 208-48. Here he establishes convincingly that Fish's 
source for the striking remark with which he both opens and concludes 
his paper ("This man is a Jewish swindler, he wants to use me from 
behind and shit on my head."), was Freud rather than the WolfMan 
himself(as he leads us to believe). The remark in question is the Wolf 
Man's alleged "report" of what he thought to himself shortly after he 
met Freud for the first time. The absence of a footnote for it in Fish's 
text allows the reader to infer that, given the construction ofFish's 
sentences, he does have direct evidence from the WolfMan that this is 
what he thought. Yet Forrester's painstaking investigation of all 
possible sources for this remark reveals that it must have come not 
from the WolfMan, but from a letter dated 13 February 1910 from 
Freud to Sandor Ferenczi, in a paragraph which runs as follows: 
On the whole I am only a machine for making money and have 
been working up a sweat for the last few weeks. A rich young 
Russian, whom I took on because of compulsive tendencies, 
admitted the following transferences to me after the first session: 
Iewish swindler, he would like to use me from behind and shit on 
my head. At the age of six he experienced his first symptom cursing 
against God: pig, dog, etc. When he saw three piles of faeces on the 
street he became uncomfortable because of the Holy Trinity and 
anxiously sought a fourth in order to destroy the association. 
What Fish represents as a patient's independent judgement of 
psychoanalysis thus turns out to be a negative transference, the source 
for which was Freud himself, and not the WolfMan, as Fish implies 











Fish's argument that he detach these words from Freud's pen and 
detach them from the WolfMan's analysis altogether, so as to convert 
them into an independent judgement upon Freud and the analysis. To 
do so, Fish has to dissemble the source from which the remark comes -
it comes from Freud, not direct from the WolfMan - and detach the 
phrase concerning Freud from the anal and pious childhood material 
which immediately follows in the original letter and with which it is, 
for Freud, the reporter of these words, intimately connected. Let us 
leave to one side - for good - the question of whether Fish manages to 
extricate himself entirely, as he so wished the WolfMan to have once 
been free, from the clutches of the Jewish swindler and his shit. The 
point is that Fish got it wrong: the judgement that Freud is a Jewish 
swindler who will cover his patients and his reader in shit is just as 
much a part of Freud's rhetoric as any other passage Fish quotes. If the 
WolfMan got it right, it is courtesy of Freud. The accusation that Freud 
used nothing but rhetoric is, in the nature of such an accusation, bound 
to cut both ways" (1997: 218). 
14. For an elaboration of this point, see Louis Althusser, "Freud and 
Lacan," in Essays in Ideology (London, Verso 1984). Althusser 
suggests that one of the difficulties facing any attempt to understand 
and assess Freud's work today is to cross the "vast space of ideological 
prejudice" that divides us from Freud through the reduction of his 
"revolutionary discovery" of the unconscious to disciplines essentially 
foreign to it - including that of psychology itself: "Western reason ... 
will only agree to conclude a pact of peaceful existence with 
psychoanalysis after years of non-recognition, contempt and insults ... 
on condition of annexing it to its own sciences and myths ... " (186). 
This history of mythologization has had far-reaching effects on the 
reception of Freud's ideas. First, it has resulted in a displacement of the 
object of psychoanalysis from what analytical technique deals with (the 
unconscious) to analytical practice, or the "cure" itself. Second, it has 
prevented the successful transferral from a form of critical attention 
dominated by a problematic of consciousness to one that starts from a 
recognition of the primary role played by the unconscious. Hence, a 
form of criticism has arisen whose focus is misdirected, and is based on 
preconceptions inimical to an adequate response to Freud's ideas. 
For what amounts, in my view, to an outstanding recent corrective 
to this reductive critical tradition, once again see Forrester, 1997 - and 
particularly Chapters Five and Six. Chapter Five, "A Whole Climate of 
Opinion", is devoted to a chronicling of the historiography of 
psychoanalysis in the twentieth century, in which Forrester sets out to 
show that what he calls "the many faces of Freud's offspring, 
sometimes working together, sometimes in tension or in conflict," 
require a "more subtle history" than we have yet been offered (9). 
Chapter Six, "Dispatches from the Freud Wars," confronts head on a 
range of offensives in the recent cultural interrogation of "the Freud 
question", exploring the terrain on which these critiques are played out. 
There is, in the history of psychoanalysis, Forrester suggests, a constant 










Freudiana, Freud's writings, Freud's theories, classical psychoanalytic 
theory, orthodox psychoanalytic practice, psychoanalysis as a cultural 
movement, therapy as a professional practice - which is made easy by a 
strange fact: everyone knows, from a very young age, what "Freud" 
said and what "Freud" stands for. Indeed, he goes on, there is a 
different piece of cultural history to be written in this domain, the 
domain of Freud as a "received idea" of the twentieth century: "Not 
only does everyone know what Freud wrote and what everything 
Freudian "really means," everyone also knows what all the fuss is 
really about." As such, Forrester concludes, the process of writing 
about Freud must always be a process of "un educating" one's readers: 
"I stand on common ground with some of Freud's critics on this issue, 
since at least some of them believe in reading and thinking closely 
about his work and its historical context. But, unlike these critics, it is 
my wager that the more one knows about Freud - the more one has 
unlearned what one was culturally hard-wired to know about him - the 
more interesting and surprising and thought-provoking he becomes. 
The final answer to Freud's critics is that many intelligent men and 
women - and maybe even children - have recognized and continue to 
recognize this" (11112). 
15. See Habermas, 1974: "The starting point of psychoanalytic theory is 
the experience of resistance, that is the blocking force that stands in the 
way of the free and public communication of repressed contents. The 
analytic process of making conscious reveals itself as a process of 
reflection in that it is not only a process on the cognitive level but also 
dissolves resistances on the affective level. The dogmatic limitation of 
false consciousness consists not only in that lack of specific 
information but in its specific inaccessibility. It is not only a cognitive 
deficiency; for the deficiency is fixated by habitualized standards on the 
basis of affective attitudes. That is why the mere communication of 
information and the labelling of resistances have no therapeutic effect" 
(229, my emphasis). This thesis - that psychoanalysis belongs to the 
category of "self-reflection" - can be demonstrated on the basis of a 
number of Freud's papers on analytic technique, namely: '''Wild' 
Psychoanalysis" (SE XI), "Remembering, Repeating and Working 
Through" (SE XII), "Lines of Advance in Psychoanalytic Therapy" (SE 
XVII), "Constructions in Analysis" and "Analysis Terminable and 
Interminable" (SE XXIII). 
16. Ironically, Frederick Crews began as an adherent of Freud, one of those 
"old fashioned" psychoanalytic critics who, typically, treated the work 
of art as a window to the artist's tormented soul. In what Maud 
EHmann describes as a "notorious" analysis of Joseph Conrad's Heart 
of Darkness (1994: 2), for example, he interprets Marlow's pilgrimage 
to central Africa as a "journey into the maternal body," citing as 
evidence the matted vegetation of the wilderness '''that seemed to draw 
[Kurtz] to its pitiless breast by the awakening of forgotten and brutal 
instincts, by the memory of gratified and monstrous passions'." Kurtz, 











is the son who interrupts the primal scene, the "unspeakable rites" of 
parental intercourse (Joseph Conrad: Heart of Darkness, ed. Robert 
Kimbrough (New York: W.W Notron, 1963), pp. 67 and 51, cited in 
Frederick Crews, "Conrad's Uneasiness", in Out of My System: 
Psychoanalysis, Ideology and Critical Method (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1975). In what seems to me an astute perception, 
EHmann suggests that Crews has "talked himself out of psychoanalysis 
precisely by applying it too heavy-handedly" (since he now repudiates 
psychoanalytic criticism as a whole) (1994: 2). 
17. This is the list invoked by Crews himself in (Unauthorized Freud, 
1998) of writers who have "enriched our understanding of Freud 
without mounting a challenge to psychoanalysis itself' - the list whose 
contribution to our present understanding of Freud he once again denies 
by excluding any of their work from his collection. 
18. For a characteristically trenchant analysis of some of these limitations, 
see Terry Eagleton'S review ofFish's ProfeSSional Correctness: 












Freud1s critics have often suggested that his work would have been more 
successful had it embodied their notions of scientific discourse; but there is 
evidence to suggest that the enabling dynamic of Freud IS thought was the result 
of a constant transgression of the boundaries of these notions as instituted by the 
scientific community during his lifetime. For all his desire that psychoanalysis be 
accorded the resonance and prestige of a true science along with all the others -
"Psychoanalysis is a method of research, an impartial instrument, like the 
infinitesimal calculus ... II ("Civilization and its Discontents", SE XXI: 36) - Freud 
never failed to respond to his material with the full resources of a supremely 
creative imagination. Indeed, there are many examples of this creative tension 
scattered throughout his work. In the earliest case histories of the Studies on 
Hysteria (1893-1895) he writes, 
I have not always been a psychotherapist. Like other neuro-pathologists, I 
was trained to employ local diagnoses and electro-prognosis, and it still 
strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should read like 
short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of 
science ... (SE II: 160). 
The problem, Freud believed - and in this he consoled himself - lay not in any 
preference of his own for the literary or fictional mode of writing so much as in 











The fact is that local diagnosis and electrical reactions lead nowhere in 
the study of hysteria, whereas a detailed description of mental processes 
such as we are accustomed to find in the works of imaginative writers 
enables me, with the use of a few psychological formulas, to obtain at 
least some kind of insight into the course of that affection (SE II: 160-
161). 
In the Dora case history, Freud was prepared to acknowledge that his 
narrative was such that many would find it possible, and would take it upon 
themselves, to read it as a roman a clef, "designed for their private delectation", 
rather than a serious contribution to the psycho-pathology of the neuroses (SE 
VII: 9). Indeed, as Steven Marcus has shown, Freud's prophecy was not to go 
unfulfilled. In his reading of the memoirs of Dr. Daniel Paul Schreber, as we 
have already seen, Freud made a further confession of his convictions regarding 
the thin line dividing fact from fiction, truth from delusion (SE XII: 79); and in a 
letter to Hermann Struck in 1914, Freud acknowledged his essay on da Vinci to 
be "partly fiction" (Freud, E., 1961: 312). He also admitted, in the essay itself, 
that as a piece of writing it might easily be classified as a "psycho-analytic 
novel": 
In the preceding chapters I have shown what justification can be found 
for giving this picture of Leonardo's course of development - for 
proposing these subdivisions of his life and for explaining his vacillation 
between art and science in this way. If in making these statements I have 
provoked the criticism, even from friends of psycho-analysis and from 
those who are expert in it, that I have merely written a psycho-analytic 
novel, I shall reply that I am far from over-estimating the certainty of 
these results. Like others I have succumbed to the attraction of this great 
and mysterious man, in whose nature one seems to detect powerful 
instinctual passions which can nevertheless only express themselves in so 
remarkably subdued a manner ("Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his 











It is only fitting that the scientific investigator who chose for his objects of 
research the stuff of dreams, desires and fantasies - those very fictions by which 
we constitute ourselves as human subjects - should have been one of the first to 
refuse, however tentatively, the margins between literature and the more 
important territory of "truth" traditionally set aside as the domain of science. It 
was Barthes who said that "what the human sciences are discovering today, in 
whatever field it may be, sociological, psychological, psychiatric, linguistic, &c., 
literature has always known ... " - but it might just as well have been Freud. 
"Science has only a few apodeictic propositions in its catechism: the rest are 
assertions promoted by it to some particular degree of probability," he wrote. "It 
is actually a sign of a scientific mode of thought to find satisfaction in these 
approximations to certainty and to be able to pursue constructive work further in 
spite of the absence of final confirmation" (SE XV: 51). 
Pace his critics, Freud himself was well aware of the ambiguous textual status 
of much of his own writing, which hovered uneasily, he seemed to feel, on the 
borders between literature and science. Yet was it not precisely this uneasy 
position which enabled him to open up that "other place," that whole new 
dimension of intellectual inquiry, the unconscious? "Only the real, rare, true 
scientific minds can endure doubt, which is attached to all knowledge," he once 
said to Marie Bonaparte (cited in Mahony, 1987: 77). Freud's commitment 
finally was a commitment to scepticism - a scepticism which, in refusing the 
usual boundaries of science, made it possible to transcend them and explore a 
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